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WELCOME AND KEYNOTE REMARKS
Introduction:
Hon. Professor Sir Robin Jacob (ret.), University College London (London, UK).
Prof. Patricia Kuszler, Vice Dean and Director, Health Law. University of Washington
School of Law (Seattle, WA, 7 USA).
Prof. Graham Russell, Nuffield Department of Orthopaedics, Rheumatology and
Musculoskeletal Sciences (NDORMS), Oxford University (Oxford, UK).
Prof. Mary-Claire King, Genome Sciences and of Medicine (Medical Genetics), University
of Washington (Seattle, WA, USA).
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: Good morning. My name is Toshiko Takenaka. I'm a
professor at the University of Washington as well as was co-director of Center for Advanced Study
and Research on intellectual property. I retired from directorship. I was a director 22 years. I feel
it's a time to focus more on research and writing so therefore at this doctor conference I will be
learning on behalf of University of Washington, but I am very excited with this opportunity
because this will be a great success and there was such an important topic for innovation.
Usually, you know, my science background is science, computer science, and this is rather
an important area, but because of my partner, Professor Sir Robin Jacob, we are able to host a list
of very distinguished speakers from pharma industry as well as life science industry.
So without any delay, I would like to ask Professor Sir Robin Jacob.
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[Applause]
SIR ROBIN JACOB: Good morning, you all. It's not easy helping run a conference from
London when the conference is going to be in Seattle but it's been well worth it and the Seattle
team have been superb. And so with a bit of luck we're going to make this one work.
The subject matter is probably the most important subject matter I think I've been involved
in which is what happens when the patent system fails, when there is no patent incentive, when
there is no other incentive, what happens to research? And we're going to have a vivid example at
the beginning and we're going to have many other examples. And I don't think people really realize
what a serious problem this is. Let me just give you a few numbers which my research has dug
out. I don't suppose they're all that precise.
Big Pharma, top 20, 30 companies, spend about $120 billion a year on research and
development. Governments, charities, Gates Foundation, Malcolm Foundation, other smaller
charities, between them 30 billion. You can -- NIH here and the MRC in England, and of course a
lot of their money goes off to fundamental research which just leads to Nobel prize winners and
inventions 20 years later.
So who is going to do the clinical trials to research new uses for established medicines?
Some of this conference will be concerned with various ways of trying to get patents, and if you
get them, how effective they are. And that's interesting in its own way, but it's actually, I won't say
we shouldn't be doing it, but it's actually a bit of a side show, because very often these new uses
cannot be patented in any way for the obvious and simple reason that how does anybody come
across the possibility of a beneficial use of an existing medicine?
Why? Because doctors are treating patients. They're treating the patients for the old disease
and they notice something. Few of the patients have other conditions and it's being affected,
beneficially. So what do they do? They write a paper about it. That's what doctors do. No reason
why they shouldn't. Only you can't get any kind of patent after that.
The regulatory system provides some sort of controls, but again, you've got the real
problem, what about the generic company that's busy making the old product for the old use and
lo and behold somebody finds a new use? Can you charge more for it? How does that work? That's
the subject matter of this conference and it's such a serious subject that, as I say, I don't think I've
ever seen anything quite as important. It's strange that it's not been tackled before, but it's becoming
more and more acute and maybe that's why it's come up now.
It came up originally because of a conference suggested by Novartis and joined in by Teva,
and on this occasion on opposite sides of the table. Teva is a bit of a mixed company, hardly
innovative and hardly generic. Fair enough. So is Novartis, as a matter of fact, with its subsidiary.
But if you're making a product Teva says, Well, no, we don't mind doing some research. The
products we will be making, who's going to pay us? How is that going to work?
So they jointly picked this idea up and we ran a conference a few years back, a small one.
This is a bigger one. I think I would like to see this become a bigger subject in the world in
challenging people, governments, policymakers and say, Look, what are you going to do about it?
Because if you don't, you will be kindly worse off.
If you would be kind enough to look at Page 28 of your brochure you will see the people
who made this financially possible. Not one of these people are putting this money in order to get
more out. Yes, their names are there and their names should be there but their names are there
because they are equally concerned with this problem. Thank you all the sponsors.
One other little thing, all the mobiles off, cell phones is what I believe you call them in
America. In court when they used to go off I used to call them cell phones as well. Are you there?
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Anyway, let's get going because time is short. Every speaker is under an edict not to overrun. It
would be very embarrassing if they do. They will get cut short by their respective moderators.
Thank you all for coming.
[Applause]
TOSHIKO TAKENAKA: Thank you very much. Next speaker is a moderator for the key
note session, Professor Patricia Kuszler is Vice Dean of the University of Washington. She will
also make a short remark on behalf of the University of Washington too.
PATRICIA KUSZLER: Thank you, Toshiko. On behalf of our dean, Kellye Testy, and
our entire law school, I want to welcome you all here today to this wonderful conference. It is my
distinct pleasure and honor to be able to introduce our two keynote speakers and then subsequent
to that I will introduce the moderator for the question and answer session which will follow.
We have two distinguished speakers today to kick off this conference. First we have Dr.
Mary-Claire King who is the American Cancer Society professor here -- of medicine and genetics
here at the University of Washington. Dr. King has a distinguished and long record in the world
of genetic science. She is world renowned for her discovery of the BRCA1 gene and its linkage to
breast cancer. She has a rich history in working with forensic genetics in the context of the
disappeared and in human rights violations. Today she will be talking a little bit about personalized
medicine and the movement of genetic science into the world of global health. It is -- it is an
amazing opportunity for us all to hear her speak.
She will be followed by Professor Graham Russell who is at Oxford University, and he too
is a distinguished scientist with a leading -- who has led in the field of bisphosphonates and their
linkage to bone disorders. He will be talking a bit today about the issues that come up in the context
of new uses for existing drugs which sort of takes us into the area that Sir Robin just spoke of the
patenting conundrum.
So, without further ado, let me bring up Professor Russell first to speak and then we will
follow on with Professor King.
GRAHAM RUSSELL: Good morning, everyone. It's a rare thing for a gentleman to go
before the ladies if he's British, but that's the way they had it in the program so I hope you'll forgive
us for inverting the talks. I think I'm really the warmup act. I'm not a lawyer. I'm a physician
scientist. As you heard, I was involved in the discovery of bisphosphonate drugs and everything
that's followed, and although there have been enormous successes, there's also been a lot of
frustrations along the way. Not just related to patents, but partly influenced by patents and the way
pharma companies handle drugs.
So, I'm going to start here. And the reason I'm here is that this gentleman (Sir Robin Jacob)
presided at a high court case in London when alendronate or Fosamax was being challenged by
generics, and he left a lasting impression on me and reading his summing up was a lesson in the
English language.
Along the way during that case he managed to entertain us and mentioned that he was also
a fellow of the same college (St. Peter’s) as I was in Oxford, but before we pass on from this, I
bring to your attention his book here. It’s called “IP and other things”. I'm trying to get him to sign
it and to bring it with me is probably the best way. There's five copies left on Amazon if you check.
I don't think it's been remaindered yet.
So, this is where I come from. I work between Oxford and Sheffield and have been director
of institutes mainly devoted to musculoskeletal disease. The Oxford group is big and we have two
research centers. One is the Kennedy which is where the anti-TNF antibodies were developed and

295

296

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol 12:3

they've recently moved their 200 people from London to Oxford so we have a very big activity
there now in musculoskeletal diseases which is going to be the main theme of what I talk about.
Before that, when we get into new uses for existing drugs, we have of course many
examples and here are just a few that you can quickly find, and I think it illustrates Robin's point
very nicely that drugs that start with one use can be found to have another property which makes
them even more valuable in medicine. Thalidomide of course was a medical disaster but the drug
is now very useful for treating leprosy, and myeloma.
Finasteride for the men here moved from treating prostate problems to working on male
baldness. Viagra, we all know about, it started as an antihypertensive drug, and aspirin of course,
one of our oldest drugs, started as a painkiller but has been found to have more and more effects
important in cardiovascular disease prevention, and possibly in cancer prevention.
So, we have an issue, new tricks, new purposing, new uses for existing drugs, they all mean
more or less the same thing. Folks like some names better than others. So, one of the things that's
currently of interest, and I'll perhaps illustrate some of the difficulties here, is life span extension.
Do you all want to life to be 120? Hands up. Maybe not. But it's interesting how the study of aging
mechanisms has uncovered a number of old drugs which have remarkable effects on stem cell
survival and even survival in animal models. Metformin is one of them, a diabetes drug,
Rapamycin which is an immunosuppressant drug also has similar effects. And even the
bisphosphonates, which you have mentioned, they're bone drugs but they and I'll end up with this
theme, have anti-aging properties and effects on DNA repair.
And of course, I can't get away having mixed with lawyers to know that there are drugs
like Pregabalin that you get very excited about and seem to spend enormous amounts of time
working on.
So, musculoskeletal diseases, you're probably are aware of these problems. One question I
could ask is: How many people here have a near relative or old friend who's had a hip fracture, for
example? It affects most families. Not many hands but probably think about it and more hands
will go up.
So, musculoskeletal diseases are among the commonest diseases and we have the very
common ones that you see here, osteoporosis, osteoarthritis and so on. Cancer affecting bone, an
important topic. And we have an enormous number of rare inherited diseases, over 450 in the
musculoskeletal area for which there are mostly no treatments, but in one or two cases emerging
treatments. Great cost associated with them, and slightly different regulatory paths, which is an
interesting topic in its own right.
Just to give you an idea of the prevalence of musculoskeletal diseases here is one depiction
of it showing that approximately half of adults have something in the musculoskeletal area going
on. How many of you have back pain, not necessarily today but in the last year and so on? And
arguably, it's more important in general practice than conditions like heart disease and pulmonary
conditions. And of course, many of these diseases or disorders affect the elderly and we have an
aging population and there's lots of these. The queen's run out of telegrams. She can't send a
telegram every time somebody reaches 100 anymore, at least I don't think that's happened yet but
it's likely to happen. Many, many more people reaching 100. And of course, that's projected in
terms of sheer numbers to become much greater and the health burden is of course enormous.
Alzheimer's particularly a huge problem.
If we go back to the osteoporosis theme, osteoporosis is essentially thinning of bones that
lead to fractures, and fractures are common, and hip fractures in particular are devastating. They're
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often the last medical event in an old person's life. They have a fracture. They go to bed and they
never get back to an independent life.
The prevalent figures are huge. One in two women, one in five men after the age of 50 will
have a fracture in their remaining lifetime. Should we be trying to prevent fractures in all those
people or just selecting the ones that we might do a better job in? And of course, it's only relatively
recently, last 20 years or so, that we've had specific treatments to try and reduce fracture rates. So,
bisphosphonates dominate this but of course the start was in the use of estrogens. After the
menopause bone loss occurs in women, an estrogen was one way of ameliorating menopausal
symptoms but also reducing bone loss.
Estrogen developed a bad reputation in terms of causing breast cancer and possibly heart
attacks and went out of favor and this encouraged pharmaceutical companies and scientists to
develop estrogen-like drugs which would have good effects but not the bad effects. And this is
what that looks like. You can design estrogen like compounds that work on the estrogen receptor
that have good effects on bone and the heart and avoid the bad effects of estrogen in terms of
causing breast cancer or uterine stimulation and tumors in the uterus.
Many, many such compounds have been made and of course patented and these are called
SERMS (Selective Estrogen Receptor Modulators), there's some examples shown here. In general,
this hasn't been a particularly successful field; there have been many more failures in drug
development than there have successes. And of this list only Raloxifene which is a Lilly drug, and
Bazedoxifene which was originally a Wyeth drug and became a Pfizer drug, more of that later in
corporate cannibalism, have been registered for use in osteoporosis. They're moderately successful
but they're not as good as the best drugs we have.
And just very quickly, this shows you the profile, for example, of an estrogen like improved
estrogen, selective estrogen receptor modulator Raloxifene compared with estrogen, and you see
as you look at the bone, breast, uterus, cardiovascular, brain, that Raloxifene has the good effects
and avoids the bad ones of estrogen.
Just a word on Raloxifene itself. This illustrates the issue of patents extraordinarily well
and it was one of my first encounters with the patent world. It's an Eli Lilly drug, a wonderful man
called John Termine left NIH to go to Lilly as their head of science for musculoskeletal and female
health problems and he found that they had this thing stuck on the shelf which had been developed
as an anti-breast cancer drug like Tamoxifen but it had failed in initial trials, which were actually
extremely badly done because they were in patients who were in a terminal state when you
wouldn't expect to see much, but it was sitting there languishing and he thought, well, let's see
what it does to bone. And they developed it and patented it and it is used in osteoporosis.
But the patents for Raloxifene were challenged largely on the basis that one of the cancer
scientists had done a bone study which was extremely poorly done but it was quoted as showing
the beneficial effect on bone. The data didn't add up, the stats were wrong, but that brought down
the patent in some territories. And this litigation ran for at least 10 years, and I know there are
people here who are involved or have been involved in that. And I think this is a good illustration
of what happens to an old drug which is reused for a new indication with great chances of success
but then gets constantly challenged by generic companies and the company has mixed feelings
about how hard they should continue in that area. Lilly tried to develop a follow-up which didn't
actually work too well because of side effects.
So, bisphosphonates are the major drugs used in treating bone diseases at this point. There's
a lovely background story and I've written about this and I think that will be among your materials,
but basically Procter & Gamble were trying to develop water softeners and they made these stable
297
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phosphorous compounds which stopped calcium carbonate deposition in water systems. You can
still find these sorts of compounds in dishwasher detergents and so on, but the structure of the
PCP, as you see down in the bottom here, is an extremely stable chemical structure and these are
the things that became drugs. And they started as drugs we thought because they blocked mineral
exit from bone but it turned out that they have a very specific enzyme action in the so-called
mevlonic pathway of cholesterol metabolism.
And that observation wasn't patented by the universities because they didn't see much point
in patenting that and how would you actually ever commercialize it? But we now understand how
these drugs work and they're very statin-like in some respects, and I'll come to that theme in just a
moment.
So, this is another story that some of the older drugs are developed without mechanisms of
action actually being known, mechanisms get known and that opens the way to exploiting new
medical uses based on the now refined mechanism of action. Vast literature, 20,000 plus
publications on biphosphonates in PubMed.
So, there are lots of bisphosphonates, there are about a dozen that have been used in clinical
practice and they're shown here. Their key properties are that they bind to bone very avidly.
If you make them fluorescent you can actually see them stick on bone surfaces. This is
probably the only cell I'll introduce to you, but this is the osteoclast, the chomping cell in bone that
dissolves bone and bisphosphonates get in and mess up the machinery of that cell. And you can
see here if you use a fluorescent bisphosphonate it is actually going inside the cell.
And one of the first uses of bisphosphonates was as bone scanning agents. You could link
them to radioactive technetium and light up lesions of high bone turnover like in people with breast
metastases. And there's some lovely illustrations of this. As you see here, these are modern imaging
approaches where you can very precisely tell where somebody has a metastases, based on the
bisphosphonates localizing to that site and having an external readout.
There are many diseases of excess bone loss, not just osteoporosis but also arthritis, effects
of steroids, effects of attempts to reduce androgens and estrogens in the treatment of cancer, for
example, and bone cancer metastases themselves, and particularly myeloma which is a horrible
condition to have and causes fast erosion of the skeleton.
The major uses of bisphosphonates are in osteoporosis to prevent fractures and in oncology
to prevent the skeletal complications that come along with myeloma or cancers. And this is a
summary, very pictorially, of the major bisphosphonates used to prevent fractures in osteoporosis.
In general, they reduce fractures by up to 70 percent so they're remarkably effective. You can
reduce hip fractures by about 40 to 50 percent if people take the drugs. And that's of course where
the IV drugs have an advantage because it's veterinarian to infuse a drug if a patient can't get away,
whereas if you give them by mouth they tend to forget to take them.
Fosamax was the one where I came across Robin Jacob first which was contested by the
generics on the grounds that it was actually an old chemical, which it was, which was possibly
predicted to have biological effects. But these are the drugs that made it. They all became
blockbusters in terms of the billion dollar plus markets.
There are some remarkable properties and I pick out zoledronic acid or zoledronate as
being quite different from the others. It's actually the one that is injected, but you only need to give
it once a year, five milligrams once a year, and it reduces your bone loss continuously throughout
a year. And in fact, people have now stopped bothering to get the second and third year infusions,
because they find that three years after one infusion it's still working. So this is veterinary practice
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at its best. You give one infusion and you can actually send the patient away for maybe a couple
or three years. It's great for compliance.
The biggest use of zoledronate has been in cancer, and just to show you illustrations of
what you are trying to accomplish, here are metastases from breast cancer. Here is a skull, “pepper
pot” skull with lots and lots of holes in it from myeloma, and this is what you try to prevent.
Now, it's interesting and related to patents and also commerce that the two oral osteoporosis
drugs, alendronate and risedronate, were never developed for treating cancer. They could have
been. They would have been orally active and that seems like a missed opportunity.
But in spite of all this apparent success in osteoporosis itself, the use of drugs appears to
be plateauing or even declining and it's a mystery as to why that should be because there are more
and more people who might benefit from osteoporosis treatment and some of the reasons are given
here; that now they're generic. We no longer have the pharma industry advertising and advocating
the use of drugs, providing education to physicians and so on. And another factor is that very rare
side effects have made better news stories than good news stories about benefits and there's been
a huge rumpus about very rare side effects and lots of litigation associated with osteoporosis of the
jaw and atypical fractures.
Are there new opportunities for osteoporosis drugs? Alendronate now costs less than $20
a year for treatment so why would you spend a billion dollars developing a new osteoporosis drug?
osteoporosis drug? Well, there are some stalwarts out there who continue, and there are two
coming along, one is a cathepsin K inhibitor from Merck which probably cost the proverbial billion
dollars to develop and the other is an antibody to a protein called sclerostin. Both of these are
derived from studying rare diseases, understanding the mechanism and then devising a therapy
based on that.
We can make new bisphosphonates. We can design them very selectively knowing the
mechanism of action. No one is interested in developing them. We have supremely powerful ones
but no Big Pharma wants to take them on because the marketplace is saturated with generic drugs.
So back to the theme of where next? And with bisphosphonates in particular there are a
number of observations that could lead to new medical uses which are difficult to patent and
difficult to commercialize. And among these I would list rheumatoid arthritis bone loss, prevention
of colon cancer, enhanced DNA repair and life span effects, and I'll illustrate each of those very
briefly. There's of course a much longer list of things that have never been done but could be done
including even effects on malaria and leishmaniasis. We're in Gates territory here. These drugs are
supremely active on protozoan parasites. You have a problem in how you deliver them but they
are one of the drug classes that could be used.
So zoledronate, just to illustrate the point about what might have been done but wasn't
done, this is the Novartis drug, it's an amazing drug, as I just showed you, for its longevity of
action. It was never developed for indications like bone loss in rheumatoid arthritis. Why does that
matter? Because actually in arthritis, particularly in rheumatoid arthritis, loss of bone is the first
step to leading to deformity. We don't see patients like this anymore but if you don't treat
rheumatoid arthritis, you can end up with that degree of deformity and the prediction is if you can
control the inflammation and the bone loss you can prevent that. The reason it wasn't developed is
that it came along too late in the life cycle to be commercially worthwhile to actually do the studies
before the patent ran out.
The generalization is that bisphosphonates have never been properly assessed in
rheumatoid arthritis.
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So a few more illustrations on the theme of old dogs and new tricks. I've already suggested
that there might be three areas of bisphosphonate use which won't be commercialized but will
probably have to be pursued outside the pharma sector. The first is reduction in colon cancers. I'm
not going to go through all the data but in people taking bisphosphonates, they have a 40 percent
lower occurrence of colon cancer death, amazing.
In the hip fracture studies done with zoledronate, after three years there was a 28 percent
reduction in death rate in those getting zoledronate. The reasons are not totally clear, possibly
cardiovascular, and there are in fact studies in rheumatoid arthritis populations who are particularly
prone to cardiovascular disease showing that if you take people on bisphosphonates you can see a
28 percent reduction in heart attacks. These are all potentially very important medical applications.
If we want to live longer, we have a wonderful mouse model where you combine statins
and bisphosphonates in a model of premature aging and you double the life span of mice. These
mice actually have the equivalent of a human condition called Hutchinson-Gilford progeria
syndrome. This is where people at age 10 look as though they're 70 and there are studies going on
using statins and bisphosphonates together.
A couple of points to end up with: I've talked mostly about drugs but of course living
among orthopedic colleagues who vastly outnumber us, I think we have 50 orthopedic surgeons in
our place, we know that implants and artificial joints achieve miracles for patients without drugs,
and of course this is an area for invention and patents and generic intrusion.
The problem with implants are that they don't go through the same sort of process of
evaluation and they can run into difficulties if they don't work too well. There is actually even an
Oxford knee which is very successful, just a one compartment knee replacement.
This has transformed the lives of many people. I heard a story only this week of somebody
who had two new knees and a new hip. He was working as a decorator and he
said
that
probably in the old days he would have been confined to bed, or be dead already, if he hadn't had
new knees and hips.
I'm sure we're going to hear a lot about drug development, but basically it's an
extraordinarily long process and it's extraordinarily costly and there's a lot of awareness that maybe
pharma is getting less good at it. The investment goes up, but the outcome in terms of good new
drugs is not going up.
Mergers aren't necessarily the solution. I was given this slide by a friend which I thought
was somewhat amusing in the era of commercial linkups, actually combining big companies. One
thing it does for drug discovery is to prune out some of the activities and to narrow the number of
projects that people work on, but these are apparently the sort of figures that show that the net
market value of the combined companies goes down.
In my own experience, risedronate, one of the very successful oral bisphosphonates is a
victim of corporate takeovers. In the last I think about seven years risedronate went from Procter
& Gamble to Warner Chilcott, thereby saving huge amounts of tax because Warner Chilcott was
based in Ireland, then to Actavis, then to Allergan and now they're merging with Pfizer, again to
go to Ireland and save tax it seems.
A final thought: There are some people so fed up with the industry model of drug discovery
and its huge cost and the fact that many companies work on similar targets and don't share their
data and the rest of it, that there's a big initiative to do open domain research where you don't patent
discoveries at all, you just make them freely available to the public. The Human Genome Project
was one great example of success there, and in Oxford we have one of the branches of the
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Structural Genomics Consortium run by Chas Bountra who is a very impressive guy, and they set
out first of all to do human protein structures.
A lot of pharma industries have invested in these activities just to increase knowledge. And
they've made crystals and elucidated structures of 1500 human proteins which are potential drug
targets and released them to the public domain and they screen chemicals looking for potential
drug templates which they then hand back to the industry to develop. It's a model and these folks
are passionate about it.
So drug discovery is not easy. I'm on the one-minute signal. This is a bit like the reserve
coming on here.
And the modern approach is to identify targets, work on them, but we mustn't forget the
role of chance, serendipity, luck and particularly championship. If you're an emerging company
and you want to keep your drug going, you have got to be pretty loudly spoken and heard.
The trends, we're going to hear a lot about this, rare and orphan diseases have regulatory
routes that may favor introduction of new medicines for conditions that wouldn't otherwise be
worked on, and of course personalized medicine. And I suppose our challenge is can we make
these road signs obsolete. Now, this road sign has a lady following a gentleman. She probably has
osteoporosis based on her stoop. He probably has osteoarthritis based on his posture and also the
fact that he has a walking stick, but the world doesn't change. She's actually picking his pocket.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
A. Commentary on Keynote Address and Challenges in Incentivizing Development of New
Treatments and Drugs
Moderator:
Laetitia Benard, Allen & Overy (Paris, France).
Panelists:
Dr. Joerg Thomaier, Bayer A.G. (Monheim am Rhein, Germany).
Professor Graham Russell, NDORMS, Oxford University (Oxford, UK).
Professor Mary-Claire King, Genome Sciences and of Medicine (Medical Genetics)
(Seattle, WA, USA).
Ilana Odess, Woven Orthopedic Technologies (Manchester, CT, USA).
PATRICIA KUSZLER: Well, thank you for both of these wonderful talks on compelling
issues in healthcare and in the world of translating research into clinical medicine. So we now have
a brief question and answer session that will be chaired by Laetitia Benard who is the lead -- leads
the IP practice in the Paris office of Allen & Overy. Also joining us on the panel will be Ilana
Odess who has a long career focused on entrepreneurship. She is with Woven Orthopedic
Technologies of Connecticut. And Dr. Joerg Thomaier, Dr. Joerg Thomaier who is a distinguished
IP attorney from EU and heads the Bayer Group. So perhaps you can all come forward.
MS. BENARD: Hello, everyone. So I have the pleasure of moderating this panel today
and I will start by introducing two new speakers, Dr. Joerg Thomaier and Ms. Ilana Odess. Dr.
Joerg Thomaier has a Ph.D. in science and he is a qualified European patent attorney. He joined
Bayer’s patent department in 1997 and he has been chief IP counsel of Bayer since 2010,
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responsible for all IP matters at Bayer. Today Dr. Thomaier will talk about efforts and financing
in pharmaceutical innovation.
Mrs. Odess has spent her entire career within the healthcare and life science industry. She
has held seniority positions in large pharmaceutical groups but also with start-ups and she is an
expert in leading companies from concept to clinical application.
MS. ODESS: Good morning. It's a pleasure being here in Seattle. My name is Ilana Odess.
I started my career actually at Johnson & Johnson, worked through three continents, Israel, later
on in Europe and then in the headquarters in New Jersey. After eight years, I started my first
company in the Bay Area in the cardiovascular space that was sold to Boston Scientific. In a
nutshell I have experience with small companies, large multi-international companies, have been
on the operational side but also on the investment side and the financial side.
So today I have three objectives: I want to make this talk very practical to the audience and
I want to prove that funding is actually available if you have a good idea, but more than that, if
you have a company. No. 2, if you could identify the right investors for you, and the third, you
have to demonstrate how you could be successful.
So here I'm bringing some data from Pricewaterhouse and Coopers. Actually the last
quarter, the third quarter of this year has been a phenomenal quarter, probably the best in the last
20 years for the life science. And when I mean life science, I mean biotech as well as med tech.
There has been $2.9 billion invested in Q3 of this year in the life science. Out of that 2.1 in the
biotech. So around 194 companies received funding. The volumes have been actually remaining
flat which means that every deal got more money. The average per deal was around $14.9 million
for an investment. So that's good news.
Regarding early stage companies versus late stage, it has been always known that you first
have to get your IP, have clinical studies and then you could go to big VCs. In the latest reports
and trends of this year, we could see that a lot of the investments actually are going to early stage
companies, more than 50 percent, which is very essential. It's -- about 1.8 billion out of that 2.9
that I mentioned is going to early stage. In number of companies, 87 transactions in the biotech
have been early stage companies.
So it is indeed a great time to be entrepreneur right here in the United States. So how do
you identify the right investors? Again, I mapped out here all these investors that you could go. I
won't go into detail but I'll give some examples. Governments are very active today so you have
in the U.S.A. SBIR grants. You have in Israel incubators that are supported and sponsored by the
chief science officer. There are over 20 incubators. Some of the big companies also sponsor them,
though on the government and state side there's a lot to be done. A state like Ohio puts in about
$3.9 billion in startups. If you take example like Cleveland Clinic, and that's under the hospitals
that you see here, they have a supporting system for startups. So a lot could be said for that.
Regarding insurance companies, under the buying groups, if you look today, I'm based in
Hartford, Connecticut where the insurance companies are, you'll see that they opened VC arms
and investment arms. If you look at Aetna, Aetna today has a VC arm and other ones as well. So
there's a lot of opportunities to raise money by those groups.
So how would an entrepreneur here in the audience that may have IP start a company and
identify what's right for him? First of all, the right industry. You won't go to a body that only does
software or greentech, et cetera. You'll go to someone that actually supports and invests life
science. The second thing, identify where you are in your life cycle, and I'll show that later on. In
every life cycle you have more appropriate bodies that will invest and the likelihood will increase
versus other cycles.
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Region is very important. If you look in detail, the regions that are usually supported
financially are the ones on the coast. So Boston today is a leader in the biotech and med tech
industries. San Francisco, Seattle has its efforts and investment room as well. So being in the right
location on the coast actually will give a lot of supporting from the investment groups.
And here is a depicting image again how you would map it out. If you want to go to high
net worth individuals, identify who's right for you. The same with angel groups, VC funds,
corporate VCs, et cetera. You can go to all of them. It takes a lot of effort and time to do funding
so really allocate and map out what's right for you.
Here is a very interesting slide that really is important to understand. Again, every stage, if
you're in the feasibility stage versus a Phase 1 or 2, you'll have a different investment or potential
investment. So very early could be government like the SBIR grant, the incubator, we gave
examples. Later on you definitely could go to VCs, private equity or strategics, the pharma
companies or the med tech companies. The longer you are in this process and the more proof that
you go from Phase I, II to III, obviously the more likelihood of commercialization you will have
and the more royalties you will get so a very encouraging slide.
How could you be successful? First of all, every investor, the first question they ask, does
a company mitigate their risk? Do they understand the risk factors and how do they mitigate them?
The second question, which is not less important, is, what will my returns be like? Am I going to
return two times on my investment? Will I lose my investment? Very essential discussions.
So this is a talk that I gave actually in Yale in the MBA program and I really believe that
there are five components to make a startup successful and mitigate those risks. I'll go through
only three today due to time. First of all, it's filling a need. Filling a need is very important. It's not
only about getting your IP but does your IP address a medical need, a medical unmet need. And
here are actually some technologies, four of them that come from Israel that really addressed an
unmet medical need. For instance, Argo Medical, okay? Restores mobility in upright mobility with
people that can't walk.
Given Imaging that was sold later on, it's an important company that took a camera,
miniaturized it and basically could look at the digestive system. There are other examples
obviously from other industries but I focused on that.
So developing a plan is very essential. And again here, I mention IP as a sector, an
important factor, but it has to work in tandem and conjunction with many other aspects of building
a company and those aspects could be the regulatory approach like FDA. If you have great IP but
the product has never been commercialized because there's not FDA approval, you will not get the
funding.
Other important things are reimbursements. Do you have the buying groups behind you?
Will you get a reimbursement code, specifically if it's a new drug compound or new treatment? So
all these six elements have to work together and most important is, Does the product, is it really
covered by the IP?
Develop a plan. Why is that important? No. 1, it aligns all the management to be focused
on the near term milestones. No. 2, you really get the resources of the funding and you allocate it.
For instance, in Woven Orthopedic Technology, $0.70 on the dollar goes to R&D. That's what I
promised my investors and that's what I actually do. We have audited numbers; our investors can
see it. So what I'm saying is this mitigates the risk to the investor and restores confidence that the
management team is focused and they have near future milestones.
Another important thing is, who are your customers? In today's world it's not just the patient
or the physician. Actually the way we see it is there are five relevant, they all start with P: The
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provider, the physician, the patient, the payer and the policy maker. Make sure that your company
has a strategy that addresses all of them, okay. The policy maker, for instance, how will you get
that same reimbursement code?
Another important thing is, what do you need in long term in capital raising? For instance,
we're raising Series A, but my investor in Series A wants to know how much he will be diluted in
the next five years. When is my inflexion point? How much will I raise throughout the lifetime of
the company until profitability? So you have to have not only a near future plan but a long-term
plan.
Build the best team. Again, I bring here Apple as an example. When Steve Jobs came in in
2000 he turned a company that had 1 percent of the market share to the No. 1 market cap with 500
billion over a decade. It takes time. Same thing as what I did in Woven. I took the No. 1 surgeons,
trauma and orthopedic surgeons, spine surgeons to be on my board. They understand the meaning
of fracture fixation and the lack of a medical solution today with the fracture fixation.
Then I took industry people. I took the main people that worked in Synthes, a company
that was sold for $21 billion to Johnson & Johnson in 2012 and was the largest transaction ever in
the history of orthopedics and I made them the chief technology officer in our company, the chief
legal officer and the chief medical officer. So knowledge of the market is very important. No. 3, I
added to the board members the No. 1 distributed Medtronic spine that sells more screws than
anyone and understands that there is a problem in older population with screw fixation due to the
lack of the quality of the bone.
So this is my last slide. I'm being rushed here but I want to say one message. Even in
funding, you need to be creative. If usually there was known to be debt and equity, be creative.
There also are hybrid situations. For instance, in Woven when I started the company two years
ago, I had no money. I needed immediately money and I did a convertible debt note that was
mandatory converted so they got a 15 percent discount on the Series A that happened three, four
months later, and within 10 business days I raised $650,000. So really, you can get creative in
structures.
A main message that I would like to say is that "no" is always "yes" with conditions. So if
you're thrown out of the room and someone says, no way, this is so early, it's only idea, only IP,
he actually means, yes, but you have to find the right way, the right conditions to make this happen.
So in summary, I think this is a very optimistic statement. There has never been so much
funding available for early stage companies, specifically in the life science. Very encouraging
statement. You have to take this as a strategy in identifying the right investor and the right place.
You have to have a solid plan, long-term, short-term of course, and you really have to have
leadership in it. Be creative. Don't take no for an answer. I will be around if anyone wants any
questions. And again, thank you for having me.
[Applause.]
DR. THOMAIER: Okay. It's me. I am Joerg Thomaier, head of IP Bayer, already nicely
introduced by Laetitia. For the sake of time, this is short so don't worry, yeah, maybe 12 slides but
it's short. So...
The other one to pick up on my colleague on financing. Because there's money around to
get and we already talked about mitigating it, risks in it and then a business plan to get the money.
So let's go into what's happening if you are talking about business case or research and pharma.
Graham already in his speech indicated, talking the drop down of ideas when you start developing
compounds. So this is from U.S. pharma from 2010, I think the figure is originally.
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So if you start with about 10,000 compounds at the beginning and you work on it and you
try to develop it and you go into the preclinical phase of your first test if it is really effective, you're
dropping down to about 250. When you enter in clinical trials you're already down to five and until
you're on the market you're at one, one out of 10,000.
In 2010, the numbers were on average about one billion. Believe me, it's getting more
expensive and that's maybe one thing which I want to address what Graham just said when he said
the expense, the moneys, companies like us are spending on the research going up but the number
of proved compounds are not going up. One of the reasons for sure is that the money you have to
spend per compound is getting up heavily because we as a society request much more regulatory
data, for example, which costs more money. Which is okay because we want to have safe drugs,
but it just costs more money. And if the money you spend is let's say kind of restricted, you can
only develop a few less projects because each project is more expensive.
In saying that, I'm happy being with Bayer because the last two or three years we launched
more new products as ever in our history before in the time frame. So obviously we were lucky, I
mean, of course very professional in selecting the right compounds, but that's -- overall on the
industry, this is really the problem, that you have to spend much more per compound. And one
billion I think -- and I know it's not enough anymore. So one of our actual top compounds, for
example, Xarelto, a blood thinner you may have heard, oral anticoagulant, already consumed about
2 billion in development costs together with our partner Johnson & Johnson. So it's quite some
money you put in there.
And these are the uncertainties. I mean even Phase III, shortly before you really fight for
approval, your compound can get lost and then you've already spend a couple of hundred million
on the compound when it's dying. So these are the risks you have in this kind of industry and if
you talk about mitigation or how you safeguard to get the return, you are pretty easy and quickly
on the topic of IP so talking about patents. That's the typical picture, if you the compare patent
product and commodities.
Now, if you take an unpatented commodity and you launch it into the market, of course
you work in the market. You build up the market. Your turn of work gets to a certain height and
then you come to kind of an equilibrium with the competition where you have a plateau in the turn
for the grant. That's the blue one. Now take a patent that's an innovative drug, it's the red one. It's
steeper because it's higher. I mean, if it's really innovative and has some respect, it's steeper, it's
very well received by the market. You get up in high levels, much higher than unpatents because
the patent provides you with a monopoly. You get a lot of money, but what is important is at the
very end when you see -- you see these steep downturns after patent expiry, so if you have a drug
you lose -- within a half a year you can lose up to 80 percent of your business with such a drug.
So this -- because competition gets in, generics gets in, they don't have to spend the research
money, they "only" do have the manufacturer costs but they sell much cheaper. You are out of
business. So that's the time frame, that's the insurance you have to get the money, the investment
back. That's why the investors, and correct me if I'm wrong, but still are asking these kind of
companies, do you have kind of IP protection to safeguard that you really can get the benefits of
your great, great ideas?
So without the IP protection you see the price collapse. So if you want to fund these
expensive kind of research, and it's getting more and more expensive, it's not only the research, it's
really a large part is the development cost, so this is nothing which companies or research or
science needs you to do, this is our safeguarding. This is our -- as a society we should have safe
drugs. We should have regulatory data which eats up most of the money. Which is fine but needs
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to be just realized and accepted that this is money you also have to gain with your drug to spend
with the next development.
Just a bit about Bayer. We have three -- four sides where we do basically the healthcare
research. And we spend actually last year 2.3 billion Euro in research in health. Just on something
more this year, even more next year because we're going to grow this budget. We have about 8,000
people working in R&D and about 11 percent roughly of our turnover in this area.
What are my conclusions? On the way to the market, okay, we have large up-front
payments as in front-loaded investment. It means to get the money back at the very end and the
probability of success is let's say restricted. Because I mean most -- and that's really the message I
want to send in the first slide, very, very most of the compounds you're trying to bring to the market
will fail. Because I mean we are human bodies and biology is very sensitive to everything you
bring in so the probability that a drug, be it large compound, be it a small chemical compound,
will have some effects, yeah. And most will not have the effect you like so you will end up with
only a few.
On the market, as soon as you are successful, of course the generic industry is keen to pick
up and do their business so you will come under pressure immediately once it's possible, and
therefore you need a period of protection to get your money. So therefore I think sustainability
R&D -- sustainable R&D, even healthcare R&D is only feasible with IP protection to refinance
the whole thing.
From a patient's point of view, you need to have sustainable healthcare R&D to get steady
innovation for the benefits of you and us as patients. I mean, every one of us has I think in this
large a family has someone who has certain kind of diseases and is happy to be able to treat this
or yourself, so therefore this is for us from no one else, yeah. And even for the generic industry, I
mean that's the basis for their business as well because they will view their pipeline and new
products only if we create new products, if the industry creates these products.
So at the end I wanted to make the point, I think I did, that IP is to the heart of it and it also
counts for the title of this conference of new users of old drugs or secondary mentions as they are
called. Also, they need a lot of money to be funded. The research is not for free. And well, there's
a big success story behind pharma and health research in the history of mankind, I think it's almost
exclusively driven by pharma industry, yeah. That's something which had to be kept in mind too.
So thank you for having me. Thank you for listening and I'm always happy to have a lot of
questions. Whatever you like. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MS. BENARD: Thank you very much. Any comments from our panelists or should I start
with the first question? Okay.
Mrs. Odess, I think you stressed the importance for start-ups to put in place the appropriate
structures right from the beginning to be sure to have the appropriate patent portfolio and the
appropriate development plan in place. We all know that many start-ups may fail because they
didn't put in place the appropriate structure and regulatory development plan for their product.
What kind of advice would you give to startups to put that in place and to find the
appropriate support to do that?
MS. ODESS: Again IP is very important. Also Woven Orthopedic Technology, my fourth
startup, started around IP. We bought the IP from a surgeon and around that we built the company.
But beyond IP really you need to know that you're addressing an unmet medical need. Otherwise,
this company, this idea will never grow beyond the IP so you will never get your royalty streams.
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You will never be able to build it, and at the end of the day, the idea is to bring new therapy, new
treatment to unmet medical needs.
And the other things that have to work with IP is, again, the regulatory, the reimbursement,
quality control, compliance like the Sunshine Act. If you don't think about these things, it doesn't
matter how much IP protection you have, the company will still not succeed. And again, I'm not
trying to minimize the importance of IP. In Woven and the other companies that I had, I always
put a big portion of dollars on IP to understand that I have the freedom to operate, understand my
protection, infringement risks. So we built a lot of IP around it, but the other sectors can be
deprived in funding. It's very, very important they all work together in the correlation.
MS. BENARD: And very often I think startup companies do not have the financial
resources to find the appropriate support. Do you think one solution could be more partnerships
between public -- I mean public entities and especially universities with startup companies?
MS. ODESS: Absolutely. So the good news, again, there's more funding this year more
than ever, but having institutions, if it's hospital, university hospitals, academic, align themselves
with startups, I see this as something that could really lead to more innovations, more companies,
newer treatments. And it's a win-win situation if the university has obviously stake and skin in the
game.
It's also important, a lot of the university have the transfer tech departments, how to work
with them. It's not always easy. So finding the right way, supporting the startups and bringing it to
a win-win situation I think is essential and could really, really help.
MS. BENARD: Thank you very much. Professor King and Professor Russell, can you
comment maybe on your experience working with private companies on this type of partnership?
PROFESSOR RUSSELL: Well, I'm not – my very, very limited experience of, through
universities trying to patent things, is a huge diversion from what you prefer to do in academia. I
see a nodding head on my left here. All universities have, you know, IP departments to protect
discoveries made by their staff. Maybe in the UK we're less successful than in California, but
personal experience from friends and colleagues is that it's, you know, you have to be prepared as
an academic if you really want to pursue it to devote a lot of time to it.
On the positive side, there are initiatives that you were talking about and we have the
Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust and bodies like that who have put in quite
substantial funds into a development path for promising new potential drugs. think you have to
wait to see how many of those succeed, and if a success rate is anything like the one in industry
we won't be doing it 20 years from now.
MS. BENARD: Thank you very much. Dr. Thomaier, would you like to comment on that?
DR. THOMAIER: There's not a lot of comment. I think there's some truth in it with regard
to the diagnostic field, yeah, the necessity for spending for regulatory is much lower because you're
not treating the body. You're not putting a lot of stuff into the body. What you are looking at is the
sequencing and you're looking at it to find the right genome. The basic knowledge you have to
have is what's -- how should it look like and what's the raw mutation so that you have this kind of
diagnostic. It's a completely different way to develop things, so yes, two, like I say it's -- how do
you say it?
DR. THOMAIER: Apples and oranges, right.
MS. BENARD: Thank you. I have a lot of questions for you. I mean listening to all the
presentations I think what is key is how to value the innovation and when you talk about financing
pharmaceutical innovation I see there are two key criteria: The first one would be the duration of
the exclusivity, whether it comes from patent protection or regulatory exclusivity or a combination
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of both.
The second key element would be the pricing of the drug. And it seems to me that
we are not really very sophisticated today in our discussions with health authorities and in the
mechanisms of price setting.
So what do you think about that and what is your perspective from the industry in the
discussion you have with health authorities to value innovation and set the price of drugs?
DR. THOMAIER: Okay. Well, fortunately I do not have to do these negotiations. Well, I
mean, it's a very difficult area. I mean from the perspective as a company as we are, as an industry,
as a business, as we are, one of the perspectives of course is to make more money, yeah, we want
fair pricing which means it needs to be pricing -- and you need to end up with a price that gives
you enough room to make up your investment and to make an appropriate profit. Of course you're
always in a tension field with public interest because as a patient, of course I would like to pay as
low as possible. As a society, it's depending from how our societies are organized, so I mean if a
free pricing area or you all have to pay out of your private purse, you want to get it cheap. If you're
a more government driven health system, the governments don't want to pay that much.
And the problem, and we have to take care of that with the authorities is do the pricing, if
there is a pricing. I mean there are still markets, I believe we are sitting in one of them, which is
fairly free pricing still, is that we should not overdo, let's say, the cut down on the price, do not -I mean otherwise you kick off the effect also of the IP which enables sustainable research, yeah,
gives you the opportunity to make up the money. But it's very -- it's a field where the -- a very
sensitive field because you are in very -- in an area which is very -- you have high tension.
I always say it's -- I mean I would prefer if we go to pricing, and fortunately I don't have
to negotiate them, yeah. I would be happy to negotiate a price for a Porsche because no one would
care how expensive the Porsche is, but if you talk about health, it's something different. We are in
an ethical field and therefore both sides, you know, need to be appropriately sensitive to negotiate
fair enough to fulfill the needs of both sides, therefore, authorities or the public as well as for the
industry.
Otherwise, because as I said, if you look to the past and the history, it's -- the health industry
was responsible for most, I think even all of, but most of the fine development and bringing new
trucks and treatments on the market. Also for the medical needs out there, you should not dry it
out, yeah. And that's basically what you should keep in mind.
MS. BENARD: Two weeks ago in France I heard a comment from one of the -- I mean
the president of one of the health authorities in France, he was talking about the pricing of drugs
and he said it's absolutely not legitimate for a company to say that when you value the innovation
of one drug, you have to take it into account the failed research.
So what do you think about
that?
DR. THOMAIER: I mean refusing this for me, I have no other word other than this is
ridiculous. Because I mean, if I start to research, as I showed on the one slide, it's similar in the
oncology field and we start with 10,000 potential compounds. And 9,999 will fail during the way
and one successful one. We spend a lot of money on these failed parts and you also have to get
this money back, otherwise you are drying out of money -DR. THOMAIER: Well, absolutely –
DR. THOMAIER: I'm not saying that the failed is the major majority of the spending, but
it's also not negligible spending so to say you should not put that into account, that's plainly wrong.
DR. THOMAIER: It's part of it, yeah. Well, even a failed product which fails even to
three and then you're in the hundreds of millions and you need to get that back too from the
successful ones.
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MS. ODESS: If I may comment, again, I'm not a reimbursement expert and this is a very
specialized field, but again, on the medical device, we always have to have medical outcome,
clinical outcome. So, for instance, the days that I was in Johnson & Johnson and we came up with
the first stent, Palmaz-Schatz, we had to compare it to CABG to open heart surgery and show that
we have equivalent or better results in one lesion or multiple lesions. And through a very expensive
clinical study, it also had IP but we also had to go through a rigorous clinical study, with five-year
follow-up, we showed that we had a better clinical outcome.
So now you could argue for the reimbursement and the reimbursements are very different
in the states, in Europe and every country in Europe and every region within the country, but in
the U.S., we could claim that we could take a CABG procedure that's about $8,000 and now have
something like that for stents, although again, stents were much less in those days. But it all comes
to the evidence, to the clinical evidence that you could prove that you're as good or better.
In Woven Orthopedic Technologies, what we prove is that we reduce revision rates as a
result of better screw fixation and that's how we're actually going to make our case for
reimbursement. So it's -- again IP is important, but clinical studies are not less important to prove
the clinical outcome.
PROFESSOR KUSZLER: I think we have a nice diverse group of folks on the panel and
I think it would be good as long as we have 10 minutes left or so to get some questions from the
audience on these excellent presentations. We've covered from diagnostic really to end marketing
so perhaps some audience members have some questions? There are microphones set up so that
you could come forward.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: As head of intellectual property for a pharma company. I think
this conference is terrific and can address some really important questions. A fundamental issue
that I think we have to recognize is the development of pharmaceuticals and even ethical reliable
regulated diagnostics is that profit-driven companies are doing this. We've heard about how to get
the investment. We know we need to have the investment and I think it's also important to know,
while we think about recovering our sunk costs on R&D, that's not what we're doing in a
pharmaceutical company. We're making money to invest in the next generation of 10,000 failures.
We're not recovering anything. We've already paid for that. It's the ability to have a continuing
business operation that is funded by stockholders and to keep those stockholders happy.
So given that that's a big issue here and a real concern, what I would challenge this
conference to think about in the broad context, and I'd love to hear what the panel thinks about it,
is, what's the alternative? How are we going to develop medicines to treat unmet medical needs?
How are we going to have safe reliable diagnostics? And I take a little bit of issue with Dr. King.
You're not done when you find the mutation. You really have to have a regulated industry there as
well because there are tragic outcomes from poorly done commercial diagnostics. Patients get bad
information and make the wrong decisions. You've got to have regulation of that industry as well
as the pharmaceutical industry.
What's the alternative model to the one that we have now and does intellectual property
have a role to play there? Right now it's critical to the profitability of the profit-driven industries
that are the bulk of new drug development, and let's face it, new diagnostics. Thank you.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: What's the alternative? How do we do that otherwise?
PROFESSOR KUSZLER: Professor Huntsman?
PROFESSOR HUNTSMAN: First of all, thank you very much. I would like to encourage
not only the speakers and panel now but throughout this conference to, when possible and
appropriate, also speculate a little bit about the possible impact of some of the big changes
309

310

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol 12:3

underway in science and health and their future impact on our ability to actually successfully
develop new devices and drugs in a commercial setting.
For example, the shift toward a value orientation in healthcare. What's a likely impact of
that? What is the likely impact of the enormous progress in precision medicine and our ability to
maybe narrow patient populations? What's the chance that the word "indication" is going to
become a quaint artifact of legal history? But for right now, I'd like to ask you about the perception
that there is an increasing debate underway. I know that there are veterans of drug development
both in pharma and in the biotech who say that absolutely you need protection. You need
intellectual property protection in order to pursue these therapies, but that patents are really not a
very significant part of that protection.
They say that -- they argue that when you look historically at the actual marketplace of
drugs, that patents have been relatively insignificant except for the comfort they bring to investors.
What's your perception about the actual importance of patents in the constellation of intellectual
property protection that firms need to do this work?
DR. THOMAIER: I can give you a very short answer, maybe my colleagues may have
different ones. I'm completely convinced that it's an extremely important part to drive innovation
and not only to have the business but to drive the innovation in these parts. That's my conviction.
That's what I see in research in drugs in the past. If I wouldn't convince personally, and this is not
really personally, personally that this is the case, I wouldn't work in the area. But my personal
opinion is you're wrong, it's not a small contribution. It's pretty important. And I have not seen yet
any -- and that's I think the one topic of this conference, right, not seen any real idea where I would
buy in and say that could be an alternative to safeguard of health research. That's my personal view
and that's not even Bayer, that's me, yeah.
PROFESSOR KUSZLER: Yes, Professor Russell.
PROFESSOR RUSSELL: I brought up that issue of open domain research as being
perhaps an efficient way to research and get beyond the initial steps. My colleagues like Chas
Bountra, when they do a public talk, and it's a great shame he's not here to evangelize to you all,
he will show pictures of how dominant the crowd effect within the companies is. They all work
on the same targets, often in very parallel ways, even if they turn out to be nothing. There's a pain
pathway called TRPV and he has a slide showing that 12 companies have done this all in secret in
competition and nothing's come out of it. Another one that he illustrates nicely is looking under
the streetlight, you know, if you're in the middle of a busy street and you only see what's beneath
the streetlight, you aren't actually getting the big picture.
And kinases are an extremely important potential target in all sorts of therapeutic areas,
particularly cancer, and until a few years ago, there were probably only a dozen or so which pharma
companies would work on. There are now known to be something, if I've got the figure right, in
excess of 300 in the kinase family.
So what the structural genomics guys do is to produce crystal structures and proteins and
things, all these other things that may be involved in biological processes, each of which could
have some specificity if you've developed the right small molecule. And I think the inefficiency
of the industry maybe points to the need to do some of the early stage identification of targets in
the public sector in an open way and then go on from something that is handed on to them from
government, finance or charity-financed research, often in partnership with industry who will fund
this thing collectively rather than just individually.
PROFESSOR KUSZLER: I think that's a good place to stop. We've had a very robust
discussion and I think we've seen the diversity of viewpoints on innovation, patenting, and bringing
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it to the marketplace and to help and improve public health. So let us disband for a brief break and
thank our speakers and our panel for this wonderful start to our conference.
[Applause.]
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PANEL I:
DRUG DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL PROCESS WITH ITS PART IN EXCLUSIVITY

Moderator:
Jin Ooi, Allen & Overy (London, UK).
Panelists:
Dr. Peter Feldschrieber, 4 New Square (London, UK).
Stefano Marino, European Medicines Agency (London, UK).
Hiroko Inazumi, Japanese Ministry of Health Labor & Welfare (Tokyo, Japan).
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: Please have a seat so we can start.
MR. OOI: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We're on to the first panel session today,
drug development and approval process with its part in exclusivity. My name is Jin Ooi from Allen
& Overy in London and I have the honor to moderate a very distinguished panel of experts who
will help illuminate our thinking and hopefully provide fodder for what I'm hoping to be some
lively debate after each of their presentations.
So just introducing them, the first speaker is Dr. Peter Feldschrieber who's a physician and
also a barrister in London. He specializes in healthcare and medical law including healthcare
products liability, pharmaceutical and medical devices regulatory law, clinical negligence,
personal injury and medically related employment litigation. And he's also the editor of a book
entitled The Law and Regulation of Medicines, which I have to admit to having consulted before
preparing for this session.
To his right is Mr. Stefano Marino, who is the head of legal department at the European
Medicines Agency. After a short stint practising in private practice, he moved on to the in-house
legal sector where he has held a career in the pharmaceutical industry working as general counsel
for the Italian groups, Menarini and Sigma-Tau. He also has experience as an intellectual property
contracts manager in a global petrochemical company.
And to his right is Ms. Hiroko Inazumi who is a government official with the Ministry of
Health and Labor in Japan. She works on policy and drafting laws and regulations and has also
been primarily involved with health, including making policies for drug approval and ensuring a
stable supply of blood products and vaccines. Unfortunately Dr. Mustafa Ünlü can't be with us
today due to unforeseen circumstances.
Just a quick slide of what is the long road to a new medicine and I think we've touched on
this in this morning's panel already. Three words come to mind: One, being expensive; second,
time-consuming; and thirdly, uncertain. So I guess with that in mind, there is a quid pro quo for
pharmaceutical companies to be given an opportunity and the incentive to recoup the considerable
investment in the drug development and approval process. And one example that comes to mind
is BMS's drug taxol which didn't have any patents on its active ingredients. Had it been approved
immediately for generic companies, BMS would not obviously have had any incentive to incur the
extensive costs to develop, test and bring taxol to market.
So the fact that both patent protection and data exclusivity provides incentives reflects the
dual nature of the drug development process. We all know that exclusivity drives the
pharmaceutical industry. On the one hand you've got the innovators as I said spending considerable
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amount of money and resources in bringing drugs to the market. And at the same time on the other
hand you've got generic companies who are also looking to bring their generic drugs to the market.
And patenting here being one of the main routes to exclusivity. But in the situation of BMS,
for example, patents may not always be available or some will say it doesn't give sufficient time
for companies to recoup a reasonable return of significant investments made. So there are
additional exclusivity strategies involved and I think we'll be discussing some of this today. And
this is just a table showing a quick comparison between the regimes in Europe, the U.S. and Japan.
And again, one underlying feature that I have in mind is the tension between public health
objectives and the commercial incentives for innovation. Is the current system a balanced one or
if the scales are to tip one way or the other, which way should it tip?
So with that in mind can I please introduce the first speaker, Mr. Stefano Marino.
[Applause.]
MR. MARINO: Thanks very much. Thank you very much to the University of
Washington and also to UC Yale for having invited the EMA and myself.
As you know, the EMA, the European Medicines Agency does not deal with intellectual
property. However, I have dealt with intellectual property practically all my life. So when Sir
Robin called me to ask me whether I was interested to come here, first I thought he had the wrong
telephone number, but I was so driven by his speech on the phone, and I know that for most of
you, for most of us, he's been a living legend for all IP scholars. He's still a living legend and I
literally could not refuse, so that's why I'm here.
Well, the deal was that I would not present, I would not give you any presentation today.
I prepared my slides because I'm normally a medium diligent guy but I said, well, we're going to
use them with the agreement of our moderator only for the “questions and answers” slot. And then
I was made aware last night at dinnertime that the FDA representative could not make it, I was
asked to replace him. So, instead of giving you one presentation, I'll give you two today. Not the
FDA-related one but both dealing with European matters.
Anyway, time is running and I'm very much afraid of the sanctions that I could incur. So,
my first consideration today in this very interesting conference, and also listening to the first panel
of the morning, I just was asking, talking to myself whether we have an IP issue a regulatory issue,
an economic issue, pricing and reimbursement-related, or we have the three of them altogether and
what is the role of the regulatory agencies in this complex world today. For example, the concept
of a medical need, which from we understand from Inazumi’s presentation is at the heart of the
debate that normally investors undertake, is one of the concepts that is most debated currently in
Europe. What is a medical need? We thought we knew it, but the more the science goes ahead, the
more the medical science goes ahead, we have to ask ourselves whether our regulatory
interpretation does fit with the new awareness about this concept.
And just to give you a very quick snapshot, is a medical need met or unmet only when
there is a major therapeutic advantage of a second drug over the first one, or shall we instead reason
in terms of what is satisfactory from a medical viewpoint, from a scientific viewpoint?
Well, these are the current questions that are giving us some headaches, in particular, as I
will show quickly later, when dealing with new attempts that in Europe we are trying to make in
order to attract more and more investments in R&D in our continent, like the adaptive pathway
scheme or like the priority medicine schemes. So what I will do now is to give you a very quick
picture of what is in Europe the current landscape. I don't need to annoy you with what is the
scheme of data protection or market exclusivity. You're all familiar with those concepts that are in
our DNA since many years; so presumably we are all talking the same language here.
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But in Europe, we have quite a generous, I have to say, system of rewarding pharmaceutical
research and development efforts. And as you know, in 2004, the Union has chosen this ”8+2+1”
system which is so far still the best in the world, at least on paper. It remains to be seen whether
the case law of the European Court of Justice or the interpretation given by the European
Commission and the practice at the EMA are consistent with what the legislator wanted to achieve,
but so far, if you see the slides comparing our rules with the U.S. rules, the Japanese rules and
others, I'm not joking when I say that in Europe we have the best system for rewarding R&D efforts
in pharmaceuticals.
So as you know, there is a general harmonized protection of eight plus two years, and if a
second indication of an authorized product is approved within the first eight years, then you also
may enjoy an additional year of data exclusivity which in fact protects your product for a total of
11 years. And so the return on the investment for those who invest in Europe and actually launch
a product in Europe is not bad. And hearing also the presentation given this morning, if I were that
investor, I would probably believe that Europe is a nice country to put my money into. It depends
then, as I said, whether particularly at the price reimbursement level of the national Member States,
there is the same attitude to reward innovation or not.
In the particular field of orphan drugs, there is an additional protection or an additional
award because a second orphan product cannot be even submitted to the European Medicine
Agency for evaluation, unless it shows a significant clinical superiority over the first authorized.
So the legislature wanted to give an additional protection to the orphan drugs which are neglected.
These are neglected products, and even in that field, as you know, the European legislation is very
generous compared to others, including the United States.
So, very quickly, this was the previous system before November 2005 and after November
2005 and you will find in this slide, I don't need to annoy you again, all the details concerning the
Member States who previously had a six-year protection. This is a summary of what I just said
before, but if you see the little arrow, orange arrow at the right-hand side, you will find that,
unfortunately, there is only an extra year of exclusivity for the new indication. I say unfortunately
because in my industry days I was advocating and I was fighting hard in order to get additional
protection for new therapeutic uses of existing drugs, but then at the time, the EFPIA had to make
a choice between various options and they believed that if we had insisted for an additional
protection for the subject matter of this conference, we would have probably had a clash with the
EU Commission for the “8+2+1” 10 system. So a political choice was made. It's not up to me to
say today whether that was a right one or not, but I'm very glad to hear that there are many in this
room who believe that at least now there is a need for an additional reflection on these issues.
And in fact, the new indications, where there has been significant pre-clinical or clinical
studies, get only an additional year of data exclusivity.
So this is the system at the moment. Again, I will go quick, otherwise I will exhaust my
time and I will not have time to brief you on what we are doing in Europe at the moment to foster
innovation, but this is the summary of the existing protection rules. And when it comes to the
orphan medicine or products, as I said before, as you can see here, the situation is even more
generous. In two recent judgments of the European Court of Justice, it has been more or less clearly
stated that the orphan field is quite a special one and probably is the one that deserves additional
consideration and additional protection by the legislature.
One of the cases is under appeal at the moment so I will not comment on that, but in the
words of the Court, certainly there is room for a special protection of the orphan drugs. And coming
back to what I said before, considering the unmet medical need or the concepts of significant
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benefit or a major therapeutic advantage over existing therapies, perhaps there may be the room to
distinguish between ordinary drugs an orphan drugs.
This is a long road. We are still discussing at the moment with industry but also with the
Commission, and there is a guideline on orphan products which is underway. It's going to be
produced soon by the Commission in 2016, but this is one of the areas where perhaps a distinction
between the same concept of significant benefit in one area and the other area may find some room.
Again, here is just to say that the orphan medicinal products, when combined with paediatric
investigation plan, when the PIP is completed, they can get additional two years. So this is another
signal of how, in 2004, the legislature wanted to give additional boost to the development of these
orphan medicinal products.
And this again will be a sort of summary line, executive summary of that protection. The
last two slides -- before going to the future plans, concern a recent judgment given on the 15th of
September, 2015 where the Court upheld the Commission's interpretation that the periods of data
exclusivity are counted from the notification date of the decision, i.e. not from the date of adoption,
but from the date of notification to the company.
So this is important because sometimes even a few days may change significantly the
economic impact both for the generic manufacturers who want to go to the market and for the
originators who want to remain in their monopolistic situation. The Court has clarified that the
correct date to be taken into account is the date of notification. This slide is about the famous rule
that gives companies a lot of headaches, the Global Marketing Authorization. This was enacted in
the legislation after a couple of important judgments by the Court of Justice in the '90s. All
additional strengths, pharmaceutical forms, administration routes, presentations, line extensions in
a nutshell, they are part of the same global marketing authorization. As such, they cannot get
additional periods of protection.
All these authorizations belong to the same one, therefore the “8+2+1” applies only once.
And again, there has been a very recent judgment by the Court, who has clarified in the Novartis
case of 15th September 2015, that even when the marketing authorization holder has received a
second marketing authorizations, and even when a new name has been used, if the active ingredient
is the same, they belong to the same global marketing authorization, so only one period of data
exclusivity applies.
Is that sufficient? Is this a very nice construction or is it just the most generous scenario on
paper only?
If you think about the impact that these judgments by the Court have had on the long-term
marketing plans, you may understand that maybe this scenario is not exactly the best that one could
think of, in a continent where the R&D efforts, in particular the clinical trials, have been declining
sharply in the last 10, 15 years.
What is EMA doing at the moment? We have launched recently two programs, we call
them pilot plans. The first one is called the adaptive pathways, it's a very popular concept in the
United States so I don't think I need to spend many words, and it was very successful. And the
concept of adaptive pathways is very much focused on the wise use of an instrument that has not
been used very often in Europe, which is the conditional maximum authorization. I don't need to
spend too much time on this and we can expand later on if you wish.
In addition to the adaptive pathways, we recently launched, and it's open to public
consultation now, what we call the “PRIME-priority medicine” system which is essentially, as I
call it, a business class scientific advice given to companies at the very early stage, even in the
design phase of a new product. The EMA is offering companies to assist them with the design of
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these new products so that they can go to a very targeted program of preclinical and clinical trials,
hoping that, by doing so, the result at the end will be satisfactory.
We decided to do so not only because there is a very successful system in the United
States, the FDA breakthrough designation, but also because we believe that if we don't do so,
Europe will probably meet a new phase of decline in terms of investments landing on our continent.
So what is PRIME? PRIME is the possibility to enter into this business class scientific advice
scheme very early, by proof of concept, so prior to Phase III, based on very few clinical data, but
significantly showing that this product has a therapeutic advantage over existing therapies. And
even at the early stage of proof of principle, prior to Phase II, by exploratory clinical studies,
particularly when small enterprises or even academia are involved.
So the main organizational innovation here is that a rapporteur, CHMP rapporteur will be
appointed earlier. Today a rapporteur is appointed much later, of course. But this will guarantee
that there will be very wise and competent guidance from the best experts that the Member States
will make available to the European Medicines Agency, so that the company may get the best
possible advice.
And then there may be (we are discussing at the moment with the Commission and we are
still waiting for the results of the public consultation) incentives for small to medium enterprises
and perhaps even for other categories of applicants.
Very shortly there will be an early confirmation of the potential for the accelerated
assessment, a written confirmation of the viability for the scheme, an early rapporteur appointment
and the continuous presence of the best experts side by side. I mean, they will go hand in hand
with the company, and even the financial side will be important because sometimes even the fee
incentives may be hard to combine with these new ideas. These slides have been presented by my
colleague, Sabine Haubenreisser, who works at the FDA at the EMA liaison office, at the RAPS
regulatory convergence conference in Baltimore one month and a half ago. I encourage you to take
a look at them in the interest of time and also to take a look at other presentations that were given
in that conference where we tried to describe this new PRIME scheme the best we could.
We are very much interested in seeing what will come out of the public consultation and
I'm sure that once this will be launched, this may really be a new driver for innovation and for the
access of good ideas to the pharmaceutical world in Europe.
I think that before Sir Robin or the moderator jumps on me, I should stop here and I would
encourage you to ask questions or even to simply take a closer look at these slides. You will find
my address wherever in the presentation. You may even come back to the EMA with written
questions, we'll try to answer them the best we can. Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
MR. OOI: Thank you, Mr. Marino. We'll hold off on questions to the end. Dr.
Feldschrieber.
DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: Thank you very much, Jin. Well, thank you very much for
inviting me to this marvelous meeting, particularly to Robin.
When Robin first told me about this meeting, I said, Why me? I'm not an intellectual
property lawyer. I know from nothing about intellectual property law and Robin knows this, and
even today I would still be terrified of appearing before you, either a first instance or in the Court
of Appeals or indeed in arbitration or in consultancy. So as long as you understand that, I'm on a
reasonable wicket. However, he did ask me to be both a heretic and to talk really against what
seems to be the prevailing ideology, and what I'm going to say now will probably leave you with
wanting to burn me at the stake after I finish this presentation, but I want to go to what I think is
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the heart of the matter. I'm a bit eccentric, I'm both a physician and a barrister, and for this talk I'm
talking in my capacity as a physician scientist who is affected by the legal framework that I do
know a little about.
So what are the incentives for innovation? Well, regulation has metamorphosed in regards
to its -- in its regard to its public health objectives since the introduction of thalidomide. And to
set the scene, I think that this was a very prescient moment: When thalidomide came on to the
market in Europe and Australia, it was done on the basis of having been assessed on limited data.
There had been a limited scientific approach even in those days. And the United States was saved
from this terrible epidemic of focal media by one woman, by Frances Kelsey in the FDA who
refused to authorize thalidomide on the basis that she had not been provided with sufficient data
to understand its primary pharmacology. In particular, she asked questions about its potential
safety and efficacy.
Now, this of course was in the 1950s, very, very early on before pharmacology some people
say became the sophisticated science it is today. But even at that stage it was well known that the
pharmacological and pharmacokinetic parameters of drugs needed to be assessed very carefully in
order to make an evaluation of benefit risk. This was not done in the submission for thalidomide.
Frances Kelsey thankfully refused it and the United States did not suffer this epidemic. However,
Europe and Australia did, precisely because there was limited aspect -- limited access to scientific
data. And this is the theme of what I'm going to talk about throughout because I think that every
major drug disaster and every potential flawed regulatory system has been affected by this
particular philosophy which has damaged the use of good scientific practice.
So what are the current objectives of regulation? Particularly they're written into statute in
Europe. The European Medicine Directive has explicitly two particular objectives. One is the
public health objective as regards to safety and efficacy of new drugs, and the other is to facilitate
to support free trade and commercialization of new drugs; in other words, the incentives to
develop.
Are these objectives compatible? Well, I don't think so. Public health, the public health
objective is primarily towards the identification and the evaluation of benefit risk and appropriate
benefit risk for the population at large. That has an ethical consequence, it has a moral consequence
to it. Because what we do as regulatory scientists and scientists in development of drugs affects
massive populations so we've got to be extremely careful. We can cause drug disasters on the
scales unheard of in previous times.
Commercial incentives all -- as far as I can see, all the commercial incentives that have
been put together by the regulatory authorities in Europe have depended on data -- on granting
data exclusivity and restrictive access to related data in order to allow for what are effectively quasi
monopolies and this is against the practice of good science. So these two objectives are potentially
dangerous. They're both inconsistent, and I'll give you some examples of how this restricted access
to good science has ended up in drug disasters.
So the current commercial incentives, as Mr. Stefano has adequately described, are orphan
designation, protection against generic entry by extending market exclusivity, supplementary
patent certificates -- and I won't say much more about them. That's an area that Robin knows I
know very little about -- and early access schemes. And one other aspect I want to talk about which
is reflection of the regular -- of the mood in Europe to ease the regulatory burden is the access to
innovative medical treatment which is proposed UK legislation, and I'll talk about that in a minute.
Now, it's realistic, obviously, that if private companies are expected to spend huge amounts
of money in investing in research and development, there must be some reward. There must be
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some incentive for them to do that. The question is, how much is that incentive and how do you
measure that incentive? So that balance has to be struck. And we don't yet know what the potential
balancing mechanism should be but I'm going to suggest one that needs further thought in a second.
So it's realistic to incorporate facilitating return on investment to regulation and -- but, and
this is the big "but," the incentives should allow proportionate reward. They shouldn't play to the
senior management of a company who can say that they have a fiduciary responsibility to their
shareholders to maximize profits. That's the current law and that is why companies behave as they
do. What worries me is that the law explicitly invites them to maximize their profits, and because
of that, you get egregious examples of manipulation.
The recent example in the United States of Turing Pharmaceuticals in taking Daraprim, an
old antimalarial drug and raising its price 5,000 percent on the basis of new indications of the drug.
That's egregious. That's wrong. That's morally wrong. It's ethically wrong. But that's the kind of
opening that these incentives can lead to by being melanistic and bad -- they're bad incentives.
We see similar things like this with some of the examples I talked about just now. Orphan
designations for rare diseases. This provides a quasi-monopoly, for instance, two years extra
market exclusivity for those orphan diseases with agreed pediatric investigation plan. That again,
it relies on the inaccessibility of data from product -- from previous products that could be a bridge
to justify the benefit risks of upcoming products. It's open to abuse, and I as a regulator -- and I do
say I stopped being a regulator some five or six years ago, but unfortunately once a regulator,
you're always a regulator. That's open to abuse and I personally experienced some of the abuses.
For instance, malaria, a worldwide scourge has been regarded as an orphan disease in
Europe because there are less than one in 5,000 cases of it. Crazy. I had to deny, decline
authorization of a drug for Addison's disease. Still, dexamethasone, common drug for steroid
replacement in Addison's disease on the grounds that Addison's disease was effectively,
epidemiologically speaking, a rare disease in Europe. So here we were, the regulator was forced
to deny access to the market of a cheap version of a steroid which was simply performing its
fundamental pharmacology collection. Madness.
So all of these schemes have a flaw. They have unintended consequences. Let me give you
one example of another drug disaster which is -- pointedly exhibits why this is so potentially
dangerous. There was a drug disaster in the United Kingdom a few years ago called TGN1412.
This was a cytokine modulator drug that was produced by a company, TeGenero in Germany, with
the potential indications of leukemia and autoimmune diseases. That drug was prematurely put
into a Phase I clinical trial in human volunteers and nearly all of -- well, okay. It was given -active drug was given to six volunteers -- sorry. Can I take my glass of water?
It was given to six volunteers and one was given a placebo. All six volunteers nearly died
because of vascular complications. At the end of the day there was a major regulator report drafted
by Gordon Duff who was chairman of the Commission of Safety in Medicines at the time,
Commission of Human Medicines, and he came to the conclusion that the pharmacology had not
be accurately defined. The dose response hadn't been adequately defined. They used the wrong
preclinical toxicological calculations to extrapolate to a dosing, and those consequently, nearly all
six patients died.
However, what -- and he did mention it in the report, but no, there was no authority. There
were rumors. There were anecdotal rumors that a similar drug had been tried, had been developed
by a small biotech company in Southampton some 12 years prior to the TeGenero disaster and that
company had showed in limited clinical studies that cytokine store was a probable factor, a
probable side effect.
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Now, had that information been available to the developers of TGN1412, the drug would
never have been developed. I can't be the authority for that. I can't give quote -- apart from the
anecdotal quote as to what happened and that shows pointedly that restriction of access to data is
potentially so dangerous to drug development.
What about the early access to medicine schemes? Well, here you've got a scheme which,
quite rightly, is trying to lift the regulatory burden to allow for what we call inverted commerce, a
premature access to the drug on the basis of limited data to make a benefit risk evaluation. But if
you do that in the -- in the context of rules which disallow full and free and transparent access to
the data, how can you make that premature calculation safely? And that in terms has legal
consequences. It has consequences in product liability over in Europe, and I know that Robin
doesn't agree with this, I think it has consequences in IP law as well because it makes it more
difficult to deduce the evidence. I know there are issues of discovery that could overcome this, but
nevertheless, the fact that published data doesn't exist even, and it seems simply to rely on data
that is anecdotally reported that may have been a signal of potential danger is in itself dangerous.
The orphan designation I've already talked about. The access teams I've just talked about.
But do these schemes satisfy the public health objectives in unmet medical need? I think the limited
transparency in disseminating information puts a damper on those schemes and that needs to be
addressed.
What about adaptive licensing? This is a very, very interesting scientific development. It
allows for, on a case-by-case on a therapeutic-area-by-therapeutic-area basis to design clinical
studies that will be practical, pragmatic and effective in giving sufficient data to assess benefit risk.
It's predominantly being looked at in terms of biological molecules. These are molecules with
potent pharmacology. There is limited safety and efficacy data on it, and new modes of action in
particular may not be fully understood. So they need as much data as possible to make as robust
as possible a risk benefit analysis. And yet, that robust data is deliberately not being made
available.
Maybe I'm overemphasizing my point but you get the gist of it. The legal issues I talked
about. The product liability and negligence, I think this is very important one. It hasn't raised its
head in Europe in litigation yet. I suspect it may do in the United States. There have been several
issues with drugs that have failed on the basis of inadequate data. The most startling of these of
course was Vioxx. Vioxx was withdrawn as an anti-rheumatic by the company on the basis of
challenges by the Security Exchange Commission in New York, but nevertheless, it had to be
withdrawn because there was data within the Vioxx -- clinical data support further that had been
submitted that failed to be transmitted to the population at large, that the drug could and did cause
morbidity and cardiac mortality. On a very small scale, but nevertheless, the drug failed.
And here we have an example, paradoxical example of what is a marvelous drug which
was a major scientific benefit had to be withdrawn because of the inaccessible and lack of
transmission of data on safety and efficacy to the population in large. Again, that's a paradoxical,
unintended consequence of the regulatory framework.
So what are my conclusions? Well, there's a common theme that I've tried to describe here.
First, comprehensive a database as practically possible in all drug developments. I think that at the
moment all incentive schemes, or at least those have been drawn up in Europe, seem to hinder this,
and we need a rebalancing exercise. I'm not denying the fact that there has to be a reward system
but what can that reward system be? My own view, and I haven't thought this through fully and I
would very much welcome discussion on it and I'd very much welcome if possible some kind of
working group to really flesh this out.
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It could be that the metric, that the fulcrum of the balancing exercise could be the health
and technology assessment and process, the kind of process that's developed by NICE, National
Institute for Health and Care Excellence in the UK and Health Technology Association databases,
assessment databases that have been generated in the United States. This could provide a metric - as the database builds up, this could provide a metric which could itself be a benchmark for both
the regulators and the companies and governments when they go and talk about reimbursement in
pricing, to suggest quantitatively what is a recent and proportionate return on investment in
particular therapeutic areas? I understand that you can't do it for every medicine particularly as
we're moving into an arena of personalized medicines, but there should be some framework where
we can have a generalized view of what health technology assessment thinks the benchmark should
be.
On that, I leave you a very open question. I hope you're not going to burn me at the stake.
I have some friends here who have in the past instructed me, I know they won't instruct me again,
but never mind, maybe if I stick to intellectual property law I'll be in better shape. But thank you
very much.
[Applause.]
MR. OOI: Thank you for a very thought provoking presentation. Ms. Inazumi.
[Hiroko Inazumi speaks but is not written or transcribed.]
[Applause.]
MR. OOI: Thank you, Ms. Inazumi. I guess before I open the floor to questions, I was
wondering if the panelists have anything to comment on your other panelists' topics? No? I'll just
open the floor to questions then. Yes, please.
DR. DRESSEL: Jurgen Dressel from Novartis. My question is to Mr. Stefano Marino
regarding centers for new indications. You mentioned in your presentation we have the eight plus
two plus one scheme, which in Europe of course runs at the same time as usually compound patent
production or other protection is running and I would say, at least according in most of the cases,
expires earlier than the compound patent protection, especially including the supplementary
protection certificate. I do appreciate the issues with the global marketing authorization concepts
and the reason about this decision, but could you imagine that there could be a separate kind of
data exclusivity for new indication similar let's say to the Japan or U.S. in Europe?
MR. MARINO: Well, I could imagine it. No, in fact, by reading Inazumi’s slides on the
additional protection that there is in Japan for those new indications, I only regret that in 2004 the
EU legislature did not think with a sort of far-sighted approach, because more medium enterprises
as well as generic manufacturers, I think they would have incentivized to explore these new
avenues. I can only -- as you very well said, I can only imagine that the situation could change. At
the moment, as you know, to change the legislation is a pretty much laborious mechanism in the
European Union, but let's not lose our hope for the future.
MR. OOI: Yes, please.
PROFESSOR TOUMI: I have two questions about Japan. One of the questions is about
orphan drugs. How do you explain that the orphan drug regulation has been so little successful?
There is about 300 products that have been designated as orphan drug in Japan compared to few
thousand in Europe and the U.S. And the second question is about the introduction of an HTA
assessment in Japan where health economics is going to be part of the assessment of the new drugs.
Last week [a company] has issued guidelines on how to perform health economics for drugs and
they announce that it could be in force in April next year.
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How does this impact the incentive for development in Japan for new drugs that you have
presented?
MR. OOI: Can you give your name and affiliation, please?
PROFESSOR TOUMI: Sorry. My name is Mondher Toumi and I'm an affiliated
professor of public health at the University of Marseille in France. Thank you.
MS. INAZUMI: Very difficult question to answer. I know the first one is, I think when
initiative MLW decides to designate orphan drugs, if there is high predictability to accept, to
develop successfully, we designate as orphan drug. So criteria, I think the criteria to orphan drug
designation is a little higher than other countries such as U.S. and European countries. So that's
the reason why our orphan drug designation -- the number of our orphan drug designation is
limited.
And the next one; I'm sorry. I'm not an expert of the health economics you mentioned so
please send an e-mail to me so I will ask my colleagues and answer you later. I'm sorry.
PROFESSOR TOUMI: Thank you.
MR. MARINO: If I may make comments, not on the Japanese situation but in general. I
think I would support what Peter was saying before concerning the health technology assessment.
This is a very powerful instrument in order to evaluate the real add-on that a new drug may be
bringing to patients. In Europe, the Commission launched some years ago and has recently
refinanced for the next five years this initiative called EUnetHTA, which is the EU Network of
Health Technology Assessment bodies, and EMA is an observer there, but we are trying to make
the point that if there's a forum-- well, "centralized" is not the right word, but if there's a hub where
the health technology assessment bodies of Europe can gather together with the experts sitting in
the Committees of the EMA, and they together take a look at the value, comparative value of a
new drug, I think at the end of the day their results may be satisfactory for all, including the payers.
When I say "all," I include industry, the applicant, because of course the process of bringing
the product to the market for reimbursement later is painful, is long, but if they can rely on a joint
centralized European assessment, that of course would be enormously positive for them as well.
And the patients would benefit because at the end of the day regulators have the patients at the
heart of their job of their work. And if a patient can get access to this drug earlier, I think the whole
community, the whole scientific community would benefit as well.
So I do believe and I do hope that the HTA assessment could be a real driver of innovation
in Europe, at least one of those drivers and I do hope that some Member States who are not
convinced yet will renounce a little bit to their traditional thinking that because the competence
lies with each of them at national level, there cannot be a joint discussion. I think if there is a joint
discussion at the end of the day, the evaluation is far better.
MR. OOI: The gentleman there.
MR. OKUMURA: Thank you. I'm Yoichi Okumura of the Takeda Pharmaceutical
Company from Japan. Let me somehow make a comment to the questions previously asked about
the Japanese processes. The -- I'm very much sorry, I can't tell you the exact process of the PMDA
about HTA consideration, but what I know is the PMDA is now deeply considering with the HTA
for evaluating a drug value. That's why, for example, the example Inazumi-san showed the
Sakigake project, that's the forerunner project, that is I think one of the program run by the PMDA
somehow related to the HTA. And of course private sector in Japan are also pretty much
encouraged to develop the innovative track. This is the current situation in Japan. And also the
question -- what is that?
MS. INAZUMI: Orphan drug.
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MR. OKUMURA: Actually many orphan drugs in Japan have been now approved.
Maybe a couple of years ago, the private sector initiated together with the government to set some
sort of the development system on Drugs for the disease difficult to be cured and also the rare
diseases. We have funded to iy together with the government. And then it encourages private
companies of the pharmaceutical industry to discuss this opportunity and then to deliver those
drugs to patients. That's the current situation what I know. Thank you.
MR. OOI: Thank you. Dr. Gonen, yes.
DR. GONEN: Hi, I'm Galit Gonen from Teva. So just to recap from the morning. We
talked about incentives for doing researching for new users in established drugs and we started
with patents. So Professor Russell's presentation basically demonstrated how problematic this is
in view of the requirements, we're talking about established molecules. Then we move on to
regulatory data protection which seems more appropriate because we can -- that's the natural
vehicle to protect data. There is new research, new clinical data accumulated. We can play with
the scope and make it in line with the scope with innovation. Stefano says he could imagine it in
Europe as well. It all seems great. But I think when we talk about the incentive, so we talked about
patents, regulatory data protection. At the end of the day we need to think about the payers and we
need to move on to this discussion, because even if someone has a regulatory data protection and
even a patent, why would a payer pay a premium price on a molecule which he has available for
other indication.
And I think that's the main -- that's the gist of it and that's the discussion which needs to
take place between the industry and the payers, so if the industry as a whole support in this type
of research, it brings -- it's good for patients. It's good for everybody. Then there needs to be a
discussion between the industry and to payers about premium pricing which will be for the value.
And I think linking to the presentation from Japan, which I found was fascinating, it's the first time
I've ran into a price which is set on the basis of R&D considerations rather than only on the basis
of value considerations. So if you can elaborate more on this point of your presentation, how it is
done, how the R&D consideration is taken into account in discussion between the payers and the
industry.
MS. INAZUMI: I think the incentives I explained is firstly the industry started to offer
these incentives to ministry so -- oh, I'm sorry. I can't speak very well. Do you have any ideas to
explain at all?
MR. OKUMURA: Yoichi Okumura again. Honestly speaking, I don't know exact deeper
process about pricing., Usually so-called NHI drug price is an official drug price given by the
government. To obtain it, the company provides relevant information, including sometimes
expense for the development of the drugs and also cost of goods of the drug and also some sort of
a reference price of competitive products on the market. Those things are entirely managed by the
government. That is what I can tell you today.
MR. OOI: Thank you. Now, discussion on pay is actually very interesting. I wonder if Mr.
Marino and Dr. Feldschrieber have any comments on that?
MR. MARINO: I have some comments but -DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: No, no, you go first.
MR. MARINO: No, I agree with Galit. The payer is the real problem, the real hardship,
especially when you have an economic crisis that really strangles every attempt to do better. One
thing that I have to say: historically, the evaluation of R&D efforts made by companies, like one
of the tools to give a better price, a premium price for a drug, has also unfortunately led to
undesirable results. There have been cases in the late '80s and early '90s where in some countries
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of Europe at least, this has led to major deviations from the good tracks, and you may recall some
egregious cases of corruption and biased evaluation made by payers at the time in various
countries. Unfortunately my country was at the forefront of that attempt.
But perhaps the route is to have a very robust health technology assessment, because that
would be the basis for the payers at a national level to then decide based on their national
legislation. In Europe the competence lies, as I said before, with the Member States. EU does not
have a competence in pricing and reimbursement, but based on a very robust health technology
assessment, perhaps centralized, or if we don't want to use the word "centralized," at least
harmonized among the various bodies, I think that the national payers would have an additional
tool based on their own legislation to give this premium price.
And finally, one more thing. You are very right, there is no real hope that new drugs may
be brought to the mass market even using these additional schemes that we are trying to promote,
like adaptive pathways. And in fact, one of the features of adaptive pathways, the way the EMA
sees it, is that the payers must sit down with the companies much before, not only when the drug
is ready, the approval is granted by the Commission, and then they start negotiating the price and
it takes 18 months or 24 months to get reimbursement.
One of the core issues of adaptive pathways is to launch a sort of early discussion before,
so that the payers can see the drug while it's being developed, and particularly in the first 12 months
of the conditional marketing organization (which could be 90 percent of the cases. In those 12
months, the payers will have a look at that.
So without new ideas, Europe is a different world with respect to Japan and the U.S. If I
may say so, it's a much more difficult world to live in because you have to combine 28 member
states experiences, national systems, payment, advertising, it's complicated. But we are trying to
do our best in order to harmonize even in that respect.
DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: I agree entirely with Galit, she makes a very valid point in
trying to get some harmonized quantitative view of what the payers think and realize would be a
benefit with the drug and inject that into an HTA assessment. I think it's terribly important, and
despite all the difficulties that Stefano said, I think we should start setting up mechanisms to do
that. And it can be done. There are organizations in Europe which would actively cooperate with
one another -- with each other. And my suggestion would be that it's not just individual HTA,
health technology assessments on particular drugs. In parallel to that, you have to build up a
benchmark of comparative HTA assessments, both across therapeutic areas and across
geographies. And that can then be interrogated as part of this final decision-making point as to
what the return on investment will be.
So you could qualify it for a therapeutic area. You could qualify it for a patient population
and qualify it in -- I don't know how to describe this properly, political, patient lobbying terms.
Now, this brings me to another point: We have here an example of big data, very big data,
and it's up to the regulators and the pharmaceutical scientists I think to try and devise methods as
to how to interrogate this big data because that in itself would add to the tool. I'm talking
grandiosely, I realize that, grandiosely and expensively, but I think that we could start with some
kind of working party to put these ideas together and then flesh them out in terms of regulatory
submission.
I don't think it's going to -- it shouldn't take that long to do this because this is very, very
important for patients to have a trust in what they are paying for as taxpayers ultimately, for the
innovation of new drugs.
What do you think, Robin?
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SIR JACOB: Well, I'll go back a little bit and talk about your talk. The word "patent"
means open. The basic idea of a patent system means that information is put out there. The
protection given by the regulatory system is closed. It's the opposite of patent. And I think quite a
lot of criticism of the pharma industry is indeed that all that data is private, and in principle it's a
bad thing, which is what you said.
Similarly, a lot of other data is kept private and I think that's unfortunate too. Some of it is
even protected by privacy laws. Now, if I was given charge of things, first of all every prescription
would say what the medicine is for. Why? Because later on you're going to want to know whether
it's working for that thing, and a much better idea if you can mine the data of all the patient records,
which brings you back to the personal thing, of whether it really is working, then you're going to
have a much better idea whether it's working for other things because the patient records would
happen to contain all the other things and suddenly you'll find correlations which you would never
have noticed. And the history of science is about competitive scientists but also open information.
So my own view is, it's a great pity that we have to have regulatory protection but it's a
good deal better than having no protection. So if you replace it by an open system for regulation
where the regulators are concerned with one thing, does it work and is it safe, and the scientists
are creating new uses for old uses or old established medicines and using that data to find more
things and learn more things, that would be an ideal system but we've got to put in place some
other system to pay for the industry.
And it's no good bemoaning it and saying, Oh, well, there are all these wicked capitalists
making money out of this, because the question was asked earlier, you got any better ideas? Jamie
Love, "Give him a prize," he says. Well, that's pathetic. They tried prizes in Russia. Prize systems
have never worked for innovation except once, longitude, the chronometer. But even then it wasn't
a very satisfactory story for those that read that wonderful book called Longitude. But you're not
going to have prizes from governments or anybody to pay the $120 billion a year coming out of
Big Pharma, you're just not going to get it.
So those who want to come and say the patent system is no good are talking destruction.
Every CEO of a pharma company must wake up in the morning sweating, every product they sell
which is making profits now will be out of patent and making hardly any profit in 10 year’s time.
My company is going bust unless they find something else.
So the focus must be for leaving the system for new medicines, new molecules as it is, and
looking at ways to encourage research into other, apparently less profitable things. And it's the
same problem which we've got for personalized medicine. If you can't sell the pill at a reasonably
high margin to 100 patients of whom it benefits 10, and you're only going to give it to the 10 who
you know it's going to benefit because personalized medicine is coming and you can figure out
whom it would work on, can you charge 10 times as much? And if you can't, what's going to
happen to the research?
The same problem for the cures. I mean, this industry is moving to a bit of a crisis because
-- with mass medicines. Now we're going to have cures. Cures are not very profitable to the pharma
industry. What are you going to do? We've just learned that there's a cure for most common form
of Hepatitis C. It's a couple of injections or something like that. What are you going to charge for
it? 70,000 pounds? Actually cheaper than treating the way you treat them now, but it doesn't look
like that to politicians.
Now, I think this industry, which has served mankind extremely well in the post war period,
is under the very severe threat. There, you've got all my thoughts all packed up in one piece.
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As regards openness, I think we should be looking at ways in making it more open and yet
providing the protection which the closed system provides now. And viola, that's the question. I
think the answer may lie in Galit's question, it's the payers, deep down it's the payers. Governments
in some European countries, insurance companies in others, insurance companies in the United
States, it's the payers. They should be paying for the research which is going to be done.
MR. OOI: That's a very intriguing idea. I was wondering if there are any views from the
U.S. perspective particularly because we don't have a U.S. panelist on board? Or if anyone has any
other questions or comments?
MR. FEHLNER: So you'll probably be sick of me pretty soon. Paul Fehlner again from
Novartis. So one point of clarification on data. Data protection is in place because the generic
companies are allowed to refer to the proprietary data that the originators generated and that
reference saves them a boatload of time and money, they don't have to conduct their own clinical
studies. This is a benefit for society.
The more robust data protection is, that is, the longer or having a set period of time, and
we like Europe, 10 years before that data can be used by others, makes it more possible for us to
publish our data. And a concern from the pharmaceutical industry isn't Europe or the United States
because there's good robust data protection there as well as patent protection, it's in countries where
we can't necessarily rely on the patent system and the data can be used from Day 1. And that kind
of short circuiting or free-riding creates a very difficult situation for us at least to invest in
launching drugs in those countries.
And let's face it, the innovator is probably in the best position to launch a product, to
monitor its safety. We have a real compelling obligation both legally and ethically to do that, and
a generic company that's free-riding on our data may be less so. But the question for me is, if we
eliminate the leverage that the innovator company has through patents, which has been pointed
out, are a mechanism for disclosure, because we don't have patents, what we have are trade secrets
and that's keeping things quiet.
If we don't have good data protection, if the company don't have these levers, how do we
negotiate with the payers? Because they have the money, and I just always am cognizant of the
golden rule, who has the gold makes the rules.
MR. OOI: Any comments on that from our panelists?
DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: From my point I'm not advising resigning from patent
protection. I realize it is the one effective mechanism that has to be maintained. What I'm
concerned about is the balancing between these two seemingly inconsistent objectives and I need
to find a practical mechanism which allows that balancing to take place on a proportionate scale.
MR. FEHLNER: Just to be clear, I think my question is, if the innovator companies don't
have the benefits of patents or data protection, how can they counterbalance the interest of the
payers to drive prices as low as possible?
MR. OOI: Bryan, perhaps you -- were you going to ask a question or were you going to
comment on that?
MR. ZIELINSKI: Well, I did have a question. When you say it should be proportional,
do you mean the regulatory exclusivity should somehow vary?
DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: No, no, I don't think it can vary by case to cases. If it's a
principle of law, then it has to be harmonized, irrespective of what cases come before the Court.
I'm saying that the return on investment, the quantity of reward of patent need to be assessed in a
more robust way than it is in the moment, and that's why I'm suggesting HTA databases to be used
to that effect so you have a reason.
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MR. ZIELINSKI: So it's a price that can be charged then?
DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: Sorry?
MR. ZIELINSKI: It's the price that can be charged for the drug? Is that it?
DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: I have not thought that through. I must admit that. I don't think
-- if it's the price that can be charged for the drug, that would depend on market demand, that would
depend on political issues, political lobbying by the patients, emotive issues, and that becomes
egregious.
MR. ZIELINSKI: I think right now I think Europe has it roughly right -DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: What's that?
MR. ZIELINSKI: I think that Europe has it roughly right. I think the difficulty is in their
uses, particularly new uses at the end of the product life cycle or after it. You can give data
exclusivity, but it may not be enforceable data exclusivity because of off label use. So it could be
a meaningless gesture. So you have to somehow overcome that.
DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: Overcome that, yeah.
MR. ZIELINSKI: I really appreciate this conversation and I think it points out the fact
that the regulatory processes and regulators stand at the nexus of the major problems that confront
pharmaceutical development, and clearly, one of those problems is the creation and maintenance
of incentives. But the other big one is that drug development costs too much and I'm wondering,
particularly in light of Sir Robin's comments, we're in this era of precision medicine and
companion diagnostics such that you more and more can't identify that subpopulation of patients
who will respond to a drug and that creates great marketing problems. But it also perhaps creates
the opportunity to address clinical trials a little differently.
If we look at the cost structure, an overwhelming amount of the cost is in clinical trials,
and so you can imagine with precision diagnostics that you can have a much smaller trial size to
demonstrate efficacy. But we have this overhanging concern with safety, and so from a regulatory
point of view, is there any potential, are there any good ideas out there about how we could evaluate
safety with smaller clinical trials and then -- and thus lower our total costs so that we can change
the cost side of the equation as well? What is the attitude of regulators toward post market
surveillance as an adequate approach and what other ideas do you have?
DR. FELDSCHRIEBER: Can I preempt? And I'll give a lay opinion and then you can
give a professional opinion. What you're saying is that you can amplify the power of studies by
identifying those subsets of population, and that will make a very dramatic difference in the size
and duration of clinical trials to show efficacy, efficacy and effectiveness. What it may not do of
course is enhance the power of those studies to exhibit signals of safety. But in parallel with that,
the initiatives of what Stefano was talking about, particularly the -- what I'm saying is that this
suggestion of defining subsets of populations to go into efficacy clinical trials greatly enhances the
statistical power of those studies so that you can get conclusions on efficacy and potentially
effectiveness in HTA assessments much, much earlier, but it doesn't allow for an amplification of
the power to detect safety seal.
But the regulatory initiatives in Europe at the moment, the early access to medicine
schemes, coupled with the identification of innovative medicines, orphan medicines and so forth,
personalized medicines, that will allow a faster conditional assessment of what the benefit risk is,
together with the resources needed to monitor the patients post marketing and to take effective
steps if the benefit risk study -- if the benefit risk evaluation changes. What it does demand, and
this is where I leave it to Stefano, is huge investment in post marketing authorization studies.
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MR. MARINO: You have a very well taken point, and in fact, one of the features of
priority medicines pilot scheme that we are trying to develop now is how to keep the same positive
risk benefit ratio and so to not release at all the concept of safety for the patients, allowing at the
same time the applicant to come up with lesser, more targeted data, for example for a small subset
of population and then have predictions for a positive successful outcome in a broader population.
Now, this was one of the features of an instrument, as I said in my presentation, that has
not been used much by companies, which is the conditional marketing authorization, granted for
12 months. This entails assessing the data that come from real life, from market, and see after 12
months whether it should be confirmed or revoked. There are two more elements that since 2012
have been introduced in Europe and these are the so-called PAES and PASS20, that is, postauthorization efficacy studies, post-authorization safety studies. The EMA negotiates with
applicants the conduct of these studies which should cast additional light on the real value of the
product.
If you combine all this, ideally what we are trying to obtain is a system where companies
spend less in clinical trials. Ethics are also satisfied because you don't go without any medical
need, any scientific need, you don't go to perform additional clinical trials that would not be
absolutely necessary. The safety of the patients is guaranteed as well.
When the pharmacovigilance legislation introducing these two instruments was enacted in
2012, there was a lot of muttering at the level of companies. They said, Well, why do we have to
do that? And even now, I mean we struggle sometimes at the EMA with protests coming from
companies who don't accept the evaluations by the committees, for example.
Well, we are there to help. We are there to undertake a dialog with companies. If companies
understand that these are tools that may help in the development of new drugs, facilitate the
understanding of the value of a given drug and perhaps facilitate the job of technology assessment
bodies who then have to give an opinion to the payers, if all this circle is not a vicious one but a
positive one, then I think that the whole system would benefit.
One last point I need to make based on Sir Robin's words and also about the gentleman
who also made very good comments before, about these new uses. And it's the relationship with
privacy. Because of the existence of off-label use, because of the existence of very complicated
reimbursement schemes, imagine in Germany or in Italy where not only the central government,
but also the Lander or the regions in Italy will have on how much they want to reimburse for the
drug, how can all this function if there is no robust control on the prescriptions and on the condition
for which the drug is given?
We deviated from that old address of checking the prescription. There was a law, maybe
the professor from Marseille may remember that, in France, which I think was very good. New
uses of existing drugs were reimbursed based on the prescription and on the medical condition that
the medical doctor used to indicate on that prescription. So There was a heavy administrative
control on those prescriptions. This guaranteed the reward for innovation and neutralized to a large
extent the undesirable effects of off-label uses.
Well, that law, I remember, was a model for other countries but then it was aborted in
France because of various reasons, privacy considerations, sort of a top-down approach to give
preference to generics, and so slowly other countries in Europe followed that. Isn't it time now to
go back to that concept, because in the absence of a robust protection like in Japan, what would be
the reward for
those who develop new existing -- new therapeutic uses of existing drugs? Nihil, for all the
reasons that have been said.
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Is that a desirable consequence of the legislation? I think that all these subjects were
liquidated at the time in a very quick way, because we had to introduce the “8+2+1” system. I
think politicians should take a look back at these issues and see whether there is room now to come
back to the past and see if the future was better 30 years ago.
MR. OOI: Thank you. I'd love for this lively exchange to go on but I'm conscious about
not wanting to eat into our lunchtime. So with that, will you please join me in thanking our
panelists.
[Applause.]
[Lunch recess was taken.]
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PANEL II
DEVELOPING NEW MEDICAL TREATMENTS TO IMPROVE GLOBAL HEALTH

Moderator:
Richard Wilder, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Seattle, WA, USA).
Panelists:
Dr. Tadataka Yamada, Frazier Healthcare Partners, formerly at Takeda Pharmaceutical:
Former Global Health Director, Gates Foundation (Seattle, WA, USA).
Maja Larson, Allen Institute for Brain Science (Seattle, WA, USA).
Dr. Anthony Blau, Division of Hematology, University of Washington (Seattle, WA,
USA).
MR. WILDER: So this is the second time I'm before you here today and hopefully this
will be the last, maybe very briefly at the end to give some closing remarks, but what I want to do
is to invite the panelists for the first panel here this afternoon which is the second panel for the
conference overall to come up now to the podium. So Tachi Yamada and Maja Larson and
Anthony Blau, and we'll get started then with Panel No. 2.
So I'm again Richard Wilder, associate general counsel at the foundation, and I am going
to be giving a little bit of an overview of what we do in terms of managing our work here in the
foundation. I'll be going into a little bit more detail about some of the matters that Trevor touched
on in his presentation. And we have a great panel gathered here today that is going to be able to
offer us some very interesting insights to the question about developing new medical treatments
to improve global health but from different perspectives. Tachi of course, having come from
industry, having been the president of the global health program here at the foundation, having
then been in industry, I think has a very interesting perspective to offer. Maja Larson, a good
personal friend, a good friend to the foundation from the Allen Institute will be able to talk about
how they view intellectual property in connection with the work they do. And I think it's especially
important to have her participate here because they have a particular focus on open science with
respect to the way that they conduct their work.
And then Anthony Blau of course comes to us from the University of Washington, working
at departments of medicine and genome sciences and being a very well-known scientist working
in the field. And he's representing, as I told him before the session here today, representing all of
science and all of scientists the world over.
And so, you know, I just wanted to say a couple things before I get into my presentation
itself is that I think, you know, one thread that binds us together in this panel is recognition that
science is critical to finding solutions to the problems that confront us all. And I think Trevor did
an excellent job in terms of outlining the nature of the public health problems that we're trying to
address in the developing world. There's obviously a distance between scientific discovery and
then what needs to be done in terms of developing a product, bringing it through clinical trials and
into the market, but it all starts with the science.
It was interesting that Robin was raising questions, some fundamental questions really
about the intellectual property system and the role that it plays and, you know, whether the
approach that we take is different than that that perhaps might be taken by other entities and I'll
talk about that a little bit in a minute. But as I was putting together my thoughts for this, I was
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thinking not sort of historically of where we are now or where we might be going say in 10 year’s
time, but looking back to a very early stage in the development of intellectual property and the
perspectives that we have from the foundation's perspective or from industry or from government
in terms of investments in scientific research. And many of you would remember -- or not
remember perhaps, but at least know of the paper that Vannevar Bush did in 1945 that was called
Science, The Endless Frontier, and at that stage of course it was just after the end of the Second
World War and looking at the investments that the U.S. government had made in scientific research
and asking the question as to whether or not that effort has a role to be continued in terms of
government investing in fundamental science.
And the answer was that -- the answer was yes, and out of that report came a decision by
the government to invest in basic science. It was interesting at the time that that report also
specifically called out the role that industry plays in taking that basic science and transforming or
converting it into practical applications to provide positive benefits in the world. Also paid close
attention to the interests and the needs of the university sector to be involved as well in basic
science and basic research.
And so this report led to greater and consistent funding by the U.S. federal government in
basic research, you know, but I was thinking that now, here we are 70 years on, even though it did
give rise to things like the National Science Foundation, and I think you can trace back the BayhDole Act to the Bush report from 1945, I think it maybe is a time to take a fundamental look at the
institutions we have and, you know, ask whether we might want to revisit them.
But again, science is important. It's a starting point for the work that we all do but we also
have to focus very much on those incentives that are necessary in order to get not only the basic
research to be done but also the translation work to be done by industry and other participants.
What I want to do now is turn to my presentation and kind of take some of these broader
themes about funding basic science and moving that basic science through the process of
developing drugs and vaccines and bringing them into market, and in our case, doing so in a matter
that pays particular attention to those markets that are of interest to us and then I'll hand it over to
the other members of the panel. I think Maja has a presentation and the others don't but -DR. YAMADA: I do.
MR. WILDER: You do have a presentation, okay. A slide presentation?
DR. YAMADA: No.
MR. WILDER: Sorry. That's what I meant actually, a slide presentation. And we'll just go
through the presentations, hopefully 10 or 15 minutes each so it will give us time for discussion.
Let me turn to my set of slides and I have several slides that I want to go through them
rather quickly. So the investment challenge in terms of the issues that confront us in dealing with
issues involving the world is that there's proportionately a very small amount of money that goes
into research and development for neglected diseases, the so-called, you know, 10/90 gap between
what goes into those issues that are of prevalence in the developing world versus developed world
issues. And so the question is: How then do we incentivize and focus and bring more investment
into issues that are of interest to us, as Trevor outlined.
The fundamental challenge, I'm going to go through this one very quickly, but what we
want to be able to do -- and Trevor alluded to a couple of instances in which we have been
successful in doing this, and basically is moving the graph to the left; that is, to find a way that we
can take as much of the risk out of investments as possible early on before we start making very
large scale investments in things like clinical trials. And so that's a part of the goal that we have
here.
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Part of that comes out in, you know, work that was highlighted in terms of looking at
existing drugs that might be repurposed where some of the risk in drug development and those
instances can be reduced especially in the early stages.
You know, just has historically been the case in terms of the different actors or players that
are involved in research and development, at the foundation we engage with a large number of
actors or players that are involved in basic research as well as translational research in bringing
products into the market, including multinational pharmaceutical companies, developing country
vaccine manufacturers, biotech and so on. And of course I would add to the list universities and
nonprofit institutions around the world as well.
You know, many of the companies that are represented in this room and those of you that
are outside counsel working with companies, will probably see your logos up on the screen, so we
do work with a large number of entities the world over. And in doing this work, we have a number
of investment tools that are available to us. Most of our funding comes through grants. We also
are increasingly making use of what Trevor alluded to which are PRIs, Program Related
Investments, and in that context we provide loans, guarantees, fund investments and the like.
The one thing that Trevor alluded to that I think is important to keep in mind is the direct
equity investments where we do make equity investments in small companies for the most part
that we think have promise in terms of a new platform that we may be able to have broad access
to for the work that we do, and we structure the arrangements early on to be sure that we focus on
our global access requirements and what we want to have in terms of the outcome for the work
that those companies are engaged in and I'm going to talk about that specifically in just a second.
What I wanted to do is to put up this chart, and I've got another one actually just following
this to indicate that, you know, as we think about these investments and the type of investment
vehicles we have, we also map it against the stages of development of a product from early stage
discovery through development, clinical trials and into the marketplace. And so what type of
investment vehicle we use is likely going to vary depending upon where we are in terms of the
stage of development, not only of the technology, but the products that arise from the utilization
of that technology.
And as Trevor indicated, our overarching objective is to ensure that what we call our global
access objectives are met. It largely has two sections to it. One is that the knowledge and
information gained from our project is promptly and broadly disseminated. And Trevor, you know,
mentioned our open access policy that dealt specifically to access to publications published in
peer-reviewed journals and the data underlying them. So that is a specific embodiment, if you will,
of that first prong of the global access objectives.
The second is that the products that arise from our funding are available and accessible at
affordable prices in the developing world, so in connection with that -- and really, this is the last
slide that I have for my presentation and it's a very busy one so I apologize for that. But as we
engage in these activities and we look at the different funding instruments that we have available
to us, we look at the stage of the project that we're going to be funding, the nature of the project,
you know, whether it's involving a pharmaceutical product or vaccine or a diagnostic, the question,
as Trevor indicated, is to whether it has application in the developed world and therefore is of
commercial interest or it's exclusively something that would have market potential, if you will, in
the developing world where the purchasing power is relatively low.
All of those questions come into play when we're deciding not only what particular, you
know, instruments to use but how we're going to manage the intellectual property in connection
with those agreements.
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And so as your kind of track this process from early stage research all the way to bringing
a product into the market, you know, we're likely in our very early stage agreements, going to have
a very broad recitation of our global access objectives, much like the text that I've put up on the
slide a moment ago. As we move through the process and the chances of success go up, and even
further in the process as we've identified a particular product that we can actually say, this is a
product, it's going to come into market, we can start talking about costing. We can start making
very specific projections as to what the procurement potential is for that product. Then we can get
into the stage where we talk about price and volume commitments and other aspects where we're
very, very precise about what we want in terms of the price of that product for the given markets
that we're targeting.
And so it's -- you know, it's a bit of a multidimensional chess game actually when it comes
to putting in place the agreements and managing them and the intellectual property in connection
with the projects that we fund. But as I said, it very much is driven by the markets that we intend
to serve at the end, where we are in the development stage of a given product, and also this question
of whether this product does have commercial market potential, which then goes to the question
of exclusivity and how then that exclusivity plays into the incentives of getting the different parties
interested and involved in the project from the beginning, as well as interested and involved in
making their own contributions to the development of the product.
I didn't actually have anything more for my formal presentation so I'm going to stop here
and then hand it over to Tacheta Yamada, but what I was going to suggest is that what we can do
is hold off questions until we've all had a chance to give our presentation and then we can have a
discussion amongst ourselves, the members of the panel, as well as opening it up to the questions
for the group as a whole.
So with that I'll stop and hand it over to Tachi and you're welcome to come down here or
you can speak from the -DR. YAMADA: I'll speak from there.
MR. WILDER: Great. Thank you.
[Applause.]
DR. YAMADA: Thank you, Dick. I used to work here, very happily, and I was a little
worried when I understood that Trevor and Dick were going to give presentations that I would
actually say the same thing that they were going to say. But I really wanted to focus on what the
problem is and how to fix it. So at the Gates Foundation, when I worked here and today still, the
biggest problems maybe that they work on are HIV, tuberculosis, malaria. And let's look at those
conditions.
HIV we have drugs for but it's been almost 35 years. Next year will be 35 years since the
first cases of HIV were reported in MMR Weekly, and we don't have a vaccine. We think a vaccine
is easy to make but we don't have a vaccine. So what we do is we treat people but we don't actually
cure them.
If you'll take a look at malaria, the last drug for which there is still very little resistance is
now encountering resistance and that drug was developed 2,000 years ago. It is an herbal medicine
from China from sweet worm oil. Now, the Nobel prize was given to one of the scientists who
understood the critical elements in the sweet worm that would be an anti-malarial, but think of it
as a 2,000-year-old medicine for a condition that kills a million people a year. I'm sorry; at least
700 million to -- 700,000 to a million people a year.
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And then let's think about tuberculosis, the classic diagnosis for TB is 100 years old. The
ineffective vaccine for tuberculosis is 80 years old and the last medicine until last year, new
medicine for TB was 40 years ago.
What is the problem? Why don't we have, with all the modern science, with the ways in
which we can treat and cure cancer, why don't we have these solutions? And I'd like to just talk
about three things that I think are critical.
The first is innovation. Now, that's a word that a lot of people use and it's an easy word that
slips off the tongue. Every company has it in its logo, we're innovative. But what is innovation?
There's a difference between evolutionary innovation and revolutionary innovation. If -- I'm a
gastroenterologist. I used to treat lots and lots of people with peptic ulcer disease. All of the
treatments had to do with reducing acid. So first there were antacids, basically alkalide that you
took. Then there were -- there was a Nobel prize given for the first antihistamine, Tagamet that
caused lowering in peptic acid. Proton pump inhibitors became a product that sold $14 billion a
year, the biggest product class in the world, but none of those cured ulcers because the day you
stopped taking the medicine, the ulcer came back.
And what happened was some outside-the-box thinkers, revolutionary innovators came up
with a theory that it was an infection that caused peptic ulcer and if you treat the infection the ulcer
goes away. And sure enough, that's what's happened. And why do I tell this story in Global Health?
Because it turns out that the same infection causes gastric cancer, and if you look in -- the largest
cancer burden for the poorest people in the world is gastric cancer, if they can live long enough to
get it.
And by the way, this didn't cost a lot of money. In fact, these scientists couldn't get money
for their idea because all these ideas are subject to peer review and true innovators have no peers
so therefore you cannot get an innovative solution funded. It's very hard to.
One of the great things about the Gates Foundation is that we had enough money and we
had a kind of spirit that allowed us to make high risk investments. You heard about that a little bit
from Trevor, but we were willing to do that and we had a program called Grand Challenges
Exploration that focused on true innovation, outside-the-box thinking, rewarding creative thought,
not preliminary data. I think we need much more of that to get solutions to problems that have
been around for a long time and we still don't have solutions for them.
Now, the second thing that's needed for success here is the pharmaceutical industry. You
may or may not like the pharmaceutical industry, but nobody makes drugs except pharmaceutical
companies. That's a fact. People think the NIH makes drugs. They do not. They make the science
that goes into drugs but they don't make drugs. And I learned all too well when I went from
academia where I had millions of dollars of NIH funding, to industry, and learned that all I knew
was the smallest part of making a drug, the basic science. There's a lot more critical applied science
that goes into making a drug and that can make or break a creative scientific idea.
So how do we get pharma companies involved? Well, it's a tough thing to do because they
have to answer to shareholders. They have to make a profit. Your pension probably depends on
their profit along with the oil companies and hopefully not tobacco companies, but companies that
make a profit. And so how do we engage them? Well, one thing that we can't do is to engage them,
engage their committed spirit and then ask them to -- ask them to go bankrupt because if without
intellectual property they will go bankrupt. There is no way they can make a profit of hundreds
and millions of dollars of investment unless they can get a return on that investment. But there are
ways and there are creative ways that you can incentivize pharmaceutical companies.
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I can talk about two that I've been part of. One is called a priority review voucher. Now,
the priority review voucher, essentially we worked on this together, Hannah, it was a brilliant idea
by a couple of professors in a business school at Duke who thought that the way we could get some
investment, in their case they were thinking about anti-infectives but became more broadly to apply
to products for diseases of the developing world, and more recently to orphan diseases for children,
but the idea was that if you made a product for a disease for which there is no market in the U.S.
and which had a significant impact on the global disease problem, then you would get a priority
review voucher.
Now, what does that mean? It means that you can apply this voucher to any drug in your
portfolio and that drug will get a review in six months, whereas the standard review is 12 months.
Does that seem like a lot? Well, the pharma companies, I couldn't convince them that this was a
really valuable property, okay? They said, Oh, you know, our best estimate is $20 million, maybe
$10 million. That's all they saw. Well, I can tell you what happened. The critical proof of concept
was when Sanofi purchased a priority review voucher and that allowed them to launch a new
product, multibillion dollar product in atherosclerosis a couple months ahead of Angin. They
would have been four months behind. In fact, they were two months ahead.
Now, what does this mean? Well, if you're first in class you get roughly 50 percent of the
market. If you're second in class, you get roughly 30 percent of the market. Think of that for a
multibillion dollar drug. How many billions is that worth for a drug during the course of a lifetime?
So you can see what's happened now. Actually the price of the first PRV was $60 million. The last
PRV to sell was $350,000,000, and these dollars went to small companies who are making
products for global health. And the big companies saw that that was a tremendous incentive for
them to actually acquire the asset because it would bring profit to the rest of their portfolio.
This kind of creative idea is really important. I won't talk about the other one because I'm
running out of time. But I want to talk about a third very important issue. Making medicines costs
a lot of money, lots of money. The Gates Foundation was a 50/50 partner with GlaxoSmithKline
in making the first vaccine for malaria. It's not a great vaccine, truth be told, it's maybe 50 percent
effective. This drug cost us $750 million. How many products can we make if each one costs that
much, and where is that money going to come from? The Gates Foundation is rich, but not that
rich.
So how do we get this money? Where do we get not 100 million here or 50 million there,
but billions of dollars to create new medicines for HIV, malaria, TB, pneumonia, diarrhea, all the
things that we can think about that kill children? Well, the only way is if people understand that
global health is a matter of national and global security, national and global security.
This is what happened with HIV in America. HIV in America was sought to be a disease
that sinners got and so there was no interest in it. When it became something that could be brought
in from outside to the United States, then big money came available in a program called the
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS relief, and that program was a multibillion dollar program,
and where do you think the money came from? It came from the Department of Defense budget
because it was a national security issue. And when you think about Ebola or you think about H1N1
pandemics or SARS and you see what happens to a small country like Singapore when SARS
occurs is that the airport closes, the borders close. Nobody can travel. The economy tanks. It is a
national security issue.
And so when we can think about global health problems as true national security, global
security issues, then we can tap into the budgets that will give us billions and not millions. Thank
you very much.
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[Applause.]
MS. LARSON: Hello there. So that was a very nice presentation. Thank you. And thank
you, Tony, for being the scientist because I am not a scientist nor am I an IP lawyer, but I've been
at the Allen Institute for quite a while and we are all about openness and so that is why Dick has
me on the panel. So I'm Maja Larsen, I'm the general counsel at the Allen Institute. These slides
were put together this morning so bear with me. There could be a couple typos.
So I want to talk about the Allen Institute and who we are and how do we balance
innovation management with being as open as we are. So we started out as the Allen Institute for
Brain Science back in 2003 and we started with $100 million of seed money from Paul Allen and
we are still primarily funded by Paul. He has committed about a billion dollars at this point to the
Allen Institute. We are a nonprofit independent medical research organization and we're focused
on doing basic research to propel -- well, the brain science side is focused on propelling basic brain
science forward, fueling discovery to move brain science forward as quickly as possible. So on -and we call -- we say what we do as "big science" because we do everything on an industrial scale.
Our mission is to deliver all of our data management and tools as open as we can to the
research community and also to the public and the way we disseminate most of our data is through
our website. So the first 10 years of our existence was basically creating atlases of gene expression
in different models. We did the mouse brain, the human brain and the nonhuman primate, the cat
brain, for both the adult and the developing models. But once you got all of your models -- all of
your atlases done, you're kind of done making atlases, making mops, and so in 2012 we launched
a 10-year plan to really dive deeper into brain science and ask some more hypothesis-driven
questions, to ask some of the big questions around just figuring out more about the brain. Like
how is it built, what are the parts, how do the parts talk to each other, how do the parts -- how do
the parts receive, store and pass on information, and most importantly, what goes wrong in disease.
So you'll notice the underlined words and that's important for how we are balancing our
openness with our innovation management. We are -- it was easy for us early on particularly to be
a poster child for openness and open science because of our funding. We are funded by primarily
one single philanthropist who has a passion for open science.
We are doing basic research, so on the development cycle we're at the beginning stages, so
we are doing all basic research, which doesn't have a lot of patentable, you know, protectable
things as much. And our mission is to propel science forward, so our mission is to get stuff out so
that we can make science go faster. If we spent all the time protecting everything, we wouldn't be
able to get that out as fast as we can.
In fact, when we started, we -- one of the things that we did was to put all of our research
results out as soon as they went through QC, and between two and three times a year, we would
put out our research results, and we were told that we would never be able to get a high impact
journal if we were to do that because we would be -- we would be putting out our research results.
But it was more important for us to get out the research results than it was to be in a high impact
journal so that's what we did was put out those results.
As it turned out, our first journal was the cover of Nature in 2007, so that seemed to be just
fine as well. But that wasn't our purpose. Our purpose was to get it out -- to get those research
results out. So because of our funding, our mission and where we are in the development cycle, it
makes it the perfect Trifecta for us to be able to be open science and be the -- and -- well, to be the
example. So, but you can see starting in 2012 we're now starting to think in terms of disease. So
as we start to grow, that becomes an issue as to how we now have to start managing innovations.
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So last year Paul gave $100 million to create an organization called the Allen Institute for
Cell Science. It's -- we're now called the Allen Institute and we have two operating divisions, the
Allen Institute for Brain Science and the Allen Institute for Cell Science. Cell science is also
funded right now -- well, 100 percent by Paul Allen, and it is focused on studying the cell as an
integrated system in order to push disease-related research forward. So it's much more focused on
disease-related research than our brain science has ever been.
And just -- but just like the Allen Institute for Brain Science, its mission is also to make all
of its data openly available, all of its data, knowledge and tools openly available through open
science. And the first project is called The Animated Cell. It's going to be a dynamic cell and it's
hopefully going to accelerate cell biology and biomedical research.
So here is the evolution of our innovation management program, and we call it innovation
management as opposed to intellectual property management because we think all of our
innovation because -- it's a cultural thing. So as we've been growing -- so when I started, well,
eight and a half years ago, there were less than 100 people and there were only 10 Ph.Ds. There's
now over 100 Ph.D.’s and over 300 people and we're -- our trajectory is growth. And as you can
see by the 2012 change in our 10-year plan and then the cell science, we have definitely grown in
complexity. And that is required that we have to start looking at innovation management instead
of just putting everything out open. And so we've had to start thinking about a policy and thinking
about a program so that we're not just doing things willy nilly because that's not the way we do
things. We do things very methodically.
So our mission has stayed the same. It's accelerating the pace of -- now it's science
worldwide as opposed to just brain science and cell science and -- but our biggest mission is to
make an "impact." And we use that word, we use it a lot and it is extremely important to us because
that's what we measure. We measure our impact and we focus, we do things because of our -- to
make the impact. We also use the word "stewardship" a lot because we are blessed with having an
enormous amount of money for our research institute. And -- but we have to be good stewards of
that money that we receive so we can't just give everything away for free unless that makes the
most impact and is the right decision, but if there are ways to make bigger impact we should be
using the resources that we receive to make that big impact.
So I get asked this question a lot, and as we're starting to go down this innovation
management process, what about our big open science? And it's still our bedrock principle. We
will always put out our data free and open up on our website. We are completely open access to
Dick's point about being open access. All of our data is available on line. Not only our data, but
also tools in order to read our data is also on line. And we actually do teachings. We have trainings
all over the world to teach scientists how to use our data in order to get our data used more and
more.
But where we have changed is the second bullet, and that is there are some things that are
going to take more than just publications and database and data access in order to make that big
impact that we want to make. And those are the things that we're now putting under the innovation
management policy.
And as I've always told the scientists, open is never free and unrestricted. Even open source
software has some kind of license. So it can't just always give everything away for free. There's
always going to be some restrictions.
So I hesitated putting this slide up because this is so at the very early stages of what we're
thinking of in terms of a policy, but actually I wasn't going to have any slides, I was going to speak
to this whole thing, but I thought it would be a better visual to actually see it. So as we were going
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down the pathway to figuring out how to make a policy on how do we care about innovation
management, we started with our mission, which is accelerating science, and as you can see, we
want to maximize the total impact of our big science research for the public benefit and also
minimize the barriers of access. Those are the things that are important to us. And -- but now we're
putting that parenthetical including entrepreneurial and commercial activities because we're now
getting into things that we very well could have activities and we don't want to just say no.
We used to say we'll never patent. We don't say that anymore. In fact, we filed our first
provisional patent almost a year ago. We don't know what we'll do with it. It's all baby steps at this
point that we are truly practicing.
I got to talk fast. So when we would patent is when we would maximize public use and
benefit. That's really the reason and we can talk about it. I won't talk about everything else but at
the very end that's the most important thing. Obtaining the revenue stream is not going to be a
priority for us in patenting. That's not even on the table for us. Our goal is to get our innovations
out. So this is kind of what we create, that big -- that big part of the triangle actually should be
bigger than that because most of what we create is data, but we also create software and bio
materials and equipment and devices. And then we have other things that feed into data when you
deep dive into our data. And those are things that we can figure out different ways to disseminate
and that's really what is under our innovation management program.
So these are all the different ways of -- that we can disseminate, and this is the way when
we talk with our scientists, these are -- our No. 1 way is through the website and publications. It's
still our No. 1 way of disseminating any of our research results because that's, well, it's easiest and
we hope that that would make the biggest impact. But we can also go through direct distribution
and we do. We send out a lot of transgenic mice. We've got viruses deposited. We also do a lot of
licensing.
And the last thing now that we're putting up IP, we can do patents, and again, it would only
be if we're going to maximize public use or benefit. Or the other reason is if we want what we're
calling "a seat at the table." And what that means is if it makes sense for us to spend the money to
patent something so that then we would have something to negotiate with, that makes sense to us
because that could make a bigger impact. So we would do that.
We haven't yet. We're still in the baby steps, but that's what we're kind of thinking of right
now. Again, all of these are so draft slides that I wasn't going to put them up but it was easier.
So this is my last slide. We are blessed by being one of the only research institutes that
have the -- in both policy and practice, that we can unequivocally be both open and practical. So
we're in this place. We have this opportunity to lead and that's what we're trying to do with this
openness. We understand that not everybody has that perfect Trifecta but we do. So that's it.
MR. WILDER: Thank you.
[Applause.]
DR. BLAU: So it's estimated that in the United States every year there are probably about
a million people with cancer who get treated, and they get treated and they respond and are cured,
or they're not frequently, and collectively we're no smarter for those experiences. And what we're
aiming for through this entity that we created at the University of Washington called The Center
for Cancer Innovation is that every cancer patient’s experience adds to an ever-growing body of
knowledge that makes us progressively smarter about how cancer works.
This started several years ago. I'm a hematologist. I didn’t start off working in cancer, I'm
a researcher primarily, but in discussions with my wife, who's a hard core breast cancer oncologist
in private practice, maybe about seven years ago now, it became clear that we needed a
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fundamentally different approach to address cancer. The condensation of the problem is that
technology improves exponentially whereas the manner in which that's applied to cancer patients
improves, but linearly.
So if you're in the position of a patient with cancer who's fighting for your life, you're
facing an ever-widening gap between what's possible with technology and what's actually brought
to bear in your care. And I think the grand challenge of our time is to find a way to close that gap.
So toward that end, we began at the University of Washington a clinical study, clinical trial
about two years ago that is based on the idea that you would place patients with cancer at the center
of an unprecedented scientific investigation. We have focused initially on a type of cancer called
metastatic triple negative breast cancer. About 15 percent of all breast cancer falls into this triple
negative category, and if you have metastatic triple negative breast cancer, that's thought to be a
uniformly fatal disease. It's incurable.
And so we find women who have this incredibly difficult problem who want to be the
subjects of an unprecedented scientific investigation in which they allow us to biopsy their tumor
at multiple different sites of the disease because cancer between every individual's unique, but
within an individual the cancer is constantly evolving so the tumor at one site won't be exactly the
same as a cancer at another site.
We sequence multiple independent bits of the tumor, creating in some cases terabytes of
information, enormous amounts of information, and we place it on the cloud and we make it
accessible to some of the best computational biologists in the world who help us look at it, try to
understand it to the best of our still meager abilities, try to synthesize it and look for a point of
vulnerability that we might be able to attack with a drug. So within each patient, trying to make a
prediction and and then working very hard to make it possible to test the prediction in the patient.
So if we think the patient might respond to a drug, and this may be a drug that's not approved yet,
it might be in clinical trials or it might be approved for another type of cancer but not breast cancer,
we put an enormous amount of energy in not only generating the hypothesis but testing the
hypothesis in the patient and using what happens in the patient then to create a learning loop. Feed
that information back to the computational pipeline and repeat the process iteratively over the
course of the patient's disease so that we create a longitudinal analysis of how the disease responds
within the patient. If we're wrong in our first guess, we come back and we try again.
And this has been a tremendously uplifting experience. You might find that an unusual
description, but it's been a remarkable experience in which thus far 12 patients with metastatic
triple negative breast cancer have made a heroic contribution to science by allowing us to study
them to try to help them to the best of our ability, but also to use their experiences to help future
generations of patients. One of the really interesting things that's comes from this is that when you
do this in a single patient you get an enormous amount of data and you have to figure out how
you're going to approach this. We commonly find that a mutation in a patient's tumor will involve
a gene that we know to be involved in cancer, but the specific way in which it's been altered hasn't
been studied, and so we have entered an area of the unknown.
In these cases we have found the world's experts on this gene and have contacted them to
say: “We have a patient with cancer. This person has a mutation in this gene where you're the
world's expert, could you tell us what you think about this? Could you tell us if you think this
mutation will affect the function of this protein and do you think that this might make the tumor
susceptible to a drug? And if so, what is it?
And we've done this dozens of times and almost 100 percent of the time the researchers
will answer and they will tell you everything they know, whether it's been published or not. One
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of our most interesting examples was a case in which I sent an e-mail to a colleague at the
University of Washington who forwarded my e-mail to another colleague at UW who in turn
forwarded my e-mail to a researcher in Lawrence, Kansas who turned out to be the world's expert
on this specific problem, and made a recommendation.
And so what that's led to then is the idea of trying to aggregate this knowledge so that -and so emerging from this is a platform, a web-based platform where we've placed our patients deidentified information and make it open to anyone whose input might be helpful to our patients.
And this has been built now in a way to scale so that this platform can accommodate hundreds of
thousands of individuals.
Looking toward the day where, what I used to say was that if I get cancer someday, it would
allow me to have my tumor studied on a molecular level, compare my tumor to those of a million
other people with cancer, figure out whose tumor among those million people mine most closely
matches, which treatments they received, what worked for them and what didn't, allowing me to
benefit from that knowledge, and then have my own experience add to that knowledge. And as it
turned out, ironically about six months ago I found out that I do have a form of blood cancer called
myeloma.. And I'm doing great, but -- and now I'm the poster child for this approach where I am
one of the patients on our web platform but -- along with patients from our clinical trial.
But we will be expanding this within the next few months to accommodate any patient with
cancer who wants to upload their information and have it made accessible for global expert
comment. And that's it.
MR. WILDER: That's good.
[Applause.]
MR. WILDER: So we have about 15 minutes left; is that right, for this session? I did want
to open it up to questions from the audience but I thought what I would do is, as you're formulating
your questions, maybe I can pose one to the panelists, including myself, and I'll answer it, do you
think Dick Wilder is a smart guy? No.
[Laughter.]
MR. WILDER: I wanted to kind of go back to a couple things. One is the -- you know, it
seemed like from what I understood of the discussion this morning is that there were some, you
know, more fundamental questions that were raised about the role of intellectual property in the
context of the work that we're talking about here in terms of developing and bringing to market
new pharmaceutical products and pricing and so on. And I don't want to, you know, revisit that
discussion, but -- and it did also allude to the fact that 70 years ago now there was some work that
was done by Vannevar Bush in this country that kind of kicked off a lot of thinking about funding
and participation of different entities in research in development, including the health sector, and
also kind of gave rise to some of the legislation that we have in this country and still use today like
Bayh-Dole and so on. And just raise the question of, well, 70 years on, you know, given where we
are now in the world, should there be some fundamental rethinking about some of that? And I'm
just raising the question.
But the specific question I had is, you know: Given all of that, you know, do you, the
participants on this panel from the different perspectives that you gave, you know, if you look out
into the world of intellectual property and licensing and so forth, see that in order to further your
mission you think it would be better if there were some fundamental changes or revolutionary
change, Tachi, in your remarks around innovation? And I can say that from the foundation, and I
didn't really get into the details of it in the slide, but, you know, from our perspective is that we're
comfortable using the current system of intellectual property. We have these very specific
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discussions, again, at different stages of development as to what we need from our perspective in
terms of global access and development, and ultimately bringing products to market and price and
so on. And, you know, we've been very effective using the intellectual property system and
managing it, managing licensing, again, to get what we want and to, you know, be sure that the
companies, the universities and others involved are able to reserve, you know, their rights that they
think that are important outside the scope of what we do and in particular where they think it might
provide them some commercial advantage.
So we're not, you know, at a point in our work where we're -- and as Trevor indicated, you
know, in the context of data and some other areas, we have some problems and there are
complexities and we do have protracted negotiations and so forth, but at the end of the day they're
not systemic, they're more specific to the projects that we fund and engage in.
So that's my question is just to see, you know, from the panelists, if you're looking at the
world from your perspectives and saying there is something fundamental that needs to be changed
either in, you know, the laws and regulations or the institutions that are involved in the work that
we do. And as I said, from my perspective, from the work that we do, we're able to work in the
context of existing norms and systems.
DR. YAMADA: Yeah, I don't think the issue is so much an issue of intellectual property
as the issue of what you do with it. You can have intellectual property and not -- choose not to
exercise it, and of course, that's what I think, Maja, you're talking about. Intellectual property can
actually protect your ability to operate in a space where others might take that intellectual property
and block people from doing things. So I personally don't think intellectual property is the
fundamental issue. I do think pricing is a big issue, and let me just talk about the difference between
the U.S., Europe and Japan when it comes to pricing. It's very interesting.
In the U.S., the price starts high and every six months, in some companies every four
months, the price goes up, just keeps escalating. There's no control over it and there is no real
competition in a way. In Europe, the price starts low, probably inappropriately low from the
standpoint of the share of the R&D costs that should be borne by wealthier nations and stays low.
In Japan, I think there is a very creative approach to this which is the price generally starts closer
to the U.S. price, not as high as the U.S. price, but every year the price by -- every two years by
mandate the price reduces, so you get your return on the investment you made but every year you
get less and less of the profit.
They've created a new system, they call it sakigake which is a system that says, if it's really
innovative, it's really going to transform human existence, then you can start with a high price and
stay high. Okay.
So there is some element of reward for true innovation and that's very important. The
reason why I say this is because a few years ago, I don't know what the number is now, but a few
years ago the FDA's put out a study that said the average percent improvement in benefit over
placebo of all the registered medicines was 10 percent. That's amazing.
On the other hand, if you take a drug like Sovoldi, now Harvoni, this became the poster
child for pharmaceutical excess, $84,000 for a six-week course of treatment. And everybody said
this was outrageous, a thousand dollars a day. Well, this is the only drug I know of that actually
cures a disease, cures Hepatitis C. And it not only cures Hepatitis C, but it prevents you from
getting cirrhosis and liver cancer. To me, that's -- when you're counting all that up, that makes a
lot of sense.
But if you take a cancer drug, the average cancer drug now launched -- is launched at about
$10,000 a month, $120,000, and the average extension in life for that $100,000 is about two
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months. So there has to be some sort of value equation on the innovation, on the impact, on the
true transformative impact to the medicine in setting a price and allowing the price to go up or
down. Intellectual property I don't believe is the issue.
MS. LARSON: So I think we would -- we clearly don't practice in this field yet, but we
would also be very comfortable that -- I agree that we -- the reason that we would be using it is so
that we could control it and not -- and be able to get our research out the way we wanted to, so I
don't think it's an issue.
DR. BLAU: And I think in the cancer space, lots of institutions are aggregating their data.
It's not just cancer but in health care in general, we try to look across, you know, ideally hundreds
of thousands of patients, find trends that could lead to interesting insights. But they're closed
systems. You have to be either a part of the institution or part of a consortia of institutions. What
we're trying to do -- and I don't think you need a different rule. What we're trying to do is just go
directly to the patients who give us the information in hopes that it could be helpful to them, but
then, you know, potentially bypassing all of that to get large data sets.
MR. WILDER: Thanks. So if there are questions from the floor, we have a couple of
minutes yet actually before we break and take a couple of minutes and get set up for the second
panel, but I did want to give, you know, folks in the room a chance to raise questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am really curious about what the Allen Institute's expectations
are in terms of openness by the people who are taking your information and data, and do you see
a voluntary mechanism and using intellectual property do you think you could sort of enforce that
the way the Linux open source system has the cost of participation you give your innovation back
into the system as opposed to paying money?
MS. LARSON: So I'm assuming you're talking about our data, and if you look on our
website, the terms of use are very simple but we have three requirements -- well, requirements.
One is don't copy us, and what that means is more -- it's more don't copy the entire data set and
then try to sell it. So it's actually don't commercialize it. Because we're giving it away for free so
don't go off and make your own data set and then try to charge for it. So that's the first thing. The
second thing is don't block us so that we can continue doing our research. We -- and the third is
give us credit. So those are the three things that we care about in people using our data. We want
people to use our data for commercial purposes. We want drug companies to use it. If it's useful,
that's part of our mission. We actually -- part of our mission statement is that we produce useful
public resources. And if it's useful, that is a big bonus for us. That's our whole purpose. So we
don't really -- we don't have any -- we don't own anything that you would have created with our
data. That is yours to do whatever you need to do as long as you do those three things.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How do you enforce that?
MS. LARSON: Well, the first -- so from the don't block us, so far we haven't had any
issues with that, so I guess we don't affirmatively go out and try to police it like we would a
trademark or something. And acknowledgment seems to -- again, we don't go policing it. We seem
to get acknowledgment for when people, they understand. And the commercial use, people seem
to understand what the commercial use is. We actually, we've had to clarify that in the terms of
use because people have used our pictures in textbooks. And a lot of our images and they've used
them in textbooks. There was a woman who created a training for -- using the Allen Brain Atlas
and she was selling the training, and so in those instances, what we do is we -- well, to the extent
that we can divvy it out, we did on the terms of use and just said any textbooks, please do that, we
don't want to give you a license. For the woman with the training, we just gave her a license. That's
isn't the intent of what we're considering commercial use.
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do you have to like agree to the terms of use or something to
get access?
MS. LARSON: So there's no click through. So it's pretty loose. We haven't -- we haven't
had any issues to date. As we are -- as we continue to grow up things might change, but given that
our philosophy is so open, we're not going to have a, you must click this in order to see our data.
That is -- that would be completely counter to the way -- to being open.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So one question in terms of a second element: Did you give
consideration to the partly more aggressive approach which is not about blocking us but about
blocking anyone?
MS. LARSON: Don't block anyone.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Meaning that anybody that's using -MS. LARSON: I don't know that that's the way it's written. That's an interesting point. I
don't think that's the way it's written but I like your point.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: In terms of the mission, what it does it then creates a platform - and you know, that's what the -MS. LARSON: Yep.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- the new and all those do, so it's that whole continuum in the
software space. So just curious whether you -MS. LARSON: Didn't even think about it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Okay.
MS. LARSON: But good point.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you for the presentation. I have a quick question for -- I
don't know if it's quick, but for Dr. Blau. The work that you're doing, do you run into barriers I
guess from a regulatory standpoint when you're sharing this information on patients with clinical
experts or experts? Do you run into any regulatory barriers, privacy barriers, and finally U.S. payer
barriers when there are treatments that may truly help these patients but then the payers may balk
because the experimental nature of the medicine that you're looking at?
DR. BLAU: Right. We spend a lot of time on is the patient confidentiality issue and
HIPAA compliance laws. We've surveyed the 12 patients that have come into our clinical trial
about how important is it for them to maintain their confidentiality. And the vast majority don't
care. They find the benefit of potentially being able to access experts that they have no way of
accessing otherwise to be overwhelmingly more important than protecting their confidentiality.
Another safeguard that we put into the platform is in order to come on as a contributor or
somebody that wants to look at what's going on, you have to agree not to attempt to learn the
patient's identity.
As far as regulatory issues go there are huge burdens associated with trying to get drugs.
So in three cases where there were investigational drugs that we wanted access to, we were able
to do it but we had to do it through single patient clinical trials, single patient INDs. Each one
requires an enormous amount of work. In one of our patients we had a pretty strong lead suggesting
that a particular drug might help that patient, and despite enormous effort with the company to try
to get access to that drug, which is in a Phase III clinical trial in lymphoma, we were not able to
access the drug for our patient. Despite the fact that the drug company was planning a clinical trial
of that drug in triple negative breast cancer that they would have done in nine months from now,
we couldn't get it for her. So that's -- that's also a huge hurdle.
PROFESSOR ROIN: Just real quick, this is just something I've been curious about lately.
So one of the problems I've noticed with data management in the social sciences is the
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interoperability of different data sets. So you've got one data set collected one way, another is
collected another, and you want to know a question and you need both the data to answer, how do
you get them to speak together? It sounds simple but it turns out to be paralyzingly difficult in like
most of the time I've seen it come up, but are you guys trying to deal with that in some way?
Because you're both like collecting data for other people to use and then also using different data
sources, is there some sort of effort in this biomedical space to make the -- a collection or a
presentation or use of the data so it will speak to one another or is that just something that like
people are aware of but don't have an answer to yet?
DR. BLAU: It's a huge barrier, but there are many companies and other institutions that
are working to aggregate information across different electronic medical records. Creating
structured data out of PDFs presents a very significant challenge. It's something that we spend an
enormous amount of time on trying to make sure that the data that we collect can be interrogated
when it expands to thousands or hundreds of thousands of patients. It's a hugely important issue.
MS. LARSON: For us, we're involved in a number of initiatives for neuroscience data
because it is also a huge issue. We -- one of the things we're focused on, because again, with our
funding and where we're trying to go with the openness, is creating these usable platforms. So we
have a number of initiatives, Neuro Data Without Borders, that are around the world trying to
create some standards for at least the neuroscience data. But to open data access in general is just
a big hairy issue.
MR. WILDER: Thanks. I think we have one more question.
SIR JACOB: It's not exactly a question. But I read last year that the British National Health
Service launched a program of getting patient consent to all their medical records, which in due
course, as it builds up will be an open access system for in effect the world. It can be the largest
personal database in the world. I don't know how it's going or what's happened to it since, but more
generally, you said with your 14 patients all said, Of course.
And the truth is that this confidentiality business of medical records is probably causing
more trouble than it ought to and the way around is, I think, a default consent position that when
you go to a doctor, you consent unless you withdraw the consent. Much the same as they're just
trying in Wales for organ transport. Everybody in Wales now is taken to consent unless they've
withdrawn it.
I think we should be moving that way for medical records of treatment because most people
say, Of course. Say, I'm ill, and it's going to be good for mankind and of course other people can
use this for that purpose. I think it's a great pity we're not pushing in that direction in some ways.
MR. WILDER: Would that be implemented through changes at National in the case of
the European Union through regulation or would it be done on -- simply as a matter of practice by
IRBs?
SIR JACOB: Well, the Wales thing was done by legislation at the Welsh assembly. UK is
slightly fragmenting. It would have to be done by national governments. But you only need a few
governments to change the position and you're creating a database for the world. If the United
States did it, it would be fantastic. If the European Union did it and China did it, it would be
fantastic.
DR. YAMADA: Without getting into a big argument here, I think there is an alternative
point of view which is about privacy and the utilization of the data for many different purposes,
for example, for employment or for insurance or for, you know, admission into universities and
such. I think it's not a straightforward issue.
SIR JACOB: There's ways around that.
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DR. YAMADA: We can spend two days talking about that.
MR. WILDER: Which we'll do at the reception later on this evening. All right. So thank
you very much. That's it for our panel.
[Applause.]
[Recess was taken.]
[Concluded at 4:20 p.m.]
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PANEL III
ACCESS TO MEDICINE: CHARITIES, ACADEMICS & INDUSTRY COLLABORATION FOR NEW
TREATMENTS

Moderator:
Dr. James Haley, Ropes & Gray (New York, NY, USA).
Panelists:
Dr. Jurgen Dressel, Novartis (Basel, Switzerland).
Yoichi Okumura, Japan Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and Takeda
Pharmaceutical Company, Ltd. (Osaka, Japan).
Jerry McLaughlin, AgeneBio Inc. (Baltimore, MD, USA).
Hannah Kettler, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Seattle, WA, USA).
MR. HALEY: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to have to inform you that Toshiko has
said there will be no reception unless you get back to your seats. And she is very difficult on this
point. But really, I know very well that I don't want to stand in the way of the reception and I've
already told our speakers that anyone who goes over time will be subject of ridicule of all of you
and you get one less petit four or whatever we're going to have at the Gates Foundation.
So the last panel of today is about access to medicine for new treatments. And obviously
before you can have access to medicine you have to develop the new treatment or the new drug.
And as we learned this morning, most of these repositioned or established drugs with new uses are
discovered by academics, by clinicians, by happenstance, by somebody having an idea for a new
hypothesis as to why disease works in a particular way and then they begin looking for drugs that
might treat that disease.
So you often have the discovery of the disease and perhaps the new treatment. Now you
have to find someone to fund it, to fund the development, to help you get to the clinical trial, to
help you build your market. And the people who are funding who have the deep pockets are
looking for how they're going to get a reward from doing that, and I think this panel is going to try
to address that with some real life situations.
Jurgen is going to start talking about really what the problem is with skinny labels, which
means a label that excludes the new use but the doctor is prescribing for the new use and therefore
the development of the new use does not get the proffer to which he or she deserves. Yoichi is then
going to talk about what Takeda is doing in Japan in particular models of various things to try to
overcome this thing. Jerry McLaughlin who is the CEO of Agene that happens to be one of my
clients, is really in the pits right now trying to convince someone to fund a clinical trial for a drug
that may in fact delay the onset of Alzheimer's and having a lot of trouble because it's an
established drug. And then Hannah is going to talk a little bit about how the Gates Foundation
funds this type of research. So I'll turn it over to Jurgen.
MR. DRESSEL: So good afternoon, everybody. I'm not as tall as Jim, therefore I stand
here on the podium. I don't know how you guys feel this afternoon after having heard these people
from the Gates Foundation and the Allen Foundation and what I have to say, I feel inspired. I also
feel humbled. Now -- and I have to say what I should say is I would like to thank Toshiko and
Dick and especially Robin of actually putting such great people together and tell us about these
alternative ways of how we possibly can fund research into pharmaceuticals.
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As I said, I feel humbled. You know, I almost hesitate now to go back into the nitty gritty
details and to the mundane world of enforcing patents, but I decided I have only this slide deck so
I will do it.
[Laughter.]
MR. DRESSEL: I'm sorry for that. So how did we get into this strange situation? We
started out, in principle people found, yes, this clinical innovation should be patentable. They
granted many patents for it, and now suddenly that we are trying to enforce this patents, we find
out hmm, maybe they are not really worth an awful lot. Isn't that a strange situation? So let me try
to take a little bit of a historical perspective here.
When you look at TRIPS Article 27.1 says you can basically patent anything under the sun
as long as it's novel, inventive and has some industrial application. There are very few exclusions
there, and one of them says you can exclude from patentability methods of treatment.
Some countries actually decided to ignore that. US, Australia are countries like that as it
comes to matters of treatment, but some -- many other countries actually, decided yes, I want to
make use of that exclusion. So when you look at the latest version of the European Patent
Convention, Article 53c , Exceptions into patentability, one of them that is excepted is methods of
treatment of the human body. But there's an exclusion in the exclusion and that actually was one
that was introduced after case law had actually made it possible to patent clinical innovation,
methods of treatment -- not directly methods of treatment but some of you might have heard these
weird animals of Swiss-type claims. And they basically want to legalize that and put that into the
statute and therefore they have this use-limited product claims, the exclusion of the exclusion.
Maybe it's worthwhile thinking again why was there actually the first exclusion? And a
little bit of insight is given by an Enlarged Board of Appeal decision. That's the highest Board of
Appeal at the European Patent Office, so just a few snippets from that decision G-2/08 which dealt
with dosing regimes, and there were social, ethical and public health considerations. There were
physicians who should be free to take all actions they consider suitable to prevent or to cure disease
and in this exercise they should remain uninhibited by patents. What happens if you have a patent
on the compound. Of course, as a matter of principle, you could actually prevent the doctor from
applying that where there's no exemption for the doctor to practice what he does.
So I think the exclusion of the exclusion we saw earlier makes a lot of sense in that context,
because the second medical use is not so much different from the first medical use of the
component as such.
So then how did we run into the current predicament? Let me talk about these terms "carve
out" and "cross-label use." This is a typical picture you probably have seen many times. The
pharmaceutical company spends a lot of time and money to do research, development and
regulatory approval for the drug, and very early on you actually file a basic compound patent,
possibly extend it depending on the country where that is possible in order to take account of the
time you have to spend for the regulatory approval process and for the clinical trials which take
longer than for other technologies.
And then as you are actually developing your drug, you actually learn more about the drug.
You get more experience and you might actually have the idea, maybe it's not only for the first
indication but another indication B where it can also be used. And sometimes you get a patent on
that, the so-called second medical use patent for B.
Traditionally, in most countries a generic had to do a one-to-one copy of the label of the
originator. So it had to contain all the approved indications, A and B. Of course they could get to
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the market after the last patent of the second medical use patent expired, but not, strangely enough,
when the first indication A was in principle patent-free.
So you see the tension. You see a little bit of an evergreen element there. And the legislator
said something had to be done about it, and he asked very early on and had already contained the
so-called carve-out possibility. So carve-out of B led to a so-called skinny-label generic, so a
generic that does not contain all the indications, but only the patent-free indication A, not the
patented indication B was perfect.
And that's fine, so as long as they only come with indication A, the patent-free indication,
that sounds fair. But the problem came when actually most of skinny-label generics in the
marketplace were used cross-label for the still patented indication B. And that seems wrong.
Let me explain a little bit. I can explain what I actually mean by cross-label use because
it's not such a commonly used term, but I find it useful in actually distinguishing from the normal
off-label use you might be more familiar with.
So what's the difference? When you have an originator drug, and let's say it's approved for
those two indications, A and B. When that drug is used for those indications it's on-label. When - but sometimes you find maybe an indication, or there's some scientific evidence where the doctor
says, Okay, I can also use it for this other indication C, that would be called off-label use.
Now, let's look at the skinny-label generic. The skinny-label generic has carved out the
patented indication B. Then the skinny-label drug is used for this indication B, in principle it's not
really an off-label use because the drug as such has been approved for B. It has been approved in
the originator label. And therefore, by cross reference to the originator label, the skinny-label drug
could be used for the carve-out indication. That's why we call it cross-label use, this is a different
kind of animal. Yeah, because when you look at the early case law or the determining case law in
the U.S., for example, a lot has to do with off-label and not a cross-label situation.
So just to give you an example of how the market works, the pharmaceutical market is
relatively complicated. When the physician prescribes the drug in Germany, he usually prescribes
it by the INN, by the International Non-proprietary Name, and he does not specify the indication
for data privacy reasons, for example. And then when a generic exists, the pharmacist is actually
forced by agreements with the insurance companies to take the cheapest one. And then since the
pharmacists don't know the indication, every now and then they will dispense the skinny-label
generic for the patented indication. And of course the insurer doesn't mind. He prefers to actually
reimburse it for the cheaper price.
So now we have to look at the incentives. Is it then actually worth it to develop the drug
for the indication B when you don't have any meaningful exclusivity for the second medical use?
I on purpose enhanced this -- you know, when you look for the details of the blue arrow, I enhanced
it by exclusivity because maybe the patents are not the only thing that you can actually use in order
to get exclusively. Maybe there's some other form of exclusivity you need, but it will heavily
depend. Each pharmaceutical company's decision to actually develop a new second medical use
will be heavily dependent on how much exclusivity is left.
And in that situation, I've seen -- I've actually experienced situations exactly like this one,
where it basically eats up all the 20-year term and the only thing that is left is the maximum of five
years’ patent term extension. Where there's already a question mark, should we actually do it?
Does it make sense to spend these hundreds of millions of dollars in order to develop these drugs
for this new indication?
You can imagine, the longer it takes, the less likely this will happen and here I put a big
question mark. I think it should be a no. It will simply not happen. When there's no exclusivity left
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and the one for the second medical use patent doesn't really give you a meaningful exclusivity, it
simply won't happen.
So here, this is one example which a colleague sent to me which I find a little bit personal,
it's a little bit emotional. You see it already from the title, The Shameful Story of Rituximab in
Multiple Sclerosis. But it was a blog published in a Neuroscience Journal of Immunology and had
quite a few comments, as you can imagine. This is actually worthwhile to look at this one because
I think it illustrates the predicament quite a bit.
So the story goes like that if you follow this blog. rituximabis an antibody approved, among
others, for rheumatoid arthritis. In 2010 the Phase II clinical study was published for this drug for
MS, so for a different indication, and it was as efficacious but with much less side effects, and
when you look at MS treatments, they have quite a few side effects, than the standard at that time.
Actually this clinician who wrote this blog said it was revolutionary.
But the patent expired in 2015 and no Phase III trial was done yet, and guess what the
originator did? They didn't do the Phase III study with rituximab -- is that real? minutes do you
want?
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: Yeah, but how many
MR. DRESSEL: 15 I said originally. You haven't told her yet, huh?
So they took a similar drug with the same mechanism of action. They actually came up
with the same efficacy, but a much higher mortality.
So the conclusion of this clinician is that this is terrible. We don't have so many choices to
give our patients to throw away the best ones or to have to wait several more years. And I think
that's exactly the predicament we are facing, when we don't give an exclusivity that would actually
justify it.
So without business certainty and incentive, of course, we as originators, we have a
problem because we won't invest in this type of R&D. But it's not just industrial originators, it's
also academia and a lot of this innovation is actually happening at hospitals. The patients and the
physicians will have less new therapies available. The health care systems, they think short-term
very often nowadays, but they should think long-term, yeah. Because usually the drugs actually
save money. And of course the generics, it's not good for them either because they get smaller
markets in the end.
So I think carve-out is fair. The skinny-label generic should be able to get to the market,
but cross-label use should not happen.
So my last slide. We are talking about a complex and very heavily regulated market, and
unfortunately there are systemic incentives for cross-label use. So you have the short-term budget
pressures, everybody is complaining. The health care systems, the insurance, yeah, they want to
reduce their expenses. You have a burden when you actually talk to a general practitioner. There's
a court trial, for example, ongoing in Europe, which is making headlines. For the physicians it's
awful, yeah. They have so many things to think about, should they have to think about what type
of pregabalin they should actually prescribe when they have these other things also on their minds.
Incentives for generic substitution I already talked about. And in principle, the insurers,
yeah, they get away with it. There's a relatively low legal risk until now. The second medical use
patents have been largely ignored.
The therapy exclusion squeeze, I talked already a little bit about. I think it's fair, but the
doctor doesn't really suffer from what his freedom to prescribe the best drug for the patient, because
he can choose the on-label originator drug. And I think there's also a role for the courts to play. I
think it's important that they don't stick to the literal wording of the Swiss-type claims, there should
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be a purposive claim construction here because the purpose was really to stimulate clinical
innovation, so any result leading to not stimulating clinical innovation I think would be the wrong
interpretation. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR. OKUMURA: Maybe five minutes. I am Yoichi Okumura of Takeda from the Japan
Pharmaceutical company from Tokyo and today I'm really so happy to be here and thank you very
much. Toshiko required me to be here to, actually she required me to be here as a sort of
representative for Japan Pharma industry. That's why -- my name tag said the Japan Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association but the company is Takeda anyway.
I supposed to go through these so many but with five minutes, maybe one minute each. I'll
try. Okay. This slide is showing the, how to say, the current pharmaceutical industry's new
movement. For example, development of new compound requires large development cost, so many
companies go into the repositioning of the existing drugs. Because existing drug already have
been approved based upon their safety and efficacy as well. And also the blockbuster type drug
business now goes away and turns to sort of the gene therapy or precision medicines. And the
small molecule business is now going tobe replaced with the biologics and also the regenerate
medicines. Okay. These things, how to say, make us think about how to protect our future business
with IP.
And then what I have to say about secondary patent is that the secondary patent is very
important vehicle to build up a business with new technology. So importance of secondary patent
was already discussed early in this morning session, that's why I do not touch on it so deeply.
Okay. Let's move to this one. This slide describes IP protection of the secondary patent and
the use patent in Japan. Mainly, as most of you already know, medical treatment method is not
patentable in Japan. There are lots of reasons but I do not touch on all today. One of the reasons
is, according to the Japan patent law, that this medical treatment method itself is outside the scope
of the industrial applicability. It is one of the requirements for the patentable invention.
Then -- in recent Japan the translational medicine type of disease treatment has expanded.
In that sense the precision medicine, the regenerative medicine and the genetic diagnosis type of
research and also its therapy & drugs are going to be popular. It means that medical treatment
method itself of physician is now getting closer to the industry activity. Previously just drug was
a drug but medical treatment was treatment by physician. You did somehow separated them in
different categories. But these new technologies make industry activity much closer to the medical
treatment.
Then how about in other Asian territory? For example, China and Korea, in those countries
there are lots of uncertainties. Sometimes they allow those secondary patents, and sometimes they
give low patentability to the secondary inventions. In India as all of you know about 3(d) problem.
That's why almost no chance to get the patent right in Idia.
But recently the TPP fortunately generally was agreed among those countries. That was
good. Member countries of the TPP are required to protect secondary patent. That's our hope.
From the next two slides I have to show the important activity in Japan, e.g., regenerative
medicine which was made by, as you know, one of the popular professor at Kyoto University,
Professor Yamanaka who won a Nobel prize. That is the iPS technology. That is pretty much
important to science for the entire Japan now. My company also just has initiated a collaboration
with his laboratories.
But looking at the regenerative medicine, it's very tough to imagine what kind of things or
processes can be protected by the IP by the patent system. For example, some cell, maybe almost
349

350

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol 12:3

the same as a natural cell. Some cells are derived to be somehow closer to the natural cell. And
then some other cells can be derived to the totally artificial type of the cell. Maybe this green type
of cell can be protected by the patent but we don't know how yellow and this different type of the
cell. We can't expect to protect these inventions by the patent system.
Then among those technologies we may need to also consider about FTO issue because
there are lot of technologies, complicated ways of combining together especially for the
manufacturing technology. That's why we may need to think about sort of the forest of the patent
rights. It has been discussed in sort of industries on those types of things.
And the next one, this is technology from the Tokyo University, venture company, Thera.
This company providing sort of the combination therapies of these standard therapy in cancer
vaccine therapy area. They are providing license to the hospital and also they are providing sort of
vaccine or tube to the hospital. This is their new business model.
In this kind of business model, an issue is how we can protect this new business model by
the patent system. This is the most important item that we are going to think about seriously in the
future.
Then I need to touch with somehow access issues. Actually let me back to here. We have
been considering just the patent for protecting of the technology, but I would like to express that
the patent itself should be sort of the vehicle for developing of a new business. Otherwise, patent
system would mean a sort of just domination of our technology and it would also give its negative
impression of society. Actually, if we can obtain this patent protection in emerging market, we
could expand our business in those areas, but without any patent system and protection system of
the business, then we cannot bring our business to such society. That means even if we get the
new technologies, new invention, those cannot be expanded noe distributed to many of the people
who need such them in the emerging market. That's why we really like to maintain a patent system
in an emerging market. Maybe only in LDC of Least Develped Countries, maybe they might not
need such protection. But even in those countries they need to improve themselves to catch up
and to be the next better level. Then they need a patent system. That is sort of the key for the access
issue for the emerging market and also the LDCs. That's it. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR. McLAUGHLIN: Well, it's been an interesting day in that as we've talked about new
uses for existing drugs and the debates and the challenges, my stress level goes up and down with
each talk because I'm right in the middle of it. So this is a case study in progress for a new use for
an existing drug and before I get into it, I have a little preamble. And this is born in academia and
one of the leading neuroscientists in the word, Michela Gallagher at Johns Hopkins, she just
received a lifetime achievement award for neuroscience and her life's work was really studying the
neurobiology of the aging brain and that led to a discovery in the classic sense of basic research.
And it just happened that the best target was an existing molecule. And it also just happened that
the science around the understanding of the pathophysiology in the early stages of Alzheimer's
was misunderstood for decades.
So you had that perfect combination of existing drug, if we had known about the
mechanism in the pathophysiology, it would have surely been developed or attempted to be
developed and there would have been IP around that. But because we thought the world was flat
and then it was round, it created an opportunity. And so we'll talk a little bit about that, but we're
going to talk about Alzheimer's a bit at first, and I think we all know this is, it's a tragic disorder
that affects too many of us, too many of our family members and it's only getting worse. We all, I
think, know the numbers, about five million cases a year in the United States that will go to about
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13 million by 2050. Every 68 seconds in the United States somebody is developing Alzheimer's.
It's costing Medicare and Medicaid, not with soft costs, just direct medical costs, $250 billion and
I think that's dated several years. So we're approaching the point where it's about a billion dollars
a day that it's costing our government in direct medical costs.
So we know the most common risk factor is age, so every day we live on the planet we're
at more risk. And that really has interesting implications around the world and we'll take a look at
that in a second. Here is the -- every dot represents 100,000 cases of Alzheimer's. Good news for
Alzheimer's, we didn't live as long back in 1950 so most people died before they developed
Alzheimer's. As you can see, in 2000, a lot of growth. The scary point coming up here and please
look at the difference.
By 2050 there could be 90 million cases of Alzheimer's in the world. And it's not just a
disease of the developed world. The developing world is growing quite rapidly. The African
continent will quadruple in Alzheimer's cases over the next 35 years and if the Gates Foundation
does a great job, unfortunately it's going to be worse for Alzheimer's because, once again, age is
the No. 1 predictor of Alzheimer's.
And you see the implications in India. India, China and across Southeast Asia, it's really
astronomical. And here are the numbers. This is demential. About 70 percent of the cases of
demential are Alzheimer's, it's the most common form of dementia, and that's where we get the 90
million patient number by 2050.
So I'm going to ask you to step back. When you think about Alzheimer's there's a classic
case of we think about the dementia and we think about the saying of not being able to remember
a child, the loss of functionality and eventually death, right? Forgetting how to eat. But it starts
much better that and that process of the dementia stage is typically around seven to 10 years. But
there's also a seven- to 10-year process prior to that which is called many things, it's pre-dementia
Alzheimer's, prodromal Alzheimer's and the FDA labels it right now, aMCI due to AD, which is
amnestic mild cognitive impairment. So you're not in a demented state, you're functioning, but
memory is fading rapidly. And that could be diagnosed easily with the patient and typically with
their loved one. And this is affecting about five million patients in the United States today and will
double by 2050 if nothing is done.
And as with the case with many diseases, there's been a lot of attempts early on and where
the treatments exist are for the Alzheimer's/dementia. There's symptomatic treatments, they work
in about half the patients and work for about 18 months. The disease continues to progress, the
drugs no longer work, and then there's nothing left to do. But we're learning now in this new age
of Alzheimer's drug research and discovery is that we attack the disease early prior to
neurodegeneration, or when there's minimal neurodegeneration we have the best chance of either
stopping the disease -- but at least, if we can change that trajectory ever so lightly, it can have a
major impact on the overall prevalence and the overall health care burden. And we see this here.
Unfortunately, there's nothing available today in this predementia stage of Alzheimer's.
Everything that's been attempted has failed. The existing therapies not only are not approved;
they've been proven not to work in this stage of Alzheimer's. And you can see here, this is an
interesting study that was from the Alzheimer's Association, if you can bend the curve, shape,
change the trajectory, if we can delay that conversion from this predementia stage of Alzheimer's
by five years, we can reduce the overall prevalence of Alzheimer's dementia by about 43 percent.
The bigger issue is you're avoiding a lot of end stage Alzheimer's where 24-hour care is
required. And so that's where the big impact on society is and that's why we have so much focus
by governments around the world on doing something about Alzheimer's.
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And so this gets back to sort of the genesis of we're not just a reformulation, what we're
developing, it gets back to what I was talking about, the basic science, but the question was: What
if what we believed to be true for decades was no longer true, and this is the case here and a part
of the pathophysiology of Alzheimer's that led to the development of our drug candidate, and so
here there's three basic lines. One is amyloid. Probably everyone knows what amyloid plaques are.
And they're associated with Alzheimer's. Every patient with Alzheimer's has an amyloid plaque
on the brain. Not every patient who dies with amyloid has Alzheimer's, but that's another story for
another day.
But that precedes the disease state, a lot of ramp up in amyloid, and then it's always been
known, or at least for several decades, that you then have a period where the area of the brain
called the hippocampus. The hippocampus and the internal cortex, this area of the brain, are
responsible for creating your memory. And this ramp up in activity was well characterized, well
known. It was believed to be compensatory or beneficial.
And it kind of makes sense, right? You have a brain that's starting to atrophy. You have
memory decline. Let's ramp up neural firing and activity. That's beneficial. That was the belief
until as recently as 10 years ago and it was highly debated in the literature and now -- we now
know and it was based upon the work at Johns Hopkins and then subsequently repeated at Harvard
and UCSF and other leading centers around the world, that this ramp up in hippocampal over
activity is in fact a primary driver of the initial stages of neurodegeneration in Alzheimer's. It
results in atrophy of the internal cortex, is where we process new memories, recent memory.
And then eventually you see the hippocampal activity just phased out as you have
tremendous cell death, atrophy in the hippocampus and the internal cortex. And this is important
sort of in the drug discovery here.
So we call it repurposing a drug. We like to think of what we're doing is reinventing a drug,
and I'll lead to this. I saved my heaviest slide for words, but so we have novel science. What we
are developing is known as Keppra, it's from a branded sense. It's levetiracetam, it's an antiepileptic that's been available since 1999. Sold over $2 billion in the U.S., more around the world.
Great product, great molecule, very clean molecule. But it was never pursued for age-related
cognitive impairment because what does it do? It subdues neuronal firing in the hippocampus
which in epilepsy you want to knock that down. And it was always believed until recently that in
Alzheimer's you don't want to knock down that activity, you want to rev up activity.
So the basic work that our founder did in her age-impaired rats and saw the correlation
between this ramp up in hippocampal over activity and memory loss. We repeated this time and
time again, we repeated it in UCSF in a different model, and then the big step was to go into Phase
II. So lo and behold we have Phase II clinical data. Along the way that would show that if you
deliver a low dose of this levetiracetam, you actually can attenuate or mitigate minimize this
hippocampal over activity and preserve function in the internal cortex. Fabulous work.
So along the way we're developing IP and my IP attorney counsel assures me that it will
withstand anything, but the patent office is not buying this because they're saying UCB had to have
thought about this, had to contemplate. This is subject a big market, there's five million patients in
the U.S., maybe 25 million worldwide. This has to be obvious.
Well, it wasn't until we actually showed up with our Phase II clinical data, and I'm saving
a piece of the data for you here in a second. What we demonstrated, and it's up here on the slide,
the adult dosage for epilepsy is one gram to three grams per day, and that's why they never saw
results. But what Michela had found at Hopkins in her work was she started at microdoses and
moved up, she found that there was this dosage range that was subtherapeutic for epilepsy, between
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125 and 250, that was effective for age-related cognitive impairment. It restored balance to this
network.
What we also found in all the animal models was, once you moved above 250, no effect,
no impact whatsoever. No different than the placebo using -- and we replicated that in human
clinical trials. When that data was presented to the patent office, they finally gave us the seal of
approval. They said, this is not obvious, this is truly novel, and we were issued a method of use
patent that gives us a coverage around a dosage range that today is subtherapeutic, okay?
And what we like about this, we have a novel disease state from a protection, right? Method
of use -- there's differences in method of use patents, and you can speak to this better than me, and
we have the authority sitting next to me. But we have a novel disease state. We have a unique
dosage level that previously was not therapeutic, and then we have clinical data actually to support
this that shows that dosage range.
And then we continue to build out the IP, right? It's not lost on us that we have a
reformulation. So we continue to build a picket fence strategy around from an IP perspective.
We've developed a novel proprietary formulation which we built some protection within there as
well.
The question came up here on this panel was about funding and it was discussed this
morning. And I agreed with all the points that were made earlier today, and to date its sort of been
a little bit of this and a little bit of that. Prior to my joining the company it was truly high net worth
individuals, the classic friends and family. One of the things we did, we added an additional board
member when I joined and that gave us access to a network of high net worth individuals which I
would advise anyone here starting a small company, it's a great source of capital.
In addition, Johns Hopkins has been very generous, both with time, resources, and then as
part of the deal when we created -- when AgeneBio was created, they were willing to convert the
accounts payable in intellectual property to equity, which in a small company is very, very
beneficial and very important.
In addition, the company has been supported through NIH grants, multiple NIH grants.
One paid for the Phase II trial, another is paying for a lot of the work in our -- we have also the
discovery stage program. The NIH can be very supportive early on. Also, a foundation such as
Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation. They paid for our extended release formation. We sent
them in a proposal for the project and they like to -- they have to know what the foundation wants
to support; they like to support finite projects over a finite period of time. They helped us develop
our formulation. And then additionally, like I mentioned, we had high net worth individuals.
The big step forward and what Jim was alluding to is now it's time to raise the big money,
right? We're in the Alzheimer's field. Our study will cost around $90 million which is on sale for
Alzheimer's. You hear Biogen spending a billion and a half dollars on their Phase III program.
Merck's phase number studies, we hear they're upwards of 200- to $250 million to trial. So we're
cheap from a standpoint but it's a substantial amount of capital and it's very different than friends
and family.
That said, there are many opportunities to raise that capital either through partnership or
through a hybrid approach, through private equity and also family offices. It's a lot of work, as was
mentioned this morning, but there are unique family offices that have particular interest in this
disease state because the only thing -- they've been able to control everything in their entire life,
have all the money in the world, but they can't control what happens with their brain and they want
to see something change in their lifetime.

353

354

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol 12:3

So that's where we're going for now. I will mention here just everything everybody knows,
but if I've heard it once, I've heard it a thousand times in my life in the reformulation world. There's
this classic bias of as soon as you hear reformulation, low level of innovation -- and nothing could
be further from the truth as we've talked about today. If our therapy works in Phase III and can be
on the market to slow the progression of this predementia stage of Alzheimer's, I would consider
that exquisite innovation.
And there are some who just won't look. There are companies who will say, we only look
at candidates with composition matter. Just as a rule we don't look at method of use. We're never
going to change their minds. Same with some investors, and then the assumption is, We'll get
around. I know you have Jim Haley from Ropes & Gray but we'll find a way around his patents.
And then there are the patients who will not sufficiently reimburse to 505(b)(2). I think that
really depends. 505(b)(2) is a term, don't blanket it as uniform. There's 505(b)(2) where you take
a twice-a-day formulation and make it once a day. That I think is some level of innovation but I
put it on the low end. I think what we're doing here is taking an unmet disease with five million
patients in the US, maybe 25 million worldwide, providing a novel dosage for them in a disease
state where we could major implications. I consider that pretty high level of innovation.
And I did just have a conversation because I said, Enough of this. And we're doing some
research now on reimbursement. I talked to the chief medical officer at Express Scripts, I was at a
conference, and I made a beeline for him at the break and I explained to him our profile and I was
very honest with him about what it is and what it is not. And he says, Well, we're looking to help
treat Alzheimer's. Everybody wants to do that. And I said, Yeah, but are you going to engage in
pill splitting -- with each dosage form it's 220 milligrams once a day and there's nothing that can
there exactly.
I said, are you going to engage in that? And he goes, we don't want to do that. That's not
our business, but if you get greedy we will, and his message was, Don't be greedy. And don't -like some of the things we've heard in the news recently, don't try and take too much, right? We'll
pay for the innovation even if it's a reformulation but keep it within reason.
And I think that's a reasonable approach. Now, we'll continue to do more work, but we
think there's a way to navigate through this and that's what I'll ask you to leave with, don't blanket
all reformulations as the same color. So with that I thank you.
[Applause.]
MS. KETTLER: Great. Thank you. I know I stand between you and the reception, but I'm
proud to have an opportunity to speak to you. It's actually the first time I've ever had a chance to
hear Trevor Mundel and Tachi Yamada speak together at the same meeting, and so it was a real
privilege to hear that and just how different, but also how inspiring both of them are as we think
about solving these critical problems in global health.
Tachi mentioned that he was worried Trevor might have spoken to the things he was going
to talk about. Well, I had Trevor, Tachi and Dick all ahead of me, and in fact you all covered what
I was going to speak to, so I will cover some key issues and hopefully we'll still have a little bit of
time for discussion.
So my agenda. Specifically, I'm going to look just briefly at how critical innovation and in
particular -- whatever, reformulation, repurposing, incremental innovation, just kind of all types
of innovation, how critical that is for the success of our mission at the foundation. And then I'm
going to give the example from the neglected tropical disease work, and if you stick around you're
actually going to get to see the results that Trevor is really excited about. So that's your carrot for
sticking it through to the end.
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So as was alluded to in previous presentations and as you will see when you get to go to
the visitor center, fundamental to the foundation is the concept of every person has the right to a
healthy productive life. All lives have equal value. So in that context, the foundation is very
focused on trying to develop and deliver and impact health issues that affect predominantly the
poorest in the poorest parts of the world.
A concept that we are working on, and it's actually been a learning process I would say, is
how important it is that we think about development in the context of delivery. And that seems
obvious, but I think when we started there was a real premise; as Tachi alluded to, there were no
vaccines, you know, we need drugs, that if we built anything people would buy it and it would be
used. And so there was a real focus initially on the product development piece of our business.
And over the last five, six years since Trevor joined and then we also have a new president for
delivery, we have a much firmer focus on trying to bridge between what -- what's the infrastructure,
what does the world look like that we're actually working on products for and how do we think
about that when we develop new products.
So Dick alluded to our global access agreement, he didn't just allude to it, he actually
documented it. Really critical to access is not just literal affordability, it's also is it available enough
at a sufficient scale and is it appropriate? Does it work in the regions that we're talking about? And
accessibility in this case also means can you get it there. So is it deliverable infrastructure, et cetera.
So with that in mind, and then you think about the global areas that we're working on, the diseases
we work on, modifications of products are fundamental potentially to the success. If you think
about HIV, HIV drugs, the idea that we have no vaccine so we are trying to advocate and expand
treatment, well, we've got an adherence problem and -- we have an affordability problem but we
also have an adherence problem, so the increased focus, for example, on long-acting intellectual
virals is necessarily building off of the markets that we're targeting.
Pediatric formulations, children under five are fundamentally a focus of ours -- our work,
so pediatric formulations. Fixed dose combinations, trying to get products out of the coal chain,
oral formulations when you have injectables, et cetera. So again, really critical that we have an
environment that motivates and incentivises companies and organizations to think not only about
novel, but also about potentially combining and modifying existing drugs.
I'm going to focus the rest of the talk specifically on the neglected tropical diseases and -just because background, and this was something that Trevor referenced and you can think back
to his slide of all the bubbles with sizes. The NTDs were all along the bottom, they were the
smallest circles. Together they do impact building people and there's a lot of vulnerability to
getting, and NTDs tends to bundle. Here's the diseases and they're hard to pronounce. I couldn't
spell them. It may finally be spelled correctly. These are really challenging diseases people haven't
heard of, and as I say, on some they impact millions and billions of people but they tend to be
forgotten because they're relatively small and exist really truly in the poorest parts of the world
only.
So the question is: Can you get more visibility to these diseases and then what can we do
to try to address them? And back to Trevor's question of, Well, what do we work on? And you
might say, Well, these bubbles are really at the bottom of the spectrum. And again, I don't have
the slide to reference, but even new products in this area, it was kind of borderline whether they
were cost effective or not. But the good news is that there's a real expectation, and they also
reference this: That we might be able to do something about this, that impact is really feasible.
And in 2012, in an effort to bring the key partners and stakeholders together, the
foundation, together with 10 of the largest pharmaceutical companies, many of you in the room,
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your CEOs participated in this event. It was a bringing together of the private sector, the WHO,
the World Bank, key donors, the Gates Foundation, with an eye of creating a coalition that would
commit to try to work towards what are very ambitious goals of four diseases eliminated by 2020,
two diseases eradicated by 2020, a whole host of regional elimination achieved, and that really
depends a lot on the availability of product as well as the availability of funding.
And so -- but there's a lot of optimism, and one of the reasons there's optimism is the
availability of treatment. So -- and I don't have the time and actually am not the world's expert on
this so I really couldn't speak to it anyway, but there is a history of pharmaceutical companies
donating drugs for many of these diseases. And what's interesting, and this is just a short summary,
and again, many of your companies here that -- many of your companies are here on this list, all
of these drugs were developed for something else. Many of them were actually developed for the
veterinary business. A lot of these diseases are worms, parasitic diseases and there is overlap with
the animal health world. So that was the incentive to develop a lot of these.
A couple others are antibiotics. The Gilead product I think is the only one that's still on
patent. Everything else has been off patent, but initially there was a real opportunity to make the
money back you needed to for the research and development and even sustaining -- continuing to
sustain manufacturing, but also at the same time, donate. Once it became clear and, you know, the
community of researchers, people who -- and this is truly just pulling together those who are
motivated, individuals who are trying things out in the field, aligning some facts with some of
these drugs and sorting through that they might work. And if we have a chance it would be really
interesting to hear a story from one of the companies -- we don't have time, but just kind of the
history of how you came to the side.
I would flag, there was a reference to the Artemisinin Nobel prize, there was also a Nobel
prize given to two researchers who together are given credit for the discovery of Ivermectin which
is a drug that Merck donates for onchocerciasis and LF. So the success of the coalition and the
achievement of goals is very much resting on the generosity of the pharmaceutical industry, but it
isn't donations for everything and it is also true that these had a business case and a business model
that worked to allow donation to be possible.
So now, one fact is also true is that although we have most of the tools that we need, we
don't have everything, and this gets to what Trevor was speaking to which is the idea of a
macrofilaricide. I'm actually very grateful he spoke to us because he's a much articulator -- I'm an
economist, I'm not a scientist, so you actually already got the version of why this is so exciting and
what the problem is. But essentially for both lymphatic filariasis and onchocerciasis, we have drugs
that work for the baby worm, they kill the baby worm, but you have to then treat people who are
exposed to these worms every year, you have to get back to them and treat them every year. And
there's an approach to treatment called mass drug administration where you basely give everyone
who's anywhere near the possibility of getting this disease, every year you try to get ahead of it.
But none of these drugs help with the adult worm, and without killing the adult you're not
going to be able to achieve the goal of elimination. And so the foundation, at the same time that
we're advocating for more funding and looking to give as much credit as we can to the
pharmaceutical industry for the donations, at the same time we're doing that, we're also looking
for ways to try to bridge this research gap. And both of the ways we're looking at solving it fall
very squarely within the terms of this conference and the meeting -- the discussion you're having.
One, again, Trevor gave a really good description of is the idea of repurposing, so trying
to figure out -- we only have until 2020 in theory and so we have to get going and that's not a lot
of time, trying to see whether you can't find something that already has clinical data just to test for
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safety -- to confirm for safety so that you can actually move things faster forward. And the other
is the idea of testing drugs that you already know is safe. As Trevor alluded or mentioned, these
drugs have been used -- billions of these drugs have been used, how can you bring them together
in combination?
And so this is the data, and again, Trevor referenced and it is really exciting that bringing
the combination of -- so Ivermectin is a drug donated by Merck. DEC is a drug donated by the
Japanese company Eisai. And I want to give a little credit to Eisai separately because it's the only
company -- all the other companies had a history in these diseases and these drugs and the CEO
of Eisai was motivated to get involved. They were the head of IFPMA, and so in 2011, they made
a decision they wanted to do something. And one of the gaps that were identified by the WHO was
insufficient availability of DEC. And they actually invested in developing DEC, getting it
registered, building a manufacturing plant so they could give it away. So that's exceptional level
of generosity. Everybody else has a long history with this drug, they're the only one, so I give a
little bit of extra call out for them.
And albendazole GSK donates. And so the standard of care is DEC plus albendazole except
in places where there's also onchocerciasis. And the study that was done was to try the combination
of all three, and again, the data speaks for itself in the sense that when you just use only the two,
you get kind of a mixed spread of clearing, whereas with the three, you get 100 percent. And also
Trevor mentioned that this holds for one year. It also holds for two. And so we now necessarily
have to scale up beyond Papua New Guinea and there is a lot of looking into how do we get new
trials and new studies on to this combination to make sure there's no adverse events that would
prevent us from scaling it up.
But again, the great news is, companies are already donating these drugs and with one
exception, where we'd need them is where they're already donating, and what that means is
hopefully we'll be able to leverage their preexisting commitments and scale things up really
quickly and in fact get out of it faster. So it's win-win for the companies in the sense that they won't
be donating for as long, and for us obviously to get rid of the disease. Just to give you an idea, and
again, it's tricky for onchocerciasis regions, but again, not to go into the details of that. These are
the key countries that will potentially benefit from the scale up of the triple drug and that has a
huge impact on and helps make significant progress towards the goal of elimination for lymphatic
filariasis.
So in closing, I just want to reinforce, it's been a real privilege to have a chance to speak
and just the real relevance importance of solving the problems that you have raised for the Global
Health. I want to acknowledge -- actually I'm an incentive geek and I'm sorry I didn't have a chance
to participate in that piece of the discussion. Just a closing comment that the priority review
voucher that Tachi was really excited about, one of its limitations for all of this that we're talking
about is it will only be rewarded to new products. So it can never be previously approved in the
U.S.
And so interestingly, in its current formation, it actually does not serve as an incentive for
what we're talking about here, and yet, given that it's a relatively cheaper exercise, in theory at
least, to get some of these incremental changes made, a voucher of this type would actually
potentially be a really perfect way to get it done. So with that I'll close. Thanks.
[Applause.]
MR. HALEY: So I think we have a few minutes for questions. Maybe I'll start off with
one for Jurgen. You discussed the idea of this market issue in trying to avoid off label versus cross
label. What type of law or legislation would be required? How would this be put in place?
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MR. DRESSEL: I think in principle what we need is something like a market segmentation
where the different indications are clearly separated from each other. And I actually found what
was said I think by Stefano this morning interesting, yeah, where basically the reimbursement by
the insurers depends on actually if there's indication on the label. And the Japanese, they have such
a system. It has been softened up a little bit, but in the past at least that worked perfectly.
So basically there was a system where the doctor actually had -- he didn't put the diagnosis
indication on the prescription but he had to supply it to the reimburser and they basically compared
what was dispensed with what was actually the indication it was prescribed for. And that worked
pretty well.
MR. HALEY: And Yoichi, you proposed some changes in the patent laws. What would
have to happen in Japan to do that?
MR. OKUMURA: Changing the patent law in Japan?
MR. HALEY: To cover cells, for example, in your examples.
MR. OKUMURA: Oh, that -- actually so Japan patent rules have to be changed anyway,
Therapeutic method should be patented and protected. But if -- I don't know how to say, such
new, protection could make us, how to say, be able to bringg big innovations in the future in the
pharmaceutical fields.
MR. HALEY: And Jerry, could you give us a sense of how hard you've had to work to try
to get somebody to fund your trials?
MR. McLAUGHLIN: As they say, it's a big bite and a lot of -- and we face a number of
challenges, not just related -- IP is one. As everybody faces challenges. Alzheimer's disease is
considered a high risk category from a development standpoint, given the -- everyone saw that
article where 99.6 percent of trials have failed. And I guess we're that 0.4 percent. So that raises a
challenge. So I think the bigger challenge is around, you know, it's an equation, right? It's not -it's never a simple answer, it's IP, it's reimbursement, it's cost to get to market, right? And so it's a
formula and everybody weighs each differently. And it's just finding the right mix. And I can say,
though, while some -- and we talked about this, some will never entertain a reformulation. Others
see the value. They see the risk mitigation. I can tell you, it's in our notes from the FDA from a
pre-IND meeting. They said, "No additional nonclinical safety studies will be needed, the safety
database you generated with a single Phase III will be sufficient to file."
I don't know of too many NCEs that would ever have that that in pre-IND meeting minutes.
So there are some tremendous risks we take out with novel uses of drugs, particularly in this case
of being a low dose.
MR. HALEY: How about in the audience? Any there questions in the five or six minutes
we have left? People are hungry.
MS. KETTLER: I just want to make a comment about a funding mechanism that the
foundation has established, and I'm actually sorry that we can't fund your Alzheimer's trial, but
one where they try to balance. So we've got -- we made a contribution to something called the
Global Health Innovation Fund and it's a combination of for profit investors and the foundation
and other nonprofit foundations, and it's kind of a fund where there's some preparedness to take a
double bottom line approach. There's an expectation of return, but within the fund itself, the
nonprofit are the ones that take funding last and the for profit get the funding first.
And so in general, that pool needs to be targeted on sort of charitable products or products
that advance the global health mission, but there's a real recognition that there's global health
products that also have commercial return. But I only offer that as potentially a benefit that those
who have more or less risk coming together and funding Alzheimer's.
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MR. HALEY: So audience, any questions? Comments? I want food.
[Laughter.]
MR. HALEY: Well, then, thank you very much for attending the panel and thank you to
the speakers.
[Applause.]
[Concluded at 5:27 p.m.]
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PANEL IV
PATENTABILITY AND PATENT EXTENSION OF NEW USE AND NEW DOSAGE REGIMEN FOR EXISTING
DRUGS

Moderator:
Dr. Andrew Serafini, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton (Seattle, WA, USA).
Panelists:
Shinjiro Ono, Yuasa & Hara, Tokyo, Japan, Former JPO Deputy Commissioner (Tokyo,
Japan).
Dr. Ute Kilger, Boehmert & Boehmert (Berlin, Germany).
Robert Stoll, Drinker Biddle & Reath, Former US PTO Commissioner (Washington, DC,
USA).
Jin Ooi, Allen & Overy (London, UK).
Hon. Peter Meier-Beck, German Federal Court of Justice (Karisruhe, Germany).
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: Good morning. Again, Toshiko Takenaka from the
University of Washington School of Law. I hope that you had a good time afterwards, yesterday's
session, at the Gates Foundation and of course we enjoyed our exercise at the Gates Foundation as
well as the development as well as contributions Gates Foundation have made with respect to
global health.
So today we will be focusing more on intellectual property, particularly patent law. Myself
used to be a patent attorney and trying to enforce patents of Texas Instruments. I am very excited
to hear from experts from the world with respect to the patent procurement first session in the
morning, as well as the second session more to do with remedy.
So the first session is led by Dr. Andrew Serafini and I will let Dr. Serafini to take over
that for you.
MR. SERAFINI: Thank you, Toshiko. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the
Pacific Northwest Day 2. I hope you enjoy the sunshine. A little housekeeping. Our esteemed panel
will be talking, and if we can hold all questions until the end, we'll start with some questions
directly here from the panel, and then we welcome actually as much participation as possible.
Let me start off by saying that the dilemma regarding second generation patents can be
summed up in the words of the Federal Circuit in 2008 when they were overturning an award of
horrible attorneys' fees against an innovator manufacturer seeking to enforce a second generation
patent that was deemed invalid. And I quote, "While it may be considered more socially desirable
for companies to seek truly novel inventions, formalities not yet treatable, the patent laws set the
standard of novelty nonobviousness and utility as a requirement for patentability without making
value judgments concerning the motives for making and attempting to patent new inventions of
lesser medical value."
So the patent laws embrace attention between the public interest and the ideals of
investments and profit. Ultimately it is the patent laws and patent law jurisprudence that must
guide our judgments about the enforcement of second pharmaceutical patents in the battle over
global drug markets.
So our esteemed panel, they're in the program. I will not introduce each and every one of
them, but to start off we do have Shinjiro Ono from Yuasa & Hara to kick things off this morning.
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MR. ONO: Good morning, everyone. I think -- most I think a right thing to do to the
Japanese I think low end practice, especially related to this second medical use and patent
extension. And I used to be I think an examiner and a peer examiner, a JPO, so I think the objective
of the JPO are involved in their compiling of the examination guideline. And also I think there are
lots of I think the drafts role related to our improvement of our IP system and especially patent
system in Japan. Okay.
My topic will first touch upon the eligibility of second medical use, and I will introduce
the background and also I think Japan is a very unique tried to I think to introduce their protection
of medical treatment both I think their both medical treatment by a physician and surgeon by the
patent protection like the United States. I want to explain a little bit of background.
I think that you see that their medical method is usually, I think except in the U.S., most of
the country, all right, Japan and Europe and the other country, not considered as patent eligibility.
Because of that, I think they are closely related to the doctors and promises and also I think the
patient. That is one of our barriers. And these I think the medical treatment considered to be
industry applicable. That is one of the I think methods.
And also I think most of the country now I think they're not considered as patent-eligibility,
medical treatment. But I think, in Japan, I think the 2005 Phase-I in the year 2003 and 2009, we
change the examination guideline, especially the first one is very amateur. So I think the Plan 2
protected medical treatment. This is I think there are just I will touch upon the background.
I think at that time in Japan, that year 2003, IP headquarter was set up directly to go the
prime minister. That at the time I think Japan try to bury I think the strings in their IP protection.
And two, I think there are Japanese inclination based on IP I think the asset. That is, I think the
background.
Then I think there are -- first I think the main important issue is whether I think in Japan,
is it possible to protect the medical treatment process? Of course I think there are promises to
protect the and medical propriety is already I think the patent protection. But I think the medical
treatment method is I think -- maybe I think there are people who are I think in favor of the strength
of the IP protection is try to change asking us, the government, to try to change it at all.
This is I think the IP strategic program. I think the IP headquarters and giving master I
think assignment to try to change the law. And this I think that we set up in group and consisting
of many I think are broad range of people relating to not only the IP people but also the consumer
and the doctors and also I think many I think scholars. Not only I think IP but also the rigamarole
and many I think people gathering to discuss the possibility.
And before we are in Japanese situation historically, I think in Patent Act of 1959, I think
is the old chemical substance and also medical drugs are not considered to be patent eligibility. It
is forbidden. Like I think there's some different country, people that take trips, I think many
countries, developing countries, not the chemical substance and drugs are outside scope of the
protection. But I think 1979, I think that we I think changed the law to accept the chemical
substance process and the drugs process to protect by patent rule.
I think that I would like to draw your attention to 1975. At the time I think Japanese
pharmaceutical industry is behind in terms of R and D. It's not so strong now. There were lots of I
think discussion. But I think that this -- I think that change overall were asserted in Japan. And at
that time I think the medical I think is protected procedure are protected by the law in the form of
I think their use limited product-type protection. That is very important.
I think now I think in Germany and in Europe also I think there are product type use limited
product type protection is available for a drug. But in Japan, also I think first that we introduced
361
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the changes of law over the same things, product. And we discussed under the walking group, I
think there are pro and con and these I think there are lots of I think discussions. Politically it's
very, very difficult. I think the pharmaceutical industry sending a request in addition to the
protection product to protect the method process. But I think there are government one year I think
the discussion. I think it's very difficult. Because I think there are -- this is the same as I think
Europe. I think it's explained in the medical treatment per se is not industry applicable.
But I think -- one I think important the call to decision relating to this I think medical
treatment, especially in the field of medical to recommend representation, surgical operations. But
I think the past is patent protection. But how about the method of I think treatment by this device.
But Tokyo High Court I think the JPO will deny that protection. The Tokyo High Court upheld
the JPO decision. But I think the reason is I think the main reason is industry inapplicable. But I
think the court raised the question why. I think there is no demarcation between the medicines and
the medical devices and medical treatment.
What is the difference? One is I think clearly industry. But how about medical treatment?
Even though a doctor I think doing, but what I think in the United States because it considers to
be industry. But the court said that without any statutory measure to immunize them from the suit,
their hope I think it is we called on it too. This is I think is industry applicable is okay.
Then this I think the politician discuss to try to change the law if possible. That is, I think
the background of our patent group. And the conclusion is after one learns the discussion, I think
very strong operation by the doctor’s association, they said I think that our practice is not the
industry because I think Japan is older, the medical treatment, I think all the costs will be covered
by the universal, I think the national insurance policy. And also I think the doctors' role is to cure
the patient. Not they are seeking I think any profit or something. But personally it's a question, but
I think that that is originally is what they said.
Then I think the result is like this. I think the conclusion is I think as this, patent protection
as an incentive to I think the industry is very difficult. There I think, instead I think the examination
guideline is very important. Then I think -- first I think the examination guidelines I order to the
person to compile. There are two approach. One is I think even though the medical method I think
as long as the medical device is represented as a method, in that case I think as long as that method
is not including the invasive, I think to the human body, it's okay. That's I think the drafting to that
I think invention. And also medicine invention is, as I explained, they're protected other use limited
to the product protection. And the medical claim of substances in Japan. I think that these are the
same as I think the Europe. And you can read clearly and understood the difference I think the
three overall differences.
And also I think this -- in this assumption guide, first we included dosing method in the
interval is okay. Or that I think the medical medicine use applied to the specific I think to their
patient group. But I think this is one of the examples I think.
Then I think that these I think are within the process examination guideline. Then I think
after I think four years, I think the review of the IP headquarters again I think according with I
think the development of technology, JPO tried to cover the more cutting edge technology, IPS
and other combination of new technology by guideline. That is a matter of drafting technique
without changing the law. And these are I think from first 2005 that you can see that the second I
think specific dosing interval had remarkable effect on a specific group. These are no application
because it's so limited. Then I think there are new their new guideline is not limit to the specific
group. In general, I think dosing method is okay. And also I think the method for measuring
structure or function of the human body is okay as long as there is no invasion to the human body.
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That is, I think try to avoid doctor practice, it's okay. That is, I think the matter of drafting. These
I think are present kind of situation in Japan.
And now I think this is an example of I think as long as very remarkable effect. I think at
that time pharmaceutical industries trying to request us to protect I think these inventions.
One thing is whether these I think the new guidelines or protection compiled by the JPO is
possible or not. Only one directly I think discussed, is I think this is Takeda and I think the Gyowa Company. I think this invention is a combination of medicine are already expired and
combination -- well, I think have a remarkable effect. But I think this case is a little bit I think not
good or I think example of what are called medical decision. Because I think this patent was
invalid. The lack of effective step.
But I think that in the court decision, they said -- they tried to impose this method. But I
think that -- I think the company tried to impose indirect infringement. But I think this is not I
think good from my point of view. I think that the combination is try to I think of enforcement. It's
better to see drugs in combination with. Direct infringement drug technique may I think solve this
problem. I will not go into the details because I think the next session will cover this issue.
And then I think I would like to touch upon a little bit I think the most recent Supreme
Court decision just rendered I think November, I think also two weeks ago. I think completely I
think the change the Japanese practice relating to the patent term extension. That is, I think -- you
can see I think this is a history of a patent extension in Japan. This is a little bit different from
European SPC and I think the U.S. system.
First I think the 1987 the patent system was introduced in Japan. And first I think this law
is not changed. And also guideline has been a long, long time I think in the use of the past guideline.
But I think in 2009 I think there are draft system case. I think the guideline with I think some
should be changed. And then second guideline. Then I think this second guideline was rejected by
the Supreme Court or the High Court.
I think there are -- it's a very -- we are always thinking about this article at the time is I
think an examiner, well, he should have a reason for rejection at this point. But I think -- this I
think work I think used in the article is not clear and ambiguity. Therefore, I think there is room
how to I think interpret this one. In Japan, I think there are first guideline is long. I think the scope
of rejection and scope of extended patent is thin. Because I think there is active -- I think the scope
of rejection is defined by the activity ingredient and indication.
And this I think the Supreme Court decision most recent rendered is I think a genetic case.
I think this is an example. The first I think approval of one. I think the subject approval is I think
this dosing method, this dose is I think the feature. Prior approval is a different dosing approval.
And the JPO said deny this approval. Because of I think the same active ingredient and the same
indication.
But I think this approach was denied because of I think the first approval will not lead to
the marketing I think the present, this position by the authority.
Therefore, I think if you refer back to the original I think intention of the law, this should
be I think protected. Therefore, I think the Supreme Court decided and also IP High Court rejected
the JPO's approach. Then I think each time I think if the subject approval not covered by the prior
approval, in that case I think the approval should be protected.
Therefore, I think the result is it's very clear in Japan every time I think the approval
received, it is possible to -- as long as the patent is I think embodied in that case, I think the second
approval and third approval if the dosing, I think the method will depend is also eligible for
extension.
363

364

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol 12:3

That is it. Thank you for your attention.
[Applause.]
DR. KILGER: So good morning. It's exciting to be here. There is a saying which says that
a British speaker will start a presentation with a joke, but the German speaker would start with a
table of contents. So I don't have a table of contents here.
MR. STOLL: That was a joke.
DR. KILGER: Oh, really sir. I didn't get that.
So although there is no table of contents, I would like to start with explaining to you the
different claim formats we have in Europe for the second medical uses. So as you know, the
methods of treatment are not allowed to claim under the European patent convention. And the
purpose of this is that the medical practitioner should not be hindered to treat a patient.
So the patent offices and European patent office, they invented the so-called Swiss-type
claim in order to give some protection for the invention of a second medical use but not to hinder
the medical practitioner from treating patients. So the claim reads: "Use of compound X for the
preparation of a pharmaceutical composition for treating or preventing a disease Y."
So it's a bit confusing because you have here the step or the feature for the preparation of
something, but it's not a novelty conferring feature, the novelty conferring feature is the use. The
Germans they have invented another type of claim which was “the use of compound X for the new
therapeutic application Y.” So under the new European patent convention, this has changed and
now the so-called purpose-limited product claim replaces the Swiss-type claim. And now it reads:
"Compound X for use in treating disease Y."
And for the time being and for the near future, we will see that these, both types of claims
coexist. So you will have patents with this type of claim and patents with the other type of claim.
And of course the question arises whether or not the scope of the claim will be the same.
So, the European patent office seems to think that the rights conferred to the patentee by
the new claim category, the purpose-limited product claim are likely broader and in particular lead
to possible restrictions on the freedom of the medical practitioner.
There's a citation in a decision of the Enlarged Board of appeal of the European patent
office: “if deemed necessary, the freedom of the medical practitioners may be protected by other
means on the national level”, which basically means if there is a problem, the national level should
solve the problem. The courts shall solve the problem.
And also there are other decisions from the Boards of Appeal from the European patent
office where it is stated that it is not admissible to switch from the old form, the Swiss-type claim
to the purpose-limited product claim because this would be an inadmissible broadening. So this
gives the impression that this is another type of protection.
So you could take both views. You could think, well, this is just a wording and it should
not mean anything else. It should just be the second medical indication, thus –it should have the
same scope.. Or you could take it literally, and you could think about the wording in more detail
and the Swiss-type claim had this feature “for preparation of” and as the medical practitioner would
not prepare the medicament for using it, he would not be infringing where in the other case, maybe
he could be an infringer.
So we will see what the national courts will decide, whether or not the scope will be the
same with respect to patentability and/or enforceability.
So my next topic will be that I am going to talk about is a very German principle, that is
the principle of manifested arrangement developed by the German courts, or you can call it evident
preparation, sinnfallige Herrichtung in German. And this concept teaches that the medical use
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claim includes both, the medical use itself as well as the preparatory work required to put the
compound into a form in which it may be administered.
So this looks for some material manifestation in the manufacture of the medicament, the
packaging, the label, which can be attributed to the new patented use of the drug. And this principle
has been developed in landmark decisions by the Federal Supreme Court of Germany. And they
said of course if you read such a claim, use of a medicament for treating diabetes, then on the one
hand it can encompass nonpatentable use, which is the doctor who is using the medicament for
treatment, but it also encompasses patentable uses, which is formulation, packaging, dosing in its
ready-made package.
And a question may arise, what happens if you have the first medical use and a medicament
is prepared in a certain way, and then you have a second medical use, but you do not change the
way of packaging or dosing. Would that be patentable as well? And the answer in subsequent
decisions was “yes,” patentability does not require that the use of a known medicament for treating
a second medical indication mission involves the medicament in another form.
So these are all court decisions and you might ask why I'm talking about this “old hat.”
Maybe because this principle of manifested arrangement still plays a role when it comes to
enforcement. And I don't go into details because I know that the next panel will talk about that in
more detail. But of course you can ask yourself whether this manifested arrangement would not
only encompass packaging and labeling, but also advertisement and marketing materials and so
on. And obviously the court in Dusseldorf has decided this question differently from the court in
Hamburg, which just said that a drug may be already, by its production, in manifested arrangement
for the use in the patent protected indication if it can be used without any further effort but only
needs its assigned purpose.
So where does this go? We will see from the courts and maybe also from the next panel.
So let's go in more specific detail what you can really have in your patents or what your
second medical use patents can be based on. Of course it can be a new indication, means another
disease, but it can be also a new use within the same disease, which is a different mode of drug
administration or new patient group to be treated, a different technical effect or a different dosage
regimen.
So of course all of these have to fulfill the requirements of novelty and inventive step.
So I would like to go into more detail with respect to the three latter mentioned new uses.
Imagine you have the situation where a drug X has been used in a method of treating a disease in
all patients, but later on you will find that the patients -- not all of the patients respond to the
medicament. You have responders. You have non-responders. And you seek to stratify nonresponder and responder in order to give the medicament only to those who will respond. And you
find a marker which helps to distinguish these two groups.
So think about the claims you could draft. Of course you start with the new claim format
drug X for use in a method of treating condition Y, but then you have to specify the patient groups
in more detail. You could say wherein the individual has said genetic marker Z - would be one
option. Another option would be that you define the patient group by stating an individual
identified as having said genetic marker Z, and a third option could be for instance the individual
wherein it is determined whether the individual has genetic marker Z.
So if you think about infringement, you would like to catch the alleged infringer with the
scope of your claims, you would like to avoid the latter format because you cannot be sure that the
alleged infringement act would really encompass the step of determining a marker. Because it
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could just be that the doctor knows from former analysis that the patient has the gene. So you
would prefer to have the broader claims, the first or the second one.
But then the question arises if the prior art has been used as drug for all patients, would
these claims then be novel at all? Because inherently, you have treated -- when you have treated
all patients those which had the gene Z. And also if the marker has been known before because it's
a marker for other users as well, like the blood group or so, then it could be that the marker has
been identified before independent of the stratification. So would then the second claim format be
novel?
So and I think this is something where the US point of view regarding inherency doctrine
differs from the European different point of view.
So what does the European Patent Office say? We had a decision of the Board of Appeals
and it was about the use of an antibody, rituximab, in treating a disease. And the only novelty
establishing feature was that it was administered to a human who experiences an inadequate
response to TNFa-inhibitor, meaning nonresponder to another therapy.
So the question arises because prior art was that you gave the same antibody to all patients
having this disease. So would that be novel?
So the patentee has argued that the prior art has neither disclosed a patient subgroup which
experienced an inadequate response to these inhibitors nor the successful treatment of this
particular patient group. And the Boards of Appeal actually followed this opinion and said that the
patient group of the claims is distinguishable over the patient group of the prior art document by
its physiological and pathological status. And consequently, this represents a new therapeutic
application.
So you could ask yourself, how could this be new if this has inherently happened in the
prior art? The answer is quite easy. Because before the European patent office, you don't have the
doctrine of inherency according to a very old decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal. And they
are of the opinion and still they are of the opinion that the decisive question is, what has been
explicitly disclosed in the prior art or to put it in other words, the question is not what might have
been inherent in what was made available to the public. The decisive question is, what has been
made explicitly available to the public.
So under European law, such a new patient group and would be patentable. So maybe this
would be different in the U.S.A. A different technical effect could also lead to a new use and
second medical indication. Here is a decision of the Boards of Appeal. A use of a composition has
been claimed and the composition shall be used for cleaning plaque and/or stains from human
teeth. And the prior art was the use of the same composition for reducing the solubility of tooth
enamel. And both uses have actually the same goal. They are aiming for prevention of tooth decay.
And also here it has been decided it's a new technical effect and leads to a patentable invention.
So there might be different cases where such a new technical effect would be denied. For
instance, if the new, allegedly new technical effect intervenes with a known technical effect, so
this is practically the same, or if you just give an explanation for a technical effect, but this does
not change anything, not the behavior of the medical practitioner.
So last example for new uses is a different dosage regimen, which can be patented. And
here is another decision. And I note that Peter Meier-Beck will refer to this in more detail. This is
a decision of a the Enlarged Board of Appeal and here in the treatment regimen, the only novelty
conferring feature was that this medicament as used in the treatment by oral administration once
per day prior to sleep. And the question was if this were the only novelty establishing feature, is
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the claim patentable? And if so, could this feature, which goes into the actual treatment process,
could this confer novelty to the claim? And the simple answer is yes.
So in former times, the German courts, they had some reservations against such pure
dosage suggestions, but they allowed claims requiring that the medicament be prepared for said
dosage. But they had reservation against these pure dosage suggestions. But the question is being
these reservations still applicable in view of the law as in force since December 2007 and in more
recent decisions of the Supreme Court, and we will hear about it later in detail.
So let me briefly summarize. In general, as well as in Germany as in Europe, various types
of second medical uses seem to be patentable or are patentable, dosages, patient subgroups, further
technical effect, administration modes. Then what you also can see there is "Further harmonization
of the Interpretation of the law in Germany and Europe." This has not been always the case. Then,
a question is scope of protection, has the old claim format the same scope as the new claim format?
And the most exciting questions, of course, will be the enforceability of patents directed to
these new second medical indications and the interpretation of the scope of the second medical use
claim which is evolving in the case law, in particular with respect to manifested arrangement.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
MR. STOLL: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. First I'd like to thank Professor
Takenaka for inviting me yet again to come back here and talk about issues that I feel very
passionately about.
I come from this slightly different than some of the speakers yesterday. My career, my
entire career has been in patent law. I'm not an economist or ethicist, but I do have some
background in patent law and ended up as the Commissioner for Patents for a long period of time.
And I'm going to talk a little bit more about the issues in the United States with respect to subject
matter eligibility and the case law and the evolution in what's happening here in the procurement
of rights as part of this discussion.
So let me start off by saying there are some several different areas that I'm going to look
at. I'm going to look at the Pharma Bio area compared with the high tech area. And I'm going to
talk about what's been happening here and where I think things are possibly going. But as you can
see, there are brand name pharmaceuticals. There are bio-pharmaceuticals and there are generic
pharmaceuticals. The typical pharmaceutical industry, and there is no such thing because most of
the pharmaceutical companies that I'm aware of are affiliated in some way with a generic, and
everything is getting a little bit confusing. But this is -- they develop drugs and market traditional
small molecule drugs. And they are expensive to develop and typically easy to copy and cheap to
manufacture at scale.
The biotech industry is kind of broadly divided into two areas that develop and produce a
biopharmacal, biologics, and they include proteins, vaccines, blood products, gene therapies and
stem cell therapies. In addition, bioinformatics is becoming very, very important. And these are
the gene-based diagnostic testing and pharmaceutical medicines. And they're emerging as very
important areas.
The generic industry is also an extremely important contributor to the drug producing area.
They take brand-name pharmaceuticals and they make them in the generics. But there are also
some new things emerging with respect to biosimilars, which are a little more complicated.
Because unlike traditional small molecules, the biologics generally have high molecular
complexity and can be sensitive to the difference in the manufacturing processes. So biosimilars
manufacturers do not have access to the original manufacturer's molecular clone or cell bank. Nor
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do the exact fermentation and purification process. So they're not exactly as easy to manufacture
as traditional generics.
Let's talk a little bit about what happens with respect to the development of these drugs.
And I'm going to analyze broadly what happens here.
First of all, in the pharmaceutical area there are high fixed costs of product R and D and
market entry. Sometimes greater than 1.8 billion per drug. It's a heavily regulated market. There is
a long developmental cycle. It's a high risk. One out of every 1,000 candidates identified during
drug discovery make it to clinical trial. And these factors make for strong patent protection
essential to drug development, essential.
Now, I'm going to say, in my entire career, I have never seen a study that says we should
not have patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs, never. And when I hear opining in this area
about moving in other directions, I think that before we risk economic development and job
creation, we need a little bit more of understanding if there's some other modality that might work
and not throw out everything with respect to what we're doing in patents with respect to
pharmaceutical.
Biopharma patents are similar. I mean, here we've got different ways, statutory classes for
protecting the subject matter. It's product and composition claims. There are method of use claims.
There are formulations. There are process claims and there are diagnostic methods which are a
subset.
Now, let me say a lot of the cases that have come out recently had what I would call
somewhat poorly drafted claims, and that is a different topical issue with respect to those things.
And I do think that if we are more creative and thoughtful about where we're really trying to go,
we can do a better job in this area without invoking 101.
How is biopharma different? Well, I did a comparison and analysis. Patents in biopharma
are significantly more valuable and have a higher rate of return than they do in other industries. In
contrast to most industries, biopharma firms primarily use patents to prevent copying of their
product. They also rely on patents more heavily as corporate assets. Innocent infringement is very
rare. There's almost no patent troll activity. There is an exception to that. There are fewer patents
per product. You can see that it usually takes three to eight patents to cover that, where it can be
thousands for the high tech industry.
Bottom line, because they enjoy much higher net benefits from patent ownership,
biopharma firms generally favor stronger rights and remedies than would be optimal for most other
companies.
How is biopharma different? They are discrete versus complex technologies. Higher
benefit from patents for products employing discrete technologies that are covered by a small
number of patents owned by a single entity. Transaction costs and risk of strategic behavior
increase in proportion to the number and dispersal of patent rights.
Patent density. You can take a look at the Orange Book. In patents in nearly -- in 2000,
estimated averages between 2.5 and 7 patents per product in biopharma. Compared to more than
730 patent families declared essential for a mobile standard. And despite R and D, IBM spends -received 7,481 patents in 2014 compared to 128 for Glaxo-Smith-Kline. We have a much higher
regulatory environment, and generic competitors cannot enter the market without approval of the
FDA, effectively precluding from granting approval of the generic, the incumbent's patent. So
there are significant differences.
So what are the major issues with respect to the challenges here? And I contacted the
Pharmaceutical Association and the Biotech Association to find out what they thought. And their
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biggest issue that they were talking to me about was patent eligibility. So I kind of disagree with
some of the speakers yesterday. I don't think that the industry is very happy with some of the
decisions the Supreme Court has been making lately.
They also are very concerned about the impact of the AIA, and there are concerns over
patent pending bills that are up on the Hill relating to the enhanced pleading requirements,
limitations on pre-Markman discovery, mandatory disclosure of patent ownership interests and fee
shifting. And their legislative priorities are to obtain biopharmaceutical exemptions from IPRs. I
think they're dreaming. Prohibit broadest reasonable interpretation claim construction in IPRs,
impose higher evidentiary standards for clear and convincing and invalidly and more liberal
amendment of claims in the IPR trials. And I think they'll get that.
Let's specifically talk about some of these recent cases. And that's where you're going to
find I disagree with a lot of issues. Mayo. I think that this was one of the most disastrous cases to
come out of the Supreme Court related to this subject matter in years. I mean it is terrible. The
Supreme Court confused 101 patent eligibility with 102 and 103 anticipation and obviousness. I
think that they should have listened to the experts at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
I think this is a big problem with changing what had been happening in my office for years and
years and years of granting diagnostic methods. And I am very concerned with the issues that came
out of that.
Lesser so but still a problem is Myriad. Now, I mean you know the facts of Myriad, it was
discussed yesterday but you may not know a lot of different issues surrounding it. For example,
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, the administration's experts with respect to patent
law did not sign the administration's brief. Meaning the patent and trademark experts did not agree
with the position of the administration. And it's unheard of not to sign on to an administration brief.
So the experts didn't agree.
Then we have the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with technical expertise in the
subject matter did not agree. The Supreme Court voted 9-0 unanimous and overturned the Federal
Circuit Board. I mean if you're going all the way to the Supreme Court, you kind of have a
difference of opinion in some of these areas.
So I think the whole setting for the issue is very unusual. I don't know of any of the Justices
on the Supreme Court that have technical expertise. I don't believe their clerks do either, unlike
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
I think they got the science wrong. I do think an isolated impurified gene or gene sequence
is not a compound that occurs in nature. And I even -- I think we're still at rest with respect to
CDNA. I don't really see their logic in differentiating there. I think we have a problem.
Alice is directed more toward the software industry or the business method industry. And
what the Supreme Court did with Alice is they unified the high tech industry and the biotech and
pharmaceutical industry in opposition to the procedures that they've been using, and something
that really doesn't happen very frequently at all. So we do have kind of a unified anger at some of
these decisions coming out of the Supreme Court.
They in Alice said that they weren't kidding with their earlier decisions, and they were
applying it now to issues related to software. They talked about requiring something substantially
more. They never defined what it was. They didn't tell the patent and trademark office what test
they could use. Nobody kind of clearly understands what substantially more is. So we've got
problems.
Just this week we had a very interesting -- while I was here, Ariosa Diagnostics v.
Sequenom was denied and granted an Em Bank paneling by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
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Circuit. Interestingly, I kind of agreed with all three of the sides that the judges argued there. The
people who said that they didn't think it should go there, kind of pooh-poohed the decision out of
the Supreme Court on Myriad and Prometheus and the dissent said that the Supreme Court didn't
meet it. So I believe that this one will be granted cert.
What here happened was you have a brand-new method for testing for fetal abnormalities,
which simply require testing the blood of the mother instead of invasive amniocentesis, which my
wife had to do twice. And it is lauded in every medical journal as being revolutionary for neonatal
care. And yet they said that because the cells of the fetus were in the mother's cells, it was naturally
occurring and therefore should not be granted a patent.
Big problems. And I do think there's a possibility the Supreme Court will make a change
there. I'm being told I'm out of time, so I definitely want to move quickly. But like I said, there has
to be something significantly different.
With respect to the interparty's review, really, we have one person, Kyle Bass, who is trying
to sort stocks by going to companies and saying, you know, I will file an IPR against your patent
claim unless you settle with me and pay me a fee. And so there is a little bit of troll activity going
on with respect to that.
I do believe the people on the Hill are very interested. Instead of going through the rest of
my slides, I'm going to very quickly tell you what I think is going to happen.
I don't agree with the people yesterday. Every organization that I am aware of, and I will
specifically say AIPLA, IPO, ABAIB Section, Pharma, Bio, all have in their pockets drafted
legislation for changing subject matter eligibility issues on the hill. Nobody really wants to offer
it. We're very hopeful that maybe the Supreme Court will see their senses, but the industry, at least
from my experience, is very upset with these things. We're risking our economic development and
job creation in an area where we really have quite a bit of talent. And I hope that the Supreme
Court listens to some of the people who are talking about these issues and understands that this is
affecting our community very significantly.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
MR. OOI: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Jin Ooi with Allen & Overy. And I'll just
start by saying we are very proud and honored to be invited to this conference, which has been
very, very illuminating.
I just want to talk about second medical use from a UK perspective. And I was thinking an
alternative title for this could be teaching an old dog new tricks, the UK perspective. Now, you
may recall this diagram or this picture from Professor Russell's presentation yesterday, and I
promise I didn't steal it from him. It just seems that we've picked the same picture from the Internet.
Patentability. Some difficulties. So we know that the drug molecule itself is not novel, and
there may be no physical change to the pharmaceutical itself required to give effect in new use
compared with the old use. Because otherwise, you would be able to claim those physical effects
to distinguish the drug for the new and old users such as a different-sized pill or a different
formulation.
And also you've heard from Ute and from Judge Meier-Beck that in Europe, the method of
treatment of the human or animal body is not allowed in Europe.
So then you've got these two type of claims Ute has briefly touched on. The first one from
the EPO decision of Eisai, which is use of a substance X for the manufacturing of medicament for
the treatment of disease Y, and we call this Swiss form claims. And in 2007, when the EPC patent
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convention came in, we've got a new form claim substance X for use in the treatment of disease
Y.
So you've got a purpose-limited process claim, which is a Swiss claim, compared to the
purpose-limited product claim of the EPC 2000. And for the purposes of double patenting, Swiss
claim not directed to same subject matter as the EPC 2000 claim, then it begs the question whether
or not the rights in an EPC 2000 claim are broader than a Swiss claim. Does that automatically
forward.
Difficulties to the Swiss form claims. In the UK after the decision Eisai in Wyeth's &
Schering's Application, the court sat unbound and decided that the better view is that Swiss claims
are not novel, but given the Eisai decision, decided that it was right to construe English statute in
conformity.
So the novelty there besides in the new therapeutic use and these are process claims, and
that was confirmed in BSM and Baker Norton.
Then we go on to 2008 Actavis and Merck, where Eisai extended to new dosage regimes.
And you'll hear from Judge Meier-Beck the Abbott decision in 2008.
So the general view is that Swiss form claims are claims to a method of manufacture. And
finally, how do you tell whether something is for a particular purpose? How do you tell if the
medicament is for this particular use? Suggesting that the "for" might here mean suitable and
intended for, and that was the common position adopted by Hospira and Genentech 2014 by the
parties but not argued much further.
So you've now passed through the patentability issues. You've got a second medical use
claim. But what exactly is your scope of protection? How far does it protect you from infringement
by other generic manufacturers? The way we see it, patent law issues the need for a workable
infringement test. And tied in with that are issues of claim construction, what does "for" mean.
Direct and indirect infringement. Can you claim -- can you say this infringement under both. Is
there actually indirect infringement. And tied into that what remedies are appropriate. But I'll steer
clear from that because I know that's the topic for the next presentation.
And then we've got sufficiency and plausibility issues, which is a bit of a hot topic at the
moment in the UK where whether or not you have enough data in your patent to justify claiming
a broad -- a set of claims. So you've got the cases which have come out very recently in the UK,
Generics and Warner-Lambert or pregabalin and Merck and Verner, ntpB1 antibodies for treating
cancer, Actavis and Eli Lilly and Atomoxetine. A succession of cases by three different patent
court judges in the UK talking about this issue. But I won't be going into detail on that.
And then you've got practical issues stemming from the use of skinny labels, which Jurgen
touched upon yesterday.
So the use of -- the use that can arise where an unpatented use authorized so there are issues
of cross-label use and cross-label dispensing, and that's exacerbated by the health care systems
which encourage generic prescription and substitution.
Moving on, then, to the UK Lyrica case, Generics and Warner-Lambert. And before I move
on, I should say that the ANS [sic] team and myself are involved in this case for the patentee. So
whatever I say here really is in the public domain and publicly and this really represents my views
and not that of the patentee.
What is meant by a requirement that medicant be for a therapeutic indication. And this
issue is really an important one because it concerns the scope of protection to be afforded for
second medical use inventions. And this is the first case where direct infringement turned on
ultimate intended use. And two questions could arise from that. Whose intention is it, which is
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relevant, and what's comprised in the requirement of an invention. And I'll touch on these two
questions later.
So let me then turn to the facts of Generics and Warner-Lambert. You've got a drug, amoxin
by Warner-Lambert, who's part of the Pfizer Group, which is indicated for three indications,
epilepsy, generalized anxiety disorder and pain. Warner-Lambert is the holder of a patent for the
use of pain, the compound patent having expired -- have expired quite some time ago. The dosage
forms and recommended dosages are the same for all three types of indications.
You've got a situation in the UK where doctors write the prescriptions generically or by I
and N. So you'll say pregabalin. It wouldn't say the drug Lyrica or the other generic manufacturers'
drug names. And you've got a situation where the indication of the particular drug isn't mentioned
in prescriptions. And so you would expect generic manufacturers who did, and they did carve out
skinny labels from their marking authorization to market their products for epilepsy and
generalized anxiety disorder and saying that the indications for pain are not aimed at or targeted
for.
You have got a situation in the UK National Health Service where you've got devolved
nations in each of which autonomous bodies. And in England alone, you've got 210 clinical
commissioning groups and multiple health boards of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland each
of which is an autonomous body.
So you've got a situation of thinking where, then, do you stop a generic product being
marketed for pain? Do you go -- is the solution residing with the department of health with NHS
England, with any of the devolved nations, or is the solution with the CCG for the health boards.
Of course in one side you've got the people in the left, which are your -- your left, which are Pfizer's
clients, and you've got generic manufacturers who obviously are selling the drug for generalized
anxiety disorder and epilepsy.
And just a quick word under reimbursement and drug tariff, as I said, doctors are
encouraged by higher ups to prescribe generically. And when that prescription comes to a
pharmacist, that's obviously not written for an indication. Judgment says that most of the time
pharmacists won't know what indication pregabalin is being prescribed for and obviously get
incentivized to dispense the cheaper generic product because the level of reimbursement for
pregabalin at least and still is at this stage, are the same. So really, if you dispense a cheaper drug,
you get a larger reimbursement fee.
So you've got a situation where you've got a second medical use patent. You've got
generics, sort of a marking authorization. We see a label carving out the patented indications. And
they don't advertise beyond their marking authorization. You've' got doctors prescribing
generically and prescription software, which encourages them to prescribe generically.
You've got situations where generic product may be sold for the patents and indication.
Pharmacists incentivized to dispense generic products, who don't know indication and are further
encouraged by the drug reimbursement tariff. And the question is this: Does that fact pattern, then,
amount to infringement? Is there infringement by generic companies of a Warner-Lambert patent?
Very early on in the case following a refusal of interim relief -- and I won't touch on that
because again, that's next topic on relief -- there was an order to NHS England to give guidance to
the NHS service providers, which says medical practitioners should prescribe only by brand name
Lyrica for the patented indications, that pharmacists should really dispense branded products when
they are told or when they know it was for the patented indication and to consider amending
prescription software so that if it's prescribed for pain, that you should prescribe by the brand name
Lyrica.
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And quickly for the reasoning behind this guidance, it's because NHS England was best
placed at -- it will be consistent nationwide guidance, which has the force of encouraging the
CCGs, GPs to describe and dispense in the manner as mentioned. And the judge also said that the
best solution to a problem of second medical use patents is really to ensure that doctors prescribe
by brand name rather than generic name.
So then moving on to the test for direct infringement, what does "for" mean? In the higher
court in interim injunction stage, the judge says it was subjective intention. What the generics are
thinking of when they're selling their drug for the nonpatented indications. Then it went on to the
Court of Appeal who then said well, the test really is whether or not the generics know or foresee
reasonably that their product will be used intentionally for the treatment of the patented indication.
And when that test was applied in the facts of September of this year, the judge referred to
intentional use to be that for the generic-specific product and requisite intention was that of a
doctor or pharmacist, not the patient.
So you have a situation here where the doctors are prescribing generically. They don't say
-- doctors don't intend Actavis's product Lucian, being prescribed for pain. And you've got a
situation where the pharmacists don't know an indication for the prescribed drug. Well, that's a
result that the judge said there's no foreseeability that Actavis's specific product will be
intentionally administered for the patent indication. This is all obviously still pending appeal.
And just I note there the fact the NHS guidance obviously makes the use of the patented
indication less foreseeable when you've got a situation where doctors and pharmacists are
encouraged to prescribe the Lyrica drug for the patented indication. But then it's a question of how
effective the guidance has been in the UK, and that's now a matter for debate.
Moving, then, on indirect and contributory infringement. There's a need under the EPC
2000 and the UK laws for a downstream event which could be regarded as putting invention into
effect. So this would mean for Swiss Pharma claims, because the pharmacists don't use Lucian,
Actavis's product, to manufacture the pharmaceutical composition because it has already been
received -- it's been already manufactured when they receive it. So then looking I guess what you
were saying as well to the literal construction of a Swiss form claim or do you read it purposefully.
The Court of Appeal allowed the indirect infringement claim to go on to be heard at trial.
And that trial, it was held that there wasn't any contributing infringement. The infringing fact was
the manufacture and there was no downstream act of manufacture. I said here that the Court of
Appeal was encouraged by some of the European cases. In Germany, Hacksell and Elliott [sic]
case and Warner-Lambert, which you briefly touched on. And Novartis and Sun, which had a court
of appeal judgment, just another court of appeal judgment coming down last week, which I'm sure
we will be discussing in the next session.
So then some key policy issues. Collision with the health services' approach to cost savings.
Is there any obligation of either party to act ahead in time of loss of exclusivity to partition the
market? So you've got drugs for patented and nonpatented indication. Is it fair to find infringement
when reasonable steps have been taken when a generic company says they've written dear
pharmacist letters to pharmacists saying that you shouldn't be dispensing our generic product for
the patented indication. And in circumstances where they've taken steps to carve out the patented
indication from the marketing authorization.
Some unanswered questions. What should the legal test be? Is it a once and for all test or
is it something that can be looked at again and again? Obviously intention changes and knowledge
changes. Can contributory infringement apply? What does this mean by putting invention into
effect? What final remedies are appropriate? What solutions are available in more complex cases
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where you've got drugs in a hospital setting and home care products? Do the EPC 2000 claims
make any difference?
So I won't touch on any of these, but I'm more than welcome to discuss this during Q and
A session or at the break.
And then finally my last slide and position is Australia, because that's where I started my
practice in. You have a situation where it's very similar in the U.S. where method of medical
treatment of human body is capable of being patented. So you've got a method of treatment claim,
compound when used claim, Swiss-style claims often drafted into saying patents because -- on the
basis they may have different scopes.
This has been finally confirmed by the highest court in Australia in 2013 Apotex versus
Sanofi-Aventis that you can actually patent -- a method of medical treatment is allowable. In that
case, you've got again a skinny label for leflunomide, where the generic has carved out the patented
indication. And the test there for indirect infringement is whether or not a generic has a reason to
believe that their product will be marketed for the patented indications. And in that case, it was
held that there was no reason for Apotex to so believe.
But again, the marketed side of patented and nonpatented indications is important
especially in Warner-Lambert, Apotex, where the patented indication accounted for over 95 -- 99
percent of the patented indication. So in circumstances where Apotex tried to sell their product for
the nonpatented indication, there was clearly reason to believe that they would be selling for the
patented application.
And that's the end of my presentation.
[Applause.]
HONORABLE MEIER-BECK: Good morning, everybody. Thank you, Toshiko for
inviting me to contribute to the great event. It's a pleasure to be back to Seattle.
The Supreme Court judge should be cautious and should say nothing what is not an
incontestable truth or has already been decided by his court and is therefore an uncontestable truth.
MR. STOLL: Another joke.
HONORABLE MEIER-BECK: Sorry. I'm a German judge. I am a bit confused to hear
that the same is not true in the United States, but anyway. This is my table of content with
incontestable truth.
An invention shall be considered to be new if it doesn't form part of the state of the art.
And the state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public before
priority date or application date. You may be familiar with that. But the reason why I mentioned
it is the consequence of this principle of novelty, is that novelty requires a new technical teaching.
And that is decisive for many questions we discuss today when it comes to patentability and when
it comes to infringement. Because a discovery as such does not establish a new technical teaching
and is therefore, as such, not patentable. Although the same is explicitly said in the statute. But if
you hadn't this provision in the statute, the same were true because a discovery as such does not
contain the technical teaching, but something that exists in the nature.
And nevertheless, an invention in the new technical teaching may be based on the discovery
especially on the discovery of a natural biological mechanism. And according to European and
German law, and contrary to what has been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court for the United
States, when assessing inventive step, the discovery should not and must not be disregarded
because it is not patent-eligible itself, but nevertheless it may be the only -- the main and the only
inventive contribution to the new technical teaching and may therefore be sufficient for granting
patent protection.

2017]

FUTURE OF INNOVATION IN MEDICINE

375

In the Memantine case, that was these two elements: That the discovery is sufficient as
long as a new technical teaching results from this discovery. Where the basis of the decision we
made, it was about a substance for the treatment of Alzheimer's disease. We heard about a
substance for treatment of Alzheimer's disease yesterday afternoon.
The basis of the patent was the discovery of the function of an active agent which served
as an antagonist against a specific pathologic status linked to Alzheimer's disease. But it was a
very valuable discovery to describe this function of this agent. But unfortunately, there was no
new technical teaching following from this valuable discovery because neither a new dosage
regime was taught nor a group of patients so far not treated with the agent was disclosed to be a
responsive group. So therefore, the patent was invalidated in the location proceedings before my
court.
I mentioned Article 54(2) EPC, which states that the state of the art shall be held to
comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral description before
priority date or filing date. But we have, as you know, Article 54(4) EPC that states that that
provision shall not exclude the patentability of any substance or composition comprised in the state
of the art, for use in a method referred to in Article 43(c) that is for the message for medical -- of
medical treatment. And we have in the EPC 2000 mentioned by Ute Kilger in her presentation.
Article 44(5) that states that patent protection may be granted for any specific use in that
message referred to in article 43(c). So for any specific use for medical treatment or surgery.
As already mentioned, the enlarged Board of Appeal decided in 2010 that, where it is
already known to use a medicament to treat an illness, Article 44(5) does preclude that this
medicament be patented for use in a different treatment by therapy of the same illness. But such
patenting is also not excluded where a dosage regime is the only feature claimed which was not
known in prior art.
This decision has been approved by my court in a judgment given in 2014. And in the
claim, there was an interesting feature in addition to a dosage regime. You see on my slide the
claim. The claim states the disease that has to be treated by the substance. There is a dosage,
conventional dosage regime -- scheme given in the claim and there is an additional feature, and
the most interesting feature of this case and it's the last one. The claim says that the hand with
fibrous cord has to be immobilized immediately after injection of the substance and maintained to
be immobile for several hours.
And the Federal Patent Court that has to deal with this claim, the court first instance
invocation proceedings ruled that when assessing inventive step, the last feature has not to be taken
into account because it did not relate to the substance or the dosage scheme but to the method of
treatment, the method how to treat the patient when administering the substance. And because the
remaining elements of the claim were obvious to a skilled person, the patent had been revoked.
When we had to deal with the appeal, we -- first we made clear the following: As a matter
of principle, it doesn't -- it doesn't matter for patentability issues whether you have an EPC 2000
claim, whether you have a use claim, German-type use claim as Ute mentioned, use of X for
treatment of Y, or if you have a Swiss-type claim as granted by the European Patent Office, which,
as you may be aware of, did -- does not grant these German-type use claims. Because the enlarged
Board of Appeal thought that it might be impossible to grant claims for the use of a nonmedicament
for different purpose.
We thought that's unnecessary. But anyway, at the very end, it's all about purpose-bound,
purpose-limited substance protection. That is the essence of the EPC 2000 claim that is the essence
of German-style use claim and that is the essence of a Swiss-type and use claim.
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We approved the general approach of the enlarged Board of Appeal in Apotex, and we
added that the specific use of a substance may be determined not only by the disease to be treated
and the dosage scheme, but also by other parameters that influence the effect of the applied
substance.
Or to put it differently, may be of critical importance for the entry of desired success of the
substance-specific use. But that does not mean that anything which relates to the treatment of the
patient in combination with such administration, with administering the substance concerned can
contribute to the new technical teaching therapy-related instruction can only do this if they
objectively target allowing, amplifying, accelerating on any other way improving the effects of the
substance but not so relate to a therapeutic measures which in addition to an independent of the
effects of the substance are suitable to treat the disease in question.
I think time is over and so is my presentation. To foster pharmaceutical innovation, that's
my conclusion. Any specific use of a substance for therapeutic treatment is patentable if the
specific use is new and involves a new inventive step. The letter is important. It's true that patent
protection for second medical use is a valuable incentive for developing new use of existing known
drugs. And so second medical use patents are valuable contributions for -- to allow us to reach
sufficient protection of innovation. But on the other hand, we have to be aware that this tool itself
is an incentive for inventive -- for inventing advantages of slightly changed dosage schemes, for
instance.
So we have to balance both aspects. Second medical use patents are important but we have
to -- we have carefully, we have to consider carefully in each and any case inventive step. Same is
true for the patent I have talked about, and we couldn't examine the incentive step because it wasn't
appealed on precedent of law only, so we have to send the case back for the Federal Patent Court
for considering again inventive step in the case at hand.
In any case, courts have to ensure the appropriate balance between patent protection and
freedom to operate and to use an existing substance, known substances for known treatment
methods and for known purposes. And at least this I think is an incontestable truth.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
MR. SERAFINI: Thank you, Professor Meier-Beck.
So before we open up the floor to questions from all of you, I have a few questions for each
of our panelists to get the discussion going. And in this case last is first so as you just sat down,
Professor Meier-Beck. I have a question for you: Noting all the caveats that you used when you
started your presentation, and we'll ignore the joke or the absence of a joke that you may have
made. So if you'd accept the premise that the EPO -- and this is personally my belief, that EPO is
now one of the patentee and in this case innovative drug-friendly legal frameworks, and that the
G208-case that you spoke about, the dosage regime Abbott case, provides a fantastic opportunity
to pursue creative second medical use claims in Europe.
How far do you think the regime Abbott case -- the dosage regime Abbott case can be
taken?
HONORABLE MEIER-BECK: Yes, I think it's -- when this decision -- when the EPO
came up with this decision, I was a bit skeptical at the very beginning that this approach may be a
bit too broad and give too much particularity to grant patent protection essentially for medical
treatment. But I think as we recognized in our judgment, there is no grasp -- agenda to grasp how
to deal with second medical use in a narrow but similarly clear -- and clear way. So I think it's -if it's applied carefully, I think it's -- it ensures a good balance between patent protection for second

2017]

FUTURE OF INNOVATION IN MEDICINE

377

medical use and avoiding evergreening patents on the other hand, which is also an important goal
of our -- of applying this tool of granting protection for second medical use. But that shouldn't be
the result of evergreening patents with slightly different shaded dosage regimes. And we should
always be aware that for a patent examiner it may be quite difficult to find out what it's really a
novelty of when he's confronted with more or less clear evidence on the advantages of a different
dosage scheme, for instance.
MR. SERAFINI: Thank you. Jin, until recently you had two specialists in the High Court,
two specialist patent judges, and I think now I believe you have three, Arnold, Bears and Carr
[sic], which both of them seemingly applied different approaches.
And as more of a side note, I think there have been similar cases recently reached where a
decision opposite in the Netherlands court. Do you think -- and we hear a lot in the United States
a lot about the Unified Patent Court. Do you think the Unified Patent Court will solve these
differences and the different views especially now that you have three High Court patent judges
added to the mix?
MR. OOI: I mean I think that's the hope that EPC would come up with some sort of a
unified solution. But I think the reality is, in my view, it's going to be really dependent on the sort
of panel of judges that you're going to get in EPC. Because you're going to be bringing from your
background, the English system or the German system or the Netherlands system. And to the extent
possible, I guess they'll sort of come up with a unified approach and that may be the solution as
the EPC continues on many, many years down. But I think in its nascent stages, anyway, I think
there will still be possibly differences.
MR. SERAFINI: Thank you, Jin. Bob, you're often shy to express your opinion, so I'm
going to ask you to kind of stretch a little bit and maybe come out of your shell. And if you need
to take a moment, that's okay too.
You addressed in your talk, this legislation by all these different groups related to the patent
subject matter eligibility. What is your personal or if you wish your professional view on the
prospects for this legislation going forward?
MR. STOLL: That's a tough question to answer. I don't -- I don't think that any of the
groups right now are ready to introduce any type of legislative fix at this point. Because once that
happens in Washington, D.C., you lose control and there is a possibility of things running amok
with respect to the proposals at that point. So I think that most of the -- I am on at least one, possibly
two of those task forces, and we do have legislation that's ready to go in case somebody introduces
something we really think is very onerous, but we don't want to do it.
We're hopeful that the Supreme Court will revisit some of these issues and that the
pendulum will begin to swing back a little bit. We have from the biopharma area, the areas case.
In the high tech there is Planet Blue, which also has the technology of matching the movement of
a character to speech which was denied patentability based on 101 utility.
But I'm beginning to think that the court is tiring of 101, which was supposed to be a broad
filter. I think that what needs to happen now and what I'm advising my clients is to have better
defined boundaries of their claims so that people clearly understand what they're claiming, meet
their obligations under 112 with respect to clarity, written description enablement, and that's where
we should really focus our attention instead of 101.
Knock things out with prior art. I have no problems with using 112, 102 or 103. I just
believe 101 should be a very broad filter that then allows for other things to happen with other
pieces of the statute.
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I would also at this point, I'm telling my clients, to take whatever the claim that the patent
office is willing to grant and then file a continuing application on the other claims that are maybe
violative of the current rules, but I think that eventually things will change, and you need to have
something in the hopper to be able to claim it eventually. So I'm saying bulk up your specifications,
be clear on your claims, draft them thoughtfully, and in due course in time, we may see the
pendulum swing back, particularly when all of our biotech and pharmaceutical industry moves to
Europe.
MR. SERAFINI: We have to keep in mind that Myriad and patent eligibility is not such
an issue in Europe, so I think you've seen some leakage in Australia.
MR. STOLL: Yeah, they seem to follow our Supreme Court on Myriad. However, the
lower court actually slapped Myriad down, correct? So they have the same problem we have.
MR. SERAFINI: Well, thank you, Bob, for being shy.
Two more questions for our panelists, and then we can open up the floor to questions from
all of you.
Ute, briefly, can you explain in a little bit more detail what you mean by inherency, the
inherency doctrine? I personally don't understand how, you know, that would make a claim novel
if the novel patient group treated overlaps with the patient group treated in the prior art. I don't
understand that.
DR. KILGER: So essentially, I think it is the view of the patent office is if something is
hidden in the nature or somewhere and you have not provided as technical teaching to the public,
then it's not there. So and I think in most situations, the European Patent Office will not view a
medical treatment that occurs inherently in the prior art as being publicly disclosed. So -- and I
think that this is quite a good approach because it encourages like personalized medicine, so it
encourages that you really look for responders and markers and that you stratify the patients and
only treat those who respond.
There were earlier decisions of the European Patent Offices where it was the T200 in 1996
where they introduced a two-part task and they said this patient group should not overlap. But all
the recent decisions are they took this away and they stated there is no inherent treatment if you
have not known that this patient group is a responder, this is novel technical teachings. And in fact,
you really change the way the medical practitioner is now acting. And this leads from a discovery
I think to an invention.
So everything is nature and everything is maybe a discovery. But then you turn it into a
technical teaching and that makes all about the difference. MR. SERAFINI: Great. Thank you,
Ute. And finally, Shinjiro, is there any disadvantage for the coming new practices of PTE with the
Supreme Court decision in Japan in November?
MR. ONO: Yes. The point is I think that I explained. There used to be GP consider that I
think the extension and the scope of extension and their approval. I think this new Supreme Court
decision said that the same IP High Court decision is I think every time and the prior approval and
comparing it with I think the subject new approval, and if they are identical, I think there are no
distinction.
But if there I think the second approval is not identical, it's a different from the first one
from the authority, it is possible to extend. That means it used to be GPU consider the extension
of I think scope of the extension is I think very broad. Because it's in the claim scope, but I think
this new decision implicate that the scope of the claim, scope of protection is very narrow, only
limited to I think shall we say the approval. That is very narrow one.
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Therefore, I think the user or a company should be very careful about if they apply for the
new extension but also they consider for the R and D. Two, I think they apply for the new extension
as long as because of the scope of the extension is very narrow comparing with the old style, that
is I think a little bit cumbersome for the company to be careful about and for protection of the
scope. It's very narrow. That is I think one of the...
MR. SERAFINI: Thank you very much. I know you're all very eager to come up to that
microphone or that microphone over there and ask -- assault our panel with questions, so we
encourage you to do that now.
And the first to the microphone is the first question that will be asked, so that's over here.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am a European patent attorney and I have the same problem as
Andrew actually understanding how this EPO case law regarding patient subgroups, especially
when it comes to the overlapping patients. I would have assumed, okay, if you have a patient and
then you make the discovery that the reason why he was treated was because he had this gene
marker, that should not be even novel at least with respect to that. And I see a difference with the
Memantine decision where they clearly say it has been previously untreated. I know you hate to
make predictions for the future.
Peter, but when you look at this case, how would you have decided?
HONORABLE MEIER-BECK: I refuse to answer this question. But I agree with you
that there's a difference between the Memantine decision, and this approach that is a discovery of
why patients have been well treated by administering certain substance sufficient to constitute
novelty.
MR. SERAFINI: Question?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. This is a question for Mr. Stoll as he's been a little shy here.
I'm going to try to draw him out here a little bit. In all seriousness, I appreciate your candor very
much. You spoke about U.S. legislation and I had a follow-up to that. You -- earlier in your
comments, you touched on Kyle Bass and what he's doing in the industry. I'm wondering what
your perspective is on any Big Pharma introducing any sort of legislation either in this year or next
that would fix or address the kind of activity, shenanigans that Mr. Bass and his cohorts are up to
in their approach to leverage the IPR process.
MR. STOLL: That's a thoughtful question, and it depends on what type of legislation
you're talking about. Firstly, though, I will say I don't think anything is moving at this point right
now. I would say that, you know -- and we've got an election year next year, which means things
are going to take time. I do believe there was an attempt to take him to court on RICO charges in
New Jersey at one point, which I thought was very interesting. And I think some of the things I've
got a little bit of problems when he goes privately to the company and brings that IPR already
drafted to them and hands it to them. I think that is a mistake in my opinion as to what he -- but
the rest of it I think is probably within the boundaries of the law.
I do think he can, as a concerned individual so to speak, bring an IPR. And I don't think
there's any limitations. But that was specifically contemplated in developing the IPR in the AIA. I
think based upon what he's doing with it, we now need to rethink that, whether someone has to
have an interest or not. And I think I believe in full debate and discussion because I don't like what
he's doing. But I do think that there are some public interest groups who might have an interest in
removing what I call dead wood from the IPR system.
I also believe that we need more ability to amend the claims, which is why you have the
broadest reasonable interpretation in the first place. And the PTO hasn't been able to do that, which
could take some of these problems out of the system. There may be some tie to things that have
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already got FDA approval or, you know, are farther down the pike. And there may be ways to draft
legislation to kind of exclude those types of things. But I think it's going to be difficult to do
because of -- because of all the other competing interests.
So I share your concern. I don't like what he's doing. You know, I think it smells to me.
But I think that most of what he's doing is completely legitimate, and I hope we're able to find a
way to stop that. And, you know, getting a better quality patent out of the trademark -- patent and
trademark office goes a long way to reducing the number of IPRs that are filed. So IPR can only
be brought on prior art, and if we do a better job taking care of the prior art making sure that it's in
front of the examiner and they understand it and they're only issuing patents, at least to a larger
degree, that are completely valid, we remove the Kyle Bass problem itself.
So there are many ways to tackle this. Sorry for the long answer.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you very much. Just so I understand your comments
fully, next year election year here in the U.S. so probably nothing.
MR. STOLL: Probably not.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This year.
MR. STOLL: Probably not. That's my answer.
MR. SERAFINI: He just put new batteries in his crystal ball. So, Toshiko, do you have a
question?
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: Yes. I'm completely with Mr. Stoll and I am very concerned
about sort of activism. The Supreme Court here in the United States as well as Japan, because the
activities isolate Japan or United States from the rest of the world. This has sort of, you know,
undermining force done by U.S. PTO or JPO. So therefore, I'm also concerned about the new sort
of Unified Patent Court, which will be also be enacted maybe isolating or undermining
harmonization activities.
So I want to hear from European speakers about what sort of impact a unified court will
have as well as what sort of the things U.S. PTO or JPO can do to prevent sort of -- prevent
undermining the activities for harmonization.
MR. SERAFINI: Ladies first, Ute, or Jin.
MR. OOI: I mean I think my answer is going to be quite similar to the one I gave
previously. What we're saying now that UPC is really going to be crystal ball gazing. We're really
going to be hoping that some sort of unified approach is going to come up. But with the optout/opt-in, you're still going to get national decisions on patents, and it's going to be a very, very
long way in my opinion before anything consistent will resolve. But I'm interested to hear.
DR. KILGER: So I totally agree to this. First of all, I do not think that all the users will
put all the balls into the system and to see what happens with their most precious IP. So it may
take a while that the system is going to be tackled and it may take a while that it is consistent and
harmonized, but it's really a crystal ball, as you said.
MR. STOLL: And with respect to what the U.S. PTO can do in the cases that are coming
down, if you read them very carefully, they're very narrowly decided, extremely narrowly. And
what the U.S. PTO can do is interpret them very narrowly in their implication and their guidelines.
And they have been good about making iterative changes. I am still asking for more. I think they
need to be narrower. There's many things I think can be done.
HONORABLE MEIER-BECK: I do think it's hard to predict what will happen when the
UPC Pharma will start working and the court will have to find its way between the established
EPO case law and the -- in one different national and jurisprudence. And I -- personally I hope that
there will be judges who are experienced enough to find their own European way to a certain extent
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independent to what is now established practice of the EPO. But everything will depend especially
on the judges of the Court of Appeal.
MR. SERAFINI: Great. Thank you. One last question and we're cutting to our coffee
break.
MR. FEHLNER: Paul Fehlner from Novartis again. What role do the patent offices have
to play in helping craft the claims that will stand up to further review downstream and that will be
meaningful from the perspective of actually supplying that reward for innovation that we discuss
the patent is intended to supply?
MR. STOLL: I think the patent offices can provide guidance as to what type of claims are
going to pass patent-eligibility muster. I think they're starting to do that. I see a lot of examples
being put forward out there which I think is very helpful. I would recommend also, I mean I hate
to admit this, but I see allowability rates vary from art unit to art unit. I do some of these tools and
formulate my claims in a manner that would put them in the art units that have a higher allowance
rate.
So I -- technically, I use a patent advisor myself, and I also try to route my claims through
systems that make sure that there is quote/unquote substantially more so that we move forward.
But I keep something pending, you know, if I get an allowance I take it, and I do a continuation
because I do think things will change.
MR. SERAFINI: All right. In closing, I know that I opened up the session joking about
the gray skies. As you can see there is sunshine outside. In the Pacific Northwest, they refer to that
as a sun break, and the moisture that falls from the sky is also referred to as liquid sunshine. I'd
like to take this opportunity to thank our esteemed panelists for their participation. And let's give
them all a great round of applause.
[Applause.]
[Recess was taken.]
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PANEL V
REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENT OF NEW USE DRUG PATENTS

Moderator:
David Tellekson, Fenwick & West (Seattle, WA, USA).
Panelists:
Simon Cohen, Taylor Wessing (London, UK).
Hon. Rian Kalden, Dutch Court of Appeal (The Hague, Netherlands).
Dr. Matthias Zigann, Munich District Court (Munich, Germany).
Hon. Toshiaki Iimura (ret.), Yuasa and Hara (Tokyo, Japan).
Hon. Garrett Brown (ret.), Chief Judge, U.S. District Court (D. NJ) (ret.) (New York, NY,
USA).

PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: We have special guest, meaning Dean of the law school.
She was supposed to be out of town but very fortunately that commitment was canceled so here
she is, Dean Kellye Testy.
DEAN TESTY: Thank you so much, Professor Takenaka. I wanted to take a very quick
moment as this panel begins to tell you how pleased we are that you're here at the University of
Washington School of Law and in William H. Gates Hall. I know from what I've been hearing
from my colleagues and from some of you I've talked to in the hallway that things are going great
with this event. And I just wanted a chance to tell you how much we're welcoming you all here
and how much we're pleased we'll be able to be a part of this.
I also wanted to take just a brief opportunity to thank Sir Robin Jacob, who is of course
leader of this event, and it's been wonderful to be able to get to know him and work together on
this. And then I also wanted to give a great thanks to two of my colleagues. I want to thank Mr.
Terry Price, who's been a key organizer. And then especially thank Professor Toshiko Takenaka,
who is one of the world's leaders in patent law and a colleague that we're just so pleased to have
here at the University of Washington School of Law.
So Toshiko, it's wonderful to see you here and I thank you for your leadership. And again
thank you for giving me a minute to say hello, and I'll not stand in the way of progress any longer
and turn it over to this panel. So again, enjoy. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR. TELLEKSON: I'm David Tellekson of Fenwick & West, and we have a very
distinguished Panel 5 to talk about infringement of the new use drug patents and also remedies for
that infringement. And let me just introduce briefly the panel and then we'll get started.
We have the Honorable Matthias Zigann of the Munich District Court. And next to him is
the Honorable Rian Kalden of the Dutch Court of Appeals. A nonjudge, we have Simon Cohen -well, he's currently missing, but he'll be here momentarily. And also the Honorable Toshiaki
Iimura, who is a retired former Chief Judge of the Intellectual Property High Court in Japan now
with Yuasa and Hara. And the Honorable Garrett Brown, who is the former Chief Judge of the
Federal District Court in New Jersey, is now retired.
So very distinguished panel. And the Honorable Judge Zigann will start off.
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MR. ZIGANN: Good morning, everybody. And my special thanks go to Toshiko for
inviting me over. I really appreciate being here. And just for the record, it's Matthias Zigann.
We decided upon giving me some more time to present what I have to say, as I will show
you through the pregabalin case, as it happened in Germany. And as you will learn from our
following speakers, it also ran in the Netherlands. And you have already heard that it ran also in
Great Britain and Australia.
And the methods I would like to use is kind of different to the methods you have seen by
the previous speakers. So I would like to give you an outline of the facts of the case and then we
go a step back to the law as we have it in Germany. And then we will look at the decision of the
Hamburg Regional Court.
So the facts are that we have two medicines in the market, the one medicine labeled for
epilepsy, generalized anxiety disorder and neuropathic pain. And the generic one labeled for the
same but not for pain, so it's kind of skinny labeling. And then we have the patent, a European
patent drafted according to the Swiss Patent Office so-called Swiss-type claim, which reads, use
of pregabalin for the preparation of a pharmaceutical composition for treating pain.
And what happened, the doctor prescribes pregabalin with no indication to the brand name
usually. The pharmacist receives the prescription and by law, is obliged to hand over the most
inexpensive one. To do that, we have software in most pharmacies pointing out the cheapest drug
containing pregabalin. And in addition to that, the law provides for the health insurers to be able
to get into rebate agreements with pharmaceutical companies.
So in our case, as decided in Hamburg, the defendant signed a rebate agreement with the
health insurer called KKH about pregabalin. What they did not do was to sort of carve out the
second medical use for treating pain. The rebate agreement is silent on treating pain.
So plaintiff argues, given the regulatory environment in Germany, just by producing the
drug and by signing the rebate agreement, you are infringing my second medical use patent.
Because it's sure that because of the preconditions, your drug will be used to treat pain. Also the
label of your drug does not indicate it to be used to treat pain.
I have some difficulty with my eyesight as this is not the right distance for my glasses. I
have to refer to the other ones, to the printouts.
So looking at the law as we have it in Germany, we have at Section 9 of the German Patent
Act covering direct infringement, this is quite lengthy. I broke it down to the essentials. So we
have product claims and process claims. And as you can see, specific activities are exclusively
reserved for the patent owner. And if you look the process it's using and offering to use, and if we
have a product produced directly by process, it's offering put into the market and so, on as you
might know from your own jurisdiction.
Now, as discussed before, if you look at the Swiss-type claim, we have use in the
manufacture of a medicament for the treatment. That's basically a process claim. We use something
in doing something. But we also have before for the treatment, and this indicates some kind of
purpose.
And going back a little from the slide you see at the moment, the basic problem as I see it
is that our lawgiver, our Parliament is kind of inactive with this problem.
So we have now the law that the second medical use can be patented, but we don't have a
specific law what happens then. So we have the basic law for the time before this was the case and
somehow the judges, the courts are in the duty now to find practical solutions as to have a balanced
approach, patent protection for second medical use patents and freedom to operate for the generic
companies.
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The approach at hand as the German courts saw it, was not to stick too much to the wording
of the claim, but to look where is the invention and what is a practical approach when we look to
infringement.
And they came up with the sinnfallige Herrichtung in German, manifest or purposeful
arrangement, as you have heard before this morning.
The effect of the theory is to be able not to look at the use for the treatment, but more have
to focus on the manufacturing process, which means that you can sue the generic company for
manifest purposeful arrangement of the drug in the first place, which is a direct infringement versus
suing then for indirect infringement. Because of course the generic company is not curing anybody,
they are producing the drug. Other people are using to cure the disease.
So what could be the manifest arrangement. It could be confectioning, a ready-to-use
preparation, dosage and in addition to that, also not concerning the drug itself, it could be label
instructions.
Directly infringing acts under this theory would be manifestly arranging for the patent and
use and often putting to the market and so on products that had been manifestly arranged.
Not directly infringing acts, according to the jurisprudence of our courts, had been making
the drug as such or for not patented indication. And in addition to that, acts not sufficiently
attributable to the product, which we see on the next slide. And these cases were decided in
Dusseldorf by the first and second instance court, and we had general announcements and
marketing materials, flyers, indications by salespeople and so on. And they were not deemed to be
direct infringing acts, as these acts were not sufficiently attributable to the product itself.
The specialty about these cases is that plaintiff had been asked by the Court whether or not
they wanted to plead for indirect infringement as well. And they answered no, we don't want to do
that. So these decisions don't say anything about indirect infringement.
Now, with the EPC 2000, we sort of have a product claim at the moment, X for the
treatment of indication Y. Do we have any reason to grant a different or broader scope of protection
to these kind of claims, and is the concept of manifest arrangement still applicable? I don't know.
We don't have any case law. And so it's entered into force in 2007. Maybe not. Maybe you
remember what Professor Meier-Beck just said, that, when looking at the question of patentability,
all these different kinds of claims we have at the moment, the German type of claim, the Swisstype of claim and the EPC 2000 type of claim, in his opinion are the same approach to the same
problem.
And the invention lies in a second medical use. That's the invention which should be
protected, disregarded the concrete wording of the claim. And also I know that it's the principle in
German law that the claim is the name of the game.
We sort of have a very peculiar special situation, as pointed out before, as the Parliament
didn't give us any clue how to solve the infringement problem of these kinds of claims. So I think
the courts are free or have at least some more freedom to search for appropriate solutions.
Now, let's have a look at the indirect infringement law. It's again very complicated, so I
broke it down to the essentials. What is reserved for the patent owner is offering or supplying so
it's essential to know that the protection itself can't be injuncted.
Offering or supplying means relating to an essential element of the invention for use of the
invention if said third party knows or it is obvious from the circumstances that such means are
suitable and intended for use of the invention.
According to the case law we have, this would mean in our case offering or supplying a
drug suitable for the patented indication for manifestly arranging within Germany for the patented
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indication if the person offering or supplying knows that the drug is suitable and that the custom
intends to manifestly arrange the drug for the patented indication.
So it all comes down to the manifest arrangement. And anything going downstream, which
is not manifestly arranging the drug but just administering it, would not be a direct infringement.
In addition to these two laws, direct and indirect infringement, we also have the principles and
secondary participants to patent infringement. But they all need intent. And you have to prove as
a plaintiff, the intent of the defendant.
I think that all the jurisdictions kind of have the same principles in this regard, which what
may be peculiar to German law would be the law to the principles as a principle is any person who
commits the offense himself and/or through another. To commit the offense through another
person, the other person doesn't need to have intent. And it's kind of the marionette of the person
acting.
Now, let's have a quick look at the remedies at hand because it's quite a difference. So if
you can show direct infringement, you may have an injunction on all the acts reserved to the patent
owner. If the court only finds indirect infringement, the injunction only goes to offering or
supplying the drug without informing the customer that he must not manifestly arrange and so on,
which of course is kind of a labeling, which is best use to use the drug which is offered or supplied.
Who are the possible defendants in our case? You of course can go for the generic
manufacturer, the salespersons, the pharmacist, the health insurer, the software supplier, the
doctor, but not for the patient. Regarding pharmacist and doctor we have one exclusion of the
patent law if it's an individual prescription for single preparation of a drug by the pharmacist. But
just writing out a prescription for such falls not under the exclusion.
So now let's get back to the decision of the Hamburg Regional Court. It's a PI proceeding.
And what they said was they don't believe anymore in the concept of manifest arrangement, which
is kind of revolutionary for us in the German law. Nevertheless, they did the test of manifest
arrangement and found that the preparation of the drug under the rebate agreement is enough to
fulfill the test of manifest arrangement. And the only thing left over was the intent for the use to
treat pain. And this intent is confirmed by signing the rebate agreement as the pharmacist is bound
by the social laws in Germany to provide the cheapest drug, which is the drug by the generic
company. And therefore, the injunctive relief was granted.
The Court said carving out skinny labeling does not exclude indirect patent infringement
if the rebate agreement is not limited to the nonpatented indications. And the obligation under
social law in Germany to not dispense or substitute -- or justify -- social law to dispense or
substitute does not justify an infringement of the patent. Patent law must be met at all times. And
that's a nice principle we have in the German jurisdiction or nonunity of the law.
Maybe it's of interest what the operational part of the judgment was in detail. So Hexal, the
defendant, must not enter into a rebate agreement on pregabalin or supply Pregabalin in course of
such a rebate agreement if the use of Pregabalin for treating pain is not excluded and so on. So this
is the injunctive relief they got.
The decision is silent on damages, as you can't sue for damages in PI proceedings. But this
would be a very interesting point of law how exactly do you calculate damages in such
circumstances.
In addition to this action, we had an action in front of the Federal Procurement Chamber
of the Federal Cartel Office against the health insurer because they had a public tender for the
rebate agreement. And the Federal Cartel Office stopped this tender process because it is not in
line with patent law.
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So again, the theory of unity of the law succeeded. And a third lawsuit was commenced
originally in Hamburg at the Regional Court. The defendant was the social securer, the KKH, and
the regional court sent the case to the Social Court of Hanover. So the Social Court is the first
Social Court judge in Germany was faced to decide a patent infringement case. And he did so as
he granted the injunction, but only based on a weighing of interests. So he didn't say a word about
patent infringement or about patentability or whatsoever related to patent law.
So what are the unsolved problems at the moment in my point of view? Is the concept of
manifest arrangement still applicable at all in the context of indirect infringement as the Hamburg
court found? If yes, is the concept of manifest arrangement suitable to provide adequate patent
protection in cases of off label use? Because if it's an on label use, it's obvious that we have direct
infringement. Is there any reason to grant different or broader scope of protection to an EPC 2000
claim? And is the concept of manifest arrangement applicable to EPC 2000 claims, as we don't
have the manufacturing process inside the claim anymore.
So in my view, and of course I know as a judge I had to be kind of reluctant to talk about
the future, the court should go on and provide adequate protection to these kinds of invention and
think about innovative solutions to the problems at hand. And I think that the Hamburg Court is a
perfect example of the way -- for the way we have to go.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
HONORABLE KALDEN: Good morning. Thank you very much for inviting me to this
conference. I'm very honored. And I won't start off with a table of contents, but I'll pick up where
Matthias left us and I will discuss mainly the construction of second medical use claims as we
know them and the consequences for infringement.
Before I fire off, I should say, although it's titled The Dutch Perspective, which strictly is
correct because I'm Dutch, it's only my personal opinions.
I'm not going to go into the importance of second medical use claims and patent protection,
although said yesterday that IP is of no relevance whatsoever, I think it's still common ground that
research and innovation should be stimulated and safeguarded by offering patent protection.
The question, however, is just how effective that patent protection is in terms of
enforcement and remedies. And in relation to second medical use patents, there are two specific
problems.
First of all, the novelty because the compound isn't new. And secondly, the exclusivity
from patentability under Article 53(c) EPC for methods of medical treatment.
Now, the first solution, as we've heard before, was in the form of a Swiss-type claim which
existed prior to the EPC 2000, which came into form in 2007.
Swiss-type claims are clearly a fiction. In reality, of course, it concerns a new form of
medical treatment. The manufacture it's neither new or inventive and it's only there to circumvent
Article 53(c), and the real invention only lies in the new use of the known compound. I don't think
there's any discussion about that.
The second solution is in EPC 2000, where the purpose-related product claim was
introduced compound X for the treatment of indication Z. And as from 2/2/08 in the inter peer
case, the enlarged board said that no longer Swiss-type claims would be allowed.
Now, the question is how to construe these claims. And on the face of it, Swiss-type claims
are purposely limited process claims and EPC 2000 claims are purposely limited product claims.
The difference being the element for the manufacture of.
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Now, the question is, do they for that reason have a different scope of protection? Now, I
think we're all familiar with the judgments of Richard Arnold, which he delivered on 21st January
and 2 February in the pregabalin cases. And he took the view there is a different scope of opinion,
and he relied mainly on the decision of the Technical Board of Appeal in the University of Texas
Board of Regence case, and in his judgment, striking out the claim for indirect infringement is
simply hopeless. He also referred to some earlier U.K. cases, especially Monsanto and Merck
2000, which he suspects is not going to be over ruled by the Supreme Court.
Now, UK's law of course is not binding on other judges than U.K. judges. But EPO case
law is, although not binding, considered to be quite relevant by the national courts and are generally
followed unless there is good reason not to.
So I think it's necessary to look into the case more closely. Now, as I said, the TBA held
that Swiss-type claims and EPC 2000 claims do have different scopes of opinion. But in
considering what relevance and consequence that case has to be, it's relevant to note that this
decision was taken into context of double patenting. There was a Swiss-type patent that was
granted and now an EPC 2000 divisional claim was under consideration. And the examination
division refused to grant the divisional application on the ground it related to the same subject
matter as the parent application. And it says they concern the same invention claimed in different
format.
Now, the TBA, although it recognized that both Swiss-type claims and EPC 2000 claims
fill the same gap in the legislation, and that the reason for introducing 54 Article 5 in EPC 2000
was to create legal certainty in relation to the patentability of second medical use claims, and
doubts as to the validity of Swiss-type claims existed, it still referred it to the general principle
underlying the EPC that a claim to a particular physical activity confers less protection than a claim
to a physical entity.
So much importance was attributed to the fact that both claims, solely based on the
wording, belonged to a different category, i.e. purpose-related -- process and product claims
respectively and therefore, had different scope.
Now, the technical board did refer to the earlier board decision that abolished the Swisstype claims, but in my opinion, there's nothing in that decision that suggests that the two claim
forms must have different scope of protection. And possibly even there is a suggestion to the
contrary.
In that decision, the enlarged board first sets out the extraordinary background of Swisstype claims. It said the earlier ruling introducing the Swiss-type claims found its cause and effect
that the claim directed to the use of the substance or composition for the treatment of the human
body was forbidden.
And further on, since the intention of the legislator was clearly not to exclude second
therapeutic indications of a known medicament from the field of patentability, the so-called Swisstype claim constituted the adequate but exceptional solution.
The enlarged board then refers to the new provision provided for purpose-related product
protection, noting with reference to the preparatory document, that it closed the loophole existing
in provisions of the earlier EPC. And the enlarged board also noted that the manufacture element
in Swiss-type claims was considered problematic.
It says, Swiss-type claims could be and have been considered objectionable as regards to
question as to whether they fulfilled the patentability requirements due to the absence of any
functional relationship of features conferring novelty and inventiveness, if any, and the claimed
manufacturing process.
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Now, most importantly, it also expressly referred to the preparatory document. Now, what
did this document say? There it said the new article eliminates any legal certainty. It
unambiguously permits purpose-related product protection. This protection is equivalent as far as
the further uses are concerned to that offered by the Swiss-type claim. The new articles expressly
limited to specific use. This limitation is intended to match as closely as possible the scope of
protection to the scope provided by a Swiss-type claim.
Now, that's quite clear language, isn't it? However, the Technical Board of Appeal chose
to neglect it and in my view, they wrongly considered these considerations merely expressing the
intention by the legislator, which apparently in the opinion of the TBA, apparently had not
materialized in view of the general principle that product claims have a broader scope of protection
than process claims. But it fails to take into account the background of Swiss-type claims, where
the element manufacturer, which qualifies as a process claim, was only introduced to circumvent
the prohibition to protect medical treatments.
So taking that into consideration, in my personal opinion, there is very strong argument to
construe a Swiss-type claim effectively as a purpose-related product claim. Remember the claim
construction should take place in accordance of Article 69 EPC and their protocol.
Now, construing a Swiss-type claim as a product-related -- purpose-related product claim,
in my view, stretched the right balance between the legitimate interest of the patentee and legal
certainty of third parties. Novelty and inventive step lie in the actual purpose i.e., the therapeutic
new use. So that element should be the determining element factor in considering the scope.
And as to legal certainty, it's generally known that a Swiss-type claim is a legal construct
where the manufacturing element has only been added to circumvent the prohibition of 53. Or in
the words of [unclear name] your Hoffman and Karen Angin, construing a claim, once you ask
how would the skilled person understand the patentee was used in the language of the claim to
mean. Well, certainly he meant to protect the actual invention. The actual invention is a new use.
Manufacturing has got nothing to do with the invention.
So is there a legal objection to this approach? Well, I think not. Novelty is confirmed by
the new use. And Article 53, second sentence says that the provision, the exclusion from
patentability of medical treatments, shall not apply to products in particular substances or
compositions for use in any of these methods.
So where does this lead us for scope of protection? Well, in my opinion, this leads to the
situation where if a manufacturer or distributor at the time of manufacture of distribution clearly
designates the medical need for the use for the patented indication, e.g. by prescribing the
suitability for that indication in the patient, that is a direct infringement. It's an act of indirect
infringement if the manufacturer knows or should reasonably perceive that the medicament is
going to be used for the preferred indication further down the chain. And he nevertheless continues
to manufacture and deliver the medicament without taking any measures to prevent that from
happening.
Now, as to intention, should there be some sort of culpable intention to use the generic's
medicament for the patented use down the chain. I think that was suggested by Richard Arnold in
his judgment, but I don't agree.
If you look at Grimme, which I think it's a U.K. case, but it's a European leading case on
indirect infringement, the only requirement is that the ultimate users will intend to put the invention
into effect. But intent in that sentence doesn't mean willfully. It only means something that they
are planning to do as opposed to something that has already been done.
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So requiring culpable intention downstream is wrong and leaves the holder of a second
medical use patent without any protection. Because the doctor knows the active ingredient is for
the patented indication, but he doesn't intend to use it, specifically, the generic medicament, nor
has he any knowledge what product will eventually be dispensed because he's prescribing by
generic name.
Reversely, the pharmacy has a strong incentive and intention to dispense the generic
product, but usually doesn't have any knowledge what indication it is prescribed for.
So if you would require intention just by one person specifically related to this product by
this particular generic company, would leave the holder with a second medical use patent emptyhanded. The only thing that's required is that ultimately, if the patient swallows the generic pill for
the patented indication as a consequence of the consecutive actions by the doctor and the
pharmacy, that constitutes use of the patented invention, which is intended, because it's intended
to cure the indication that the patient has.
Now, to close it off. An alternative claim construction advanced by Floyd is that it's also a
direct infringement not only if the manufacturer knows, but also if he should know or foresee, so
constructive knowledge, that the product is going to be used for the patented indication.
Well, that alternative I think does not solve the problems in the same way as the approach
that I think is also a reasonable approach to claim construction. Because in that construction, the
claim will still be construed as a process claim. And there are several issues in relation to that
which are problematic.
For instance, who is considered the manufacturer? If the manufacturer is based in India and
the packaging done in Bulgaria and the distributor is in the U.K. or the Netherlands, who is the
manufacturer and whose knowledge or constructive knowledge counts.
In the U.K., in the pregabalin case, I think we should realize that Actavis choose not to
distinguish between its knowledge and that of the actual manufacturer. But in other cases, the
generic company may raise the argument. There's no -- there's no security that in that case, the
actual distributor will be found to have the relevant intention.
So what happens if the manufacturer only intends free use, and the pharmacy knowingly
dispenses for patented use or the distributor distributes with the intention for the patented use, is it
not an infringement? Because they are not manufacturing.
Reversely it's also a problem. If the manufacturer intends patented use, then how about the
pharmacy, who's not dispensing for patented use, would still be infringement because it's product
which derives directly from a patented process. Well, I believe these problems and this lack of
actual protection is not what was issued and nor intended when Swiss-type claims were introduced.
And it may require some courage to construe a claim phrased as a process, as a product claim, but
for all the reasons I gave, I think it's better to approach to second medical use patents. And they
are already facing enough problems in terms of remedies.
And I'm going to hand it over now to Simon Cohen, who's going to go into that next.
[Applause.]
MR. COHEN: Well, I'm afraid I have to start my presentation this morning not with a joke
but with an application and/or just as Jacob. I'm not sure whether he's actually sitting this morning.
But a lot of my topic was taken by some of the previous speakers. I'm happy to name names but
this is clearly unacceptable. This is an application for trespass on my rights. And I don't know
whether Justice Jacob, my Lord, would like to hear me now or hear me maybe over the short
adjournment.
SIR JACOB: You have a very strong case. I have to hear the other side of course.
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MR. COHEN: Jin, do you want to come forward? Thank you very much, my Lord.
And seriously, I did want to say on behalf of myself and our Taylor Wessing colleagues
here to thank the Washington University and Sir Robin. And Sir Robin in particular has done an
amazing job taking forth the coalescing as he does the cutting edge scientific developments with
developments in IP law. And one thing about Robin is he will take an idea with such tenacity that
he will take it forward, just have a discussion for a day or two and leave it. And I know a topic like
this, which he's brought us all to discuss, which has been fascinating, he won't give up on and he'll
get the commission involved, get the governments involved because that's obviously what's needed
rather than merely talking about it.
So we're very grateful in England and in Europe for everything that Robin is doing for the
IP community.
Turning, then, to my talk, a lot has been covered so I'm going to sort of take things relatively
quickly. The topic of course was remedies for infringement used patents, new use claims of patents.
And I'm going to look at the available remedies through the prism of the pregabalin case in the
U.K. that Rian and others have spoken to a lot.
And I think the one thing that strikes me, having thought about it and heard the discussions,
is that remedies are really a bit of a mess. There's no excuse for the mess. Because I mean we've
been speculating about what's going to happen in this situation where there are second uses and
legitimate uses and what's going to happen when a generic launches a skinny label. We've been
talking about that for years. And therefore the uncertainty and all the various applications required
in the pregabalin cases seem to be unnecessary. And one can only hope that it will be cleared up
before the next pregabalin comes along.
We've heard all about Swiss form claims. The claim in question here in the box is the use
of pregabalin for the preparation of a medicament for treating pain. I'm not going to go through
article 53(c] and Article 4 because I think you've all heard about that.
The situation is, as of course we well know, that epilepsy and GAB were not subject to
patent protection at time at launch where pain still did have patent protection. And one of the
generic companies wanted to launch a skinny label and what was going to happen.
So as sure that X was X, no great surprise, as soon as Actavis planned -- made clear they
were trying to go into skinny label, Warner-Lambert sought interim relief.
Now, what's interesting, as I understand it, they didn't ask for a preliminary injunction, a
straight out and out injunction, but they asked for all sorts of conditions as part of their interim
relief. They asked that they should make it a condition Actavis having any agreement with
pharmacists they shouldn't prescribe it for the patented use. They asked them to write to the
superintendent pharmacists, and Jin explained the structure in the U.K. of all various organizations
involved, the superintendent pharmacists, the CCGs, the clinical commissioning groups.
So they wanted everything to be done to try and ensure that the generic product would not
be used for the patented indication, which seemed fair enough. That was the relief they sought.
Another bit of relief sought was that Actavis should put removable cellophane wrapping
over their product, stating it was not authorized for the treatment of pain and must not be dispensed
for such purposes. So a whole long list of requirements that Actavis sought to obtain. And Mr.
Justice Arnold, in all his glory smiling down at us, he's sorry he can't be with us today I'm sure,
said no serious issue to be tried and his formulation for infringement of a Swiss form claims, as a
purposeful claim as we heard, was that it requires a subjective intention, objectively assessed on
the part of the manufacturer that the product would be used for treating the patented indication.
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In any event, the judge didn't find infringement. He also found the balance of convenience
favored Actavis and no interim relief was granted.
The next story in the interim relief sequence of events was that Pfizer attained -- made an
application for NHS guidance. They obtained an injunction against the NHS, the British National
Health Service, requiring them to instruct doctors to prescribe pregabalin, the generic pregabalin,
only for the nonpatented stuff, and that they had to use and dispense Lyrica when they were treating
neuropathic pain. So that came out. That was guidance along the way.
Arnold entered an injunction application, then went to the Court of Appeal and Lord Justice
Floyd also rejected the application for interim relief for all the various conditions that WarnerLambert had wanted. He also held the balance of convenience was in Actavis's favor.
But after we heard, he came up with a brand-new formulation for infringement. He said
infringement of a Swiss form claim requires that the manufacturer knows, constructive knowledge
being enough, or can reasonably foresee the ultimate intentional use for treating the patented
indication.
So clearly an easier task to fulfill for the patentees rather than the Arnold test but very
different.
Just to see how the system works, of course, the case that went on to a full trial but its
validity, which I won't touch upon, and also on infringement, Mr. Justice Arnold commenting on
Lord Justice Floyd's formulation of infringement, said, I have considerable backed into the correct
method of Lord Justice Floyd's interpretation. Great respect here from one judge to another.
Nevertheless, I cannot say that I'm entirely convinced that it is wrong. Very gracious.
So there you have it, two different infringement tasks really confusion as to what's going
to happen when a generic skinny label is going to be launched where there are legitimate and
nonlegitimate uses. And it seems to me the mess described is really no good for anyone. It's
certainly no good for the generic companies. It's certainly no good for the government national
health services. I don't know whether it suits the brands or not. I have a sneaking feeling that the
continued uncertainty may actually help the brands somewhat.
What is the solution to the mess? Well, Mr. Justice Arnold in three or four paragraphs of
his judgment, that only ran to 727 paragraphs on this occasion, I don't think Rian has ever done a
judgment that long, have you Rian?
HONORABLE KALDEN: No.
MR. COHEN: Did offer a number of solutions. And what he was saying is the only way
forward is to separate the patented market for the substance from the nonpatented market by
ensuring that prescribed -- is write prescriptions for the patented indication by reference to the
patentee's brand name and write prescriptions for nonpatented indications by reference to the
generic name of the substance, the INN.
So he's talking about separating the market so that it's clear that whenever a prescription is
written and subsequently dispensed, you know what the ultimate indication is.
The problem is certainly is the way the U.K. is set up; the software doesn't exist. The
pharmacists don't know exactly what they're dispensing for. And Arnold hopefully, I think rather
hopefully, calls upon everyone, the patentees, the generics and the government to try and change
the system so that there is a complete separation of the markets. And he ended the judgment by
saying, I therefore trust that the Secretary of State will take steps to ensure that a suitable system
is put in place in England.
Just by finishing, I have to say I have reservations that the government will do anything. I
think we may need Robin's pushing on this because as Robin reminded me yesterday when we
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were talking, even though the NHS loses tens of millions of pounds whenever there is a wrongful
preliminary injunction granted, they hardly ever -- they never did get involved in the litigation,
even though they were written to, they were asked to come to court. They could never be bothered,
and it was only as a result of Robin's encouragement, I think in the first Paroxetine case, that it's
now part of our procedure in the U.K. that the NHA automatically gets the benefit of any loss it
makes under the cross-undertaking.
So I think that would be a great step forward if the Secretary of State and the government
got properly involved in these cases, because it means that they would get compensation for the
money lost. Because it would reduce the incentive for the patentee to go for the interim injunction
in the first place. And I think everything would be fairer all around.
All on that, thank you very much, and I will adjourn my application to Robin.
[Applause.]
HONORABLE IIMURA: Good morning. I'm very honored to be invited to Remedies for
Infringement of New Use Drug Patents Session.
1. Patent infringement suit involving a drug for a certain use:
(1) "Claim construction" for "a claim on a product reciting the use thereof"
The main issue is how to construe the exclusive scope of a patent right for a "Drug
comprising compound A as an active ingredient for the treatment of disease P." In Japan, the
dominant view is to narrowly construe it as "to manufacture and/or sell a drug A to be used for the
treatment of disease P," as the claim language literally provides. There is no view to construe it
broadly as "to manufacture and/or sell a drug comprising compound A."
In other words, where a product patent (drug patent) recites a certain use in the claim, the
Japanese claim construction practice is to limit the technical scope to such a use.
(2) Difficulties for a patentee in enforcing the patent right in a patent infringement suit
based on a drug patent reciting the use, a patentee would be faced with the following difficult
issues.
Assume the following case: A plaintiff pharmaceutical company seeks an injunction
against a defendant pharmaceutical company enjoining from manufacturing and sales of the
accused product based on a patent right related to "drug A for the treatment of disease P."
The defendant would make a counter-argument as follows: although the accused product
is an identical compound to the patented drug, the accused product may be used not only for the
treatment of disease P recited in the claim but also for the treatment of other diseases (such as
disease Q), and indeed it is used for such other purpose; therefore, the plaintiff's claim has no
ground, since the accused product is a drug sold for the treatment of disease Q and indeed is used
so.
I will address the analysis based on a premise that such a drug is "an OTC (over-thecounter, non-prescription) drug," which is different from "a prescription drug" that is prepared by
a pharmacist based on a prescription provided by a medical doctor.
In such a case, it is impossible to identify how a purchaser uses a drug for the treatment of
a disease. It is a matter of what the purchaser decides, and the defendant cannot identify how the
purchaser uses the drug.
Therefore, it is almost impossible for the plaintiff to prove how a patient who purchases
the accused product uses it for the treatment of a disease.
Under these circumstances, various standards have been suggested as to how to determine
the issue as follows.
2. Various standards
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(1) Label theory: To determine in accordance with what is described on the label.
In terms of non-prescription drugs, infringement or non-infringement is determined by
whether a label that describes the efficacy of a drug includes "for the use P," where the label is
usually shown on a container or package of the accused drug that a defendant Y sells.
Such a theory dramatically reduces the plaintiff's burden, when compared to the general
one where the plaintiff must prove how a patient uses a drug and for what purpose in reality.
This theory is popular in Japan, maybe because, by relaxing the plaintiff's burden, it
considers the balance between a patentee and a defendant to find a fair solution to the dispute.
It must be noted there is a hotly-debated issue in the detail. Basically there are two split
theories as to what kind of description is required on the label:
(A) The label describes the use P.
Infringement is established as long as the label describes the use P and it does not matter if
the label also describes the use Q.
(B) Another use Q is described in addition to the use P.
Non-infringement is found if the label describes not only the use P, but also another use Q
(since there may be a possibility that a patient purchases the drug for another use).
The former view is more popular, which favors the plaintiff. As long as the use P is
described on the label, patent infringement may be established. However, there are two major
criticisms: First, it is too formalistic; and second, a defendant may easily circumvent this theory
by not describing "the use P" on the label, which inevitably limits a patentee's right to enforcement.
In particular, the impact would be significant where a patentee is granted a patent for the
second use in addition to the one for the first use, although the first patent has expired.
(2) Totality of circumstances theory: To determine by the totality of circumstances such as
sales activities with respect to characteristic features of the accused drug and the like.
Because of the criticism that the label theory is too formalistic, this theory emerges. This
theory is based on the totality of circumstances, such as how the defendant provides a technical
explanation of the accused drug, how the defendant engages in sales activities, and the like.
(3) Personal view
I personally advocate for the totality of circumstances theory. The label theory is simple
and easy, which may relax much of a patentee's burden. However, it may not necessarily favor the
patentee, because as mentioned earlier the defendant may easily avoid infringement by not
describing the use on the label or package.
Therefore, it is reasonable to draw a conclusion from a substantive view, considering the
totality of circumstances, such as how the defendant provides a technical explanation of the
accused drug, how the defendant engages in sales activities, and the like.
3. Court decisions
(1) Tokyo District Court decision dated October 23, 1992
This court based its decision on the label theory.
(A) Factual background
The patentee had a patent entitled "preventive drug for bronchogenic asthma comprising
compound A as an active ingredient." The plaintiff sought an injunction enjoining the defendant
from manufacturing and selling "drugs comprising compound A, used by oral administration after
breakfast and before bedtime, for preventing 'bronchogenic asthma.'"
The defendant's drugs were not prescription drugs but OTC drugs sold to general
consumers. The defendant's drugs had a description on the container stating that it was effective
not only for "preventing bronchogenic asthma" but also for "preventing sinus infection."
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(B) Court's decision
The court awarded the injunction claim in favor of the plaintiff. The court held that a patent
infringement was established since the accused drug displayed the description stating that it was
effective for "preventing 'bronchogenic asthma' and 'sinus infection.'"
The decision is considered to be a court decision that supports the label theory.
The court also addressed whether it is sufficient if the label describes the use P or if it is
not sufficient if the label describes another use Q in addition to the use P. The court held that in
order for a defendant to defend against a plaintiff's claim, the defendant is required to prove not
only that the accused drug is substantially effective for “preventing sinus infection” but also that
the accused product describes “the efficacy is excluded for preventing bronchogenic asthma.”
In this regard, the court took a restrictive view with the defendant, requiring the sales be
made with the label description excluding the use Q in order to avoid infringement liability.
(2) IPHC decision dated Nov. 21, 2006
Unlike the above Tokyo District Court decision, the IPHC adopted the totality of
circumstances theory.
(A) Factual background
Under the Japanese Patent Act, where an employee makes an invention related to work and
the employer is assigned the employee's invention, the employer is obligated to pay reasonable
compensation to the employee-inventor (some revisions have been made to this provision since
however). In this case, the plaintiff (the defendant's employee) sought reasonable compensation
from the defendant (corporation). Although it is not a genuine patent infringement suit, it may be
treated as a precedent, since the court determined whether or not the defendant worked the patented
invention.
The plaintiff's invention related to a “preventive and treatment drug for arterial occlusion
by substance A.”
(B) Court decision
The IPHC held as follows. “The defendant did not sell the accused drugs comprising
substance A, described explicitly as a 'preventive and treatment drug for coronary arterial
reocclusion.' However, the defendant actively advertised and engaged in sales that the accused
drugs have an efficacy of preventing arterial occlusion and the like. Such acts by the defendant
were determined as falling under the working of the patented invention.” The court upheld the
plaintiff's claim.
In other words, the IPHC in this case came to its decision not by whether or not the label
on the container or package described such a use but based on the totality of the circumstances.
4. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion can be summarized as follows:
(A) The scope of exclusivity on drug A upon discovery of a new use P is limited to the
manufacturing, sales, etc. Of drug A for the use P recited in the claim. It does not extend broadly
to the general “manufacturing, sales, etc. Of drug A.”
(B) The plaintiff bears a difficult burden to prove that the accused drug that the defendant
company sells is actually used for the use recited in the claim.
Therefore, some courts hold that it is sufficient as long as the accused product describes
the claimed use on the container or package.
(C) Furthermore, other courts hold that, although there is no description of the claimed use
on the container or package, the plaintiff may prove that the accused product is used for the claimed
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use by the totality of circumstances such as how the defendant engages in sales activities,
advertising, and providing technical explanations, etc.
5. Supplementary remark 1 (FDA-like approval)
As mentioned earlier, my presentation is based on an OTC drug. I would like to supplement
this in terms of the FDA-like government approval process.
In order to manufacture or sell a drug, the following processes are required.
(A) A pharmaceutical company is required to obtain government approval for
manufacturing and selling a drug
It is necessary to apply for the approval by identifying the safety, efficacy and effect of a
drug. Once it is approved, a pharmaceutical company is permitted to manufacture and sell the drug
as approved, and is prohibited from manufacturing or selling beyond the approved scope. (B) For
a prescription drug to be provided to a patient, a doctor's prescription and a pharmacist's
preparation are required. In the case where the doctor's prescription says “the brand name of a
certain drug,” it would be impossible or difficult to provide a patient with “a drug” of another
pharmaceutical company.
In the case where the doctor's prescription says merely “a generic term by the name of an
ingredient,” the pharmacist may freely select any drug, whether it is the plaintiff's drug or the
defendant's drug.
In the latter case, a pharmacist (or a seller) may be a possible defendant. (In reality
however, it is not practical for a pharmaceutical company to sue the pharmacist.) (C) In contrast,
in the case of an OTC drug that does not require a doctor's prescription, a patient has a freedom of
choice (own discretion) whether or not to purchase the plaintiff's drug or the defendant's drug.
However, where the plaintiff's drug and the defendant's drug share the same substance, it is not
usually clear whether the patient uses a drug for the use P or for the use Q. (D) Therefore, there
are a number of unresolved issues concerning how a patent right is enforced on a new use drug.
Note: A prescription drug is defined as “a drug that is provided based on a diagnosis by a
doctor, etc. To look for a relevant treatment policy, that may not be used safely and effectively
unless an appropriate choice is made depending on a patient's medical condition, predisposition,
and the like, due to difficulties such as ease to cause a resistant strain or a complex administration
method, and government approval.” 6. Supplementary remark 2 (Patent eligibility where
compound A was discovered effective for the treatment of disease P)
I will not address the patent eligibility on a second use discovery for the same compound,
since another panel will discuss it.
The present Japanese practice on the topic is as follows.
(1) Product patent
Where compound A was discovered effective for the treatment of disease P, a product
patent may be granted. (A) If a discovery is made for the first use Where compound A was
discovered effective for the treatment of disease P, "a product patent" may be granted.
The claim would be described as follows: "Drug comprising compound A as an active
ingredient for the treatment of disease P;" or "Drug A for the treatment of disease P."
(B) If a discovery is made for the second use
In addition, if the same compound was discovered to be effective for the treatment of a
totally different disease Q,
"a product patent" may be granted as well.
The claim would be described as follows: "Drug comprising compound A as an active
ingredient for the treatment of disease Q;" or "Drug A for the treatment of disease Q."
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(2) Method patent
In general, in Japan, a patent may not be granted for a treatment method.
The reasons are as follows: (1) since an injunction would be sought against a medical
doctor based on patent infringement, it is not appropriate to seek an injunction against a medical
doctor taking into account the adversarial impact on a patient; (2) since "medicine" is not regarded
as an "industry" subject to patent protection, a treatment method should not be subject to a patent,
and the like.
Thus, only a product patent is available for such a medicine, thereby a patent infringement
suit in this regard is always based on "a product patent."
In addition, it is generally disputed between pharmaceutical companies X and Y. My
following explanation is based on such a premise.
7. Supplementary remark 3 (a new use discovery made on an existing non-drug substance)
In Japan, the following practice can be found to determine whether a new use is patent
eligible if it was discovered on an existing non-drug substance. (1) Product patent (A) A patent is
granted for a product invention for the first use. (YES)
Assume a person discovered that substance A is effective as a pesticide (killing insects).
He may be granted a product patent claiming “substance A for the use as a pesticide.” (B) A patent
is not granted for a product invention for the second use. (NO)
In contrast, in the case where a person discovers that substance A, that is effective as a
pesticide is also effective for weeding, “substance A for the use of weeding,” a majority view is
that “a product patent” cannot be granted. However, there is the IPHC decision dated Nov. 29,
2006 holding that “a product invention” based on the second use is to be granted a patent. I would
say the practice is not necessarily established.
(2) Method patent
(A) A patent is granted to a method invention for the first use. (YES)
In the case where a person discovered that substance A is effective as a pesticide (killing
insects), he may be granted “a method patent” claiming “a method for pesticide use by using
substance A.” (B) For the second use invention (YES)
In the case where a person discovered that substance A is effective for weeding in addition
to the prior art showing it is effective as a pesticide claiming “a method for weeding by using
substance A,” the person may be granted “a method patent.”
A product patent is very strong, so it is not appropriate to grant a product patent just for the
discovery of the new use of a certain substance except medicine. On the other hand, it is reasonable
to grant a method patent to discover the new use of a substance.
We have lots of answers among us, but my explanation is I would like to conclude my
explanation. Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
HONORABLE BROWN: Good morning. Well, it's still morning although just, and I'm
quite aware that I'm standing between you and lunch, so I will try to stay on to my schedule, and
I'm sure that David will remind me of that.
Now, my task here is to talk about remedies for infringement of new drug patents. And my
first reaction was the remedies per se are the same as for old use patents. What we've been talking
about here really seems to be an issue of infringement, or contributory infringement if you have a
skinny label carve-out. And I don't want to jump ahead too much. So I should probably discuss the
Hatch-Waxman Act, which is our unique contribution to jurisprudence in this area.
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Because just jumping ahead for a moment just to encapsulate the problem. I've seen cases
where you have a Section 8 carve-out for a skinny label. And I've seen them raised in HatchWaxman actions, and there it seems to me it's an infringement issue. And we still have the 30month stay unless somebody wants to launch risk. So I don't know that that's necessarily going to
distinguish it one way or the other.
Now, to get back to the earlier context and put it all into perspective, I'll start at the
beginning. Article 1, Section 8, the U.S. Constitution authorized congress to enact laws giving
investors exclusive rights to their discovery as inventors, certainly after that judiciary act of 1789,
and the first patent act.
So we had the executive branch issuing patents. You had the rights enforced in the federal
courts. That's still the case today. You could go back and have your patent re-examined. It took
some years under the American Invents Act, it moved ahead into partes review, where you could
have a review that would come in the matter of months rather than years. It doesn't seem to have
been used as extensively in the pharma area as it is in certain other areas, Mr. Bass notwithstanding.
And then of course you can have -- or seek to have the ITC exclude infringing
pharmaceuticals and move on a faster pace, but you don't really get any remedy other than a limited
or general exclusion order. You don't get damages. You can get a cease and desist order.
Again, the primary focus has been the United States District Courts, which is more of a
generalist body than I'm hearing from the other jurisdictions.
Now, I don't mean to say generalist in terms of general jurisdiction, because the federal
courts have limited jurisdiction, although congress expands the limits fairly frequently.
So what do we have? We have a court that is handling everything from antitrust and
admiralty to zoology and zoning and everything in-between. And there, in along everything else,
come the patent cases and of course that's only the civil side.
Those of you that have had cases in the district court probably had the experience of a judge
taking a break all of a sudden the door opens, and a Deputy United States Marshal walks in -- and
yes, we still have U.S. marshals -- marshal will walk in with a bunch of people with orange
jumpsuits on looking rather shifty wearing handcuffs and there you're introduced to the criminal
side.
So we have a court handling both civil and criminal, a variety of things taking on the
challenge of patents as they have for many years. I mean for example, the Wright brothers, Robert
Fulton, Thomas Edison, where did they all go to enforce their rights? United States District Court.
So we have a very active patent docket, some courts more active than others. Our court in
New Jersey is extremely active in the pharmaceutical area. I came on the bench in '86, and all of a
sudden I was confronted with a new statute, the Hatch-Waxman Act, which created a whole new
regimen. You had a concept really of a statutory or constructive infringement where the generic
couldn't -- didn't have to launch at risk as it were, and take the chance of having damages assessed,
but could piggyback on the new drug application of the branded, the innovator with an ANDA,
and of course wind up with the ANDA being filed, notice to the manufacturer, and you've got a
period of time there for a suit to be filed. Which was really a mirror image of general litigation,
because the defendant was the one that started the whole thing.
When we changed our rules, we noticed this fact and made the defendant explain what was
going on there to the branded, who did not necessarily know as much.
Then of course you have the 30-month stay. And that was the reason why I raised this
question. Because if you're going to have the 30-month stay in any event, whether it's a carve-out
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or some other claim of noninfringement or invalidity, I think you're going to go through the same
practice.
Would you agree with that not, David?
MR. TELLEKSON: I think that's right.
HONORABLE BROWN: Okay. So we have a different regimen in the United States, as
I say, which gives you certain period of market exclusivity that are not expressly patent-based.
We have a 7-year exclusivity for orphan drugs, a 5-year exclusivity for new chemical
entities, a 3-year exclusivity for new clinical studies where you have the approval leading to new
or changed formulation, dosing regimens or patient populations. Which is exactly what we seem
to be talking about here. So you have that protection right there.
Now, you also have the possibility of a 6-month PD exclusivity if the FDA requests that
the NDA holder conduct studies in pediatric populations. So you do have that.
On the other hand, you have the generic and ability to challenge the patent without having
to put themselves at risk unless they wish to do so. And you have of course an extension of the
patent for FDA delays and approval.
So what we're seeing in the courts is primarily the Paragraph 4, the way of challenging the
patent as being invalid or not infringed. That's -- and of course the court had to move along a lot
more rapidly than we had before, because you have this 30-month stay that expires, and then all
of a sudden you're faced with a preliminary injunction. We've done pretty well on moving them
along but we do sometimes face that.
Why does the generic want to do this? Well, of course congress encouraged them by saying
you've got 180-day exclusivity. You'll be the first to launch if you do this. There have been some
cases where there have been two generics that are filed on the same day to avoid unseemly
jockeying, pushing someone out of the way. If they file on the same day, they both get that
exclusivity period. It can be forfeited under certain circumstances, but which is set forth in the
statute, but generally not done so. As I said, we adopted procedural rules to deal with this during
the 30-month stay to keep things moving.
Of course if the branded does not file suit as required in 45 days, then the 30-month stay is
not available. But the generic can go forward and seek a declaratory judgment at which the trial,
well, you know, there's a couple features of U.S. jurisprudence which would be different. One is
the right to a jury, and two is the lack of a right to attorneys' fees. In the Hatch-Waxman context,
which we're dealing with in pharma, assuming there has not been an at risk launched, there is no
damage. Therefore, the entire issue, validity, infringement, will be tried to the judge alone.
On the other hand, if you do have an at risk launch, now you've got the jury handling both
of those issues with instruction from the court. So as I said, attorneys' fees, even though they may
rise up in the 7-figure range, are not going to be awarded absent an exceptional case. And there's
been some jurisprudence on what constitutes an exceptional case.
So what is the relief that you're seeking? Well, assuming that that judge has not moved
forward in 30 months, the brand might be seeking a preliminary injunction. U.S. law favors
multifactor tests. We got a four-factor test for that. Likelihood of success on the merits, media
irreparable injury, balancing the hardships and the public interest.
Permanent injunction at the end of the trial change the factors a little bit. Has the patent
owner suffered an irreparable injury? The remedies of law such as monetary damage is inadequate
compensation. The bounds of the hardships and the public interest.
Before the Supreme Court spoke and Mr. Stoll told us about a number of Supreme Court
decisions in his excellent presentation, but before they spoke, in eBay, there was a feeling that you
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were entitled, as the owner of the patent, to exclude competition, period. Even if you were not
practicing.
Supreme Courts have known patent cases, federal lawsuits like other federal lawsuits, you
have to go through the four factors. It may be that they favor you; it may be that they may not. But
that analysis is now done in all circumstances.
If there is monetary damage, the generic has launched, then we get into questions of
reasonable royalty, possibility of lost profits, profitability of market erosion. And again we've got
factors, Panduit factors, for example. We like those factors.
And as I said, costs are not going to be awarded absent an exceptional case.
So those are the primary differences. As I said before, I see the question of the Section 8
carve-out, the skinny label, as being one of infringement, be raised generally in my Hatch-Waxman
context and not a matter of remedies per se, at least in the United States.
So those are the points that I -- I assume I'm within my time? Those are the points that I
raised. I'm going to be available for questions.
And I think that -- when Sir Robin asked me to speak, I thought, well, okay. I'm not a
pharma expert. I'm not a patent lawyer. I'm a generalist judge. As you can see from the background,
yes, I've had hundreds of pharma cases, I've also had thousands of other cases, everything, class
actions, multidisciplinary litigation and the like. So what perspective could I bring on this? Well,
I guess the perspective of someone who sees what the courts do day in and day out in one of the
busier of the pharma patent dockets, and give you the perspective as to how the courts face these
issues in the United States. And I'll be happy to provide that perspective for you. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR. TELLEKSON: Thank you, everyone on the panel. I've got some questions for the
entire panel but -- and it may be a little off topic, but Judge Brown, you mentioned the right to a
jury trial in the United States. And I think a lot of people in room think we're nuts that we actually
entrust complex patent cases and other cases that involve lots of complex technology. In your
experience, how do juries do with these complex scientific issues?
HONORABLE BROWN: Well, for one thing it's again a matter of constitutional right.
The Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial if you have legal as opposed to
equitable relief. I think injunction is equitable relief. Only injunctions or only judge. Damages
sought goes to the jury. The juries try to do the best they can. And I will say that usually, I agree
with their determinations. I've had some jurors on, some with a technical background, some of
whom got very interested in the case. I've also participated in some mock jury exercises from time
to time and sometimes having watched it, I'm reminded of the remark attributed to Bismarck, that
you don't want to watch legislation and sausage being made. So you may not want to watch jury
deliberations.
But on the whole, I think that really it brought out a new talent in the IP bar as we saw an
increasing number of infringers demanding a jury. And that was the -- I guess the old-fashioned
trial lawyers, someone who could break it down and simplify it to the jury. Not dumb it down, but
simplify it. And when I instruct the juries, I say this may be a complicated case to you, but you
will understand it because the lawyers and the witnesses will explain it to you. Hint, hint, that's
your job.
So I will say that I've found that jurors usually get it right. Maybe their thought process is
not what a trained lawyer would follow. But you can also have specific jury interrogatories taking
them through point by point, question by question, claim by claim to focus them on issues. I've
used that very effectively.
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MR. TELLEKSON: Thank you. My experience is they do a remarkable job and kind of
surprise you with how well they understand things as long as the lawyers keep it simple or explain
it well.
To the entire panel, we've been -- I want to talk a little bit more about remedies and when
they're available and in particular injunctions. Can you think of instances where there's a finding
of liability, there's a finding of infringement, whether it's on a first use patent or second use patent,
but an injunction is not the appropriate remedy? What sort of factors come into play when you
decide that you're not going to enjoin the patent infringer? Anybody want to take that one?
HONORABLE KALDEN: Well, I can say this. In the Dutch Court of Appeal case, which
dealt with a preliminary injunction, the situation was rather clear. Because the patented indication
to 97 percent of the market and the free indication, only 3 percent of the market. So under those
circumstances, although, you know, 3 percent should remain free, we still decided to issue an
injunction or indirect infringement.
Now, of course that injunction doesn't say they shouldn't supply any of the products
anymore. It just says you should stop indirectly infringing. And of course indirect infringement
has this concept of knowing it's going to be used and not doing anything about it.
So clearly there was an obligation on the defendant in that case to make sure that that
wouldn't happen any further. And of course one of the arguments was well, you can't -- your court
can't issue an injunction because that's bound to end up with enforcement disputes. And of course
that's a possibility. But still we thought well, that's up to the responsibility of the parties, and
especially the defendant, to make sure that he's not in breach of this injunction. But that again was
quite a clear case. And I can imagine if the situation would be different, you know, like the reverse
situation, like 50 percent, 40, 60 percent, those are very difficult cases I think to issue an injunction
because that would mean that almost half of the market would be blocked, whereas half the market
would be free. And it would be a less clear situation of, you know, foreseeability that your product
would be used for the patented use.
So yes, whether or not you issue an injunction very much depends on the circumstances.
MR. TELLEKSON: How would -- how would that company selling to the 3 percent
market, what could they do to show that they're not foreseeing? Don't they have a right to sell to
that 3 percent market? How can you enjoin them from selling in general?
HONORABLE KALDEN: Well, very similar to the German case, they participate in a
tenet procedure with the insurer. And they were selected to be the preferred supplier, which means
that for every indication, their product would be used. So you can be sure that your product is also
going to be dispensed for the patented indication. So they shouldn't have participated in this tenet
procedure without any reservation as to their product would only be used for the patented disease
and not for osteoporosis. So that's the first point.
Secondly, they did send a message to pharmacies saying, our product shouldn't be used for
-- shouldn't be dispensed for osteoporosis. But they started off this letter by saying, this is a
formality. Full stop.
So I mean you can't take that serious. So you know, there should be some more real effort
to make sure that the indication that its patented is really protected.
MR. TELLEKSON: Judge Brown? Anyone else?
HONORABLE BROWN: Sure. Well, again, in the United States it's balancing the fact is
the injury irreparable? Is it compensatory monetary terms? Are we dealing with a nonpracticing
entity? Are we dealing with an entity that has licensed this or offered to license beforehand? And
we know it's compensable in monetary terms. There's an entire industry that has developed by the
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experts, as you know, in the damage area, Georgia-Pacific factors, Panduit factors. All of that is
considered the balance of the hardships, the public interest. The public has a strong interest in an
effective patent system, but it may well be that somehow this drug will not be available to the
public. Maybe the patent owner doesn't have the capacity to provide it. Maybe there's some other
public interest that would say reasonable royalty wouldn't be appropriate. Again, it's very factspecific.
MR. TELLEKSON: Let's talk a little bit about the public interest. Is the public interest a
factor in other countries, in Europe and Japan, in looking at an injunction? Is that one of the factors
you consider?
MR. ZIGANN: The German point of view is that when we look at main proceedings, if
the patent owner infringement is found, has a right to the injunctive relief. And this right may only
be declined in exceptional circumstances.
So for example, if you have this antitrust situation with standard essential patents. I can't
think of any circumstances when looking at the problem you're discussing today.
When we look at preliminary proceedings, the judge is very free to grant or not to grant
adequate relief. So in the German court, the remedies sought for in Great Britain, as we learned
today, would also be possible. So in a milder step to go forward for the time being.
But as the calculation of damages in an indirect infringement setting is very, very difficult
under German law. The patent owner is desperate to get injunctive relief because nothing else
helps for him. He doesn't want to go for the pharmacist and he definitely does not want to sue the
practitioners.
In reality, the pharmaceutical industry is putting a lot of money into the marketing directed
to the doctors to convince them to prescribe their products. So definitely we don't want to sue the
doctors.
Yeah, I think the German courts are bound to that. So they have to grant injunctive relief.
And the only question we could talk about is to what extent. So what actions are exactly injuncted.
And as I pointed out in my presentations, we have to make it to see if we have direct infringement
or indirect infringement. If it's indirect, we cannot stop the manufacturing process as such. We can
only stop putting into the market and offering. And even though it's only put into the market and
offering without indicating to the customer that it must not be used for the second medical
indication, which is kind of limited, but that's what we are able to grant to the patent owner.
MR. TELLEKSON: Mr. Cohen, the U.K.?
MR. COHEN: Yes. When they file an injunction, and certainly in the pharmaceutical field,
Robin will correct me if I'm wrong, I'm not aware of any company not getting injunction with the
exception of that Biogen case. I don't remember exactly what happened. Wasn't there a whole
public interest issue as to whether or not there should be compulsory license since obviously -- if
the patent is not developing it. But basically, unless it's in the public interest that the patients aren't
going to get the product, you're pretty well entitled, aren't you, to get an injunction, a final
injunction if not a preliminary injunction. Robin.
SIR JACOB: There's not a question. Well, there's an indication in one case that a final
injunction might be withheld if, for example, the patentee can't supply the market. And we've just
had a decision where the patentee decided not to ask for an injunction straight away because the
patent is so big. It's big pharma against big pharma, so nothing to do with the subject we're talking
about. But the patent is effectively been put up for the treatment of cancer, all cancers. It's a second
medical use. It's a second use patent.
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But there's no product on the market. So we don't get the problems of a cheap product being
sold for a new use. And the patentee, BMS, or they have the exclusive license since the Japanese
company invented it, Ono, said no, we're not asking for an injunction at the moment. This is how
much you have been paid. We're selling it for one thing, you're trying to make it for some other
purpose, and we're not going to stop you from doing that. And I think that's just an extra feature.
The big problem we're facing here is Rian has an easy case when it's 97 percent and they
intended for the whole lot 100 percent. And you knock them over. And she's right. Well, what if
it's 50/50 with 3 percent the other way? And then you've got a real problem about pursuing an
injunction. Because an injunction mustn't cover that which is old.
And the real root probably may be to start looking at the payers. And say well, you have to
cough up. You are paying for this new use, you know you are.
So it's a bit like the same thing with the Internet when you're looking for pirates, and you
start saying well, the bankers, follow the money. I think follow the money is going to be the
solution.
And I'll just make my other comment here while I'm at it. You might want to answer this
question when it comes up. Is the patent solution system at all relevant to this problem? Half the
things or more than half the things you can't patent because the doctors notice a new use and you're
following it up. There's nothing to patent, and it's all obvious or anticipated. But what we're looking
for is the incentive to follow it up even if it's obvious.
MR. COHEN: Can I get back on that? Because I was talking to someone else, I think to
Jurgen about this last night. The patent is not dead. You didn't settle its last remains. High court
decision that doesn't quite hit it for the reasons you've said now and previously.
But what I don't understand is why the regulatory system in Europe doesn't give extra
protection. And I've never -SIR JACOB: Hear more this afternoon.
MR. COHEN: Right. But it all seemed to start -SIR JACOB: We've got a panel.
MR. COHEN: Obviously all the global marketing authorization. But it just seems to have
gone too far. I'm a great one for balance, and I'm not attacking anyone. But it seems to have gone
too far the other way. There's no beta for the dosages for the indication, for everything, really. And
that seems to be the only way to correct it. Rian?
HONORABLE KALDEN: Well, one comment to make is that the generic company in
our case also argued, well, you shouldn't injunct us because we are new to the situation by the
tender procedure issued by the insurer, which doesn't allow us to make a distinction between
patented use and unpatented use. And then we said well, that might be, but then your choice, you
know, could also have been to not, you know, go on with this tender or force them to allow you to
make this distinction. So we issued two injunctions nevertheless.
I must say, though, the same person, Jurgen, yesterday asked the courts and the judges to
be more courageous and allow the proper protection given to second medical use patents.
Well, I tried this morning to advance one possible solution. But the other thing I would like
to say is that the pharmaceutical industry should also be more courageous and go against the
insurers or go against the regulatory. Because now they're only fighting the competitors and that's
not going to help you anyway.
MR. ZIGANN: May I comment on this? In Germany, they went after the insurer and they
succeeded. And we will have to wait for the outcome if it's appealed, what the Social Court did.
That's going to be very interesting.
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And the second point I wanted to add was that under German law, you don't need intent or
negligence if you ask for injunctive relief. So it's enough that the infringing acts are commenced
by the defendant. And as it is directed to the future, you don't need intent or negligence because
now he knows what he's not supposed to do. You only need these two if you ask for damages.
MR. TELLEKSON: David, why don't we open up to the floor at this point. I think we
only have five or so minutes so let's open it up to questions from the floor.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. I had a question for Judge Brown, and it's in the
context of having a discussion with some of the esteemed colleagues from Germany and
specifically about NPEs, I think you briefly mentioned nonpracticing entity. And what seems to
be apparent is that in the German system, if you're an NPE with a good, solid patent, you get treated
fairly. However, here in the U.S., in the district courts there seems to be -- and I'm not a patent
litigator but I hear this secondhand -- that there's a tremendous amount of bias. Even if you have
good, solid, valid patents and you have inventors who put their passion and their life's energies
into inventions, there's still a tremendous amount of bias against an entity that's not producing
product. And I'm wondering if you could address this, and perhaps your colleague from Germany
could comment. Why do we have this discrepancy? Is it cultural or are there other reasons between
the U.S. and Germany, and why can you as an NPE, with a good -- not junk patents but with valid
patents, why do you have to face this maelstrom of bias?
HONORABLE BROWN: Well, I don't know that you do. I mean a nonpracticing entity
can be a variety of things. It can be a research organization. It can be a university. It doesn't have
to be the definition of the troll that has bothered the congress, someone with a junk patent that will
assert it and then settle very cheaply to go away. I mean I think that is what the public has picked
up. That's what the congress has picked up.
I don't see that perception in the courts. I mean, we understand, there are people that are in
the business of research or the people in investing in valid patents, and they have a right to have
their property compensated. So I see a distinction between the probius term "troll" and NPE.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is for Mr. Cohen. In the litigation that you
described, it seemed like the rule that Judge Floyd originated was pretty friendly to the patent
holder, and yet no preliminary relief. What reasons did he give for denying the preliminary relief?
MR. COHEN: I think he found there was -- when Judge Floyd denied the injunction, I
think he found there was no serious issue to be tried because there had to be intention on the part
of the pharmacist.
HONORABLE KALDEN: No, I'm sorry. I think he denied the injunction on the balance
of interest. Because there this order with the National Health Service who issued an instruction to
the doctors prescribing that they should be prescribing by brand name if it was for pain. And since
that wasn't in place, there was no real risk of any further infringements. So that was the reason.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.
SIR JACOB: It didn't work of course, but never mind.
HONORABLE KALDEN: Well, that was the reason.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Actually, sorry, I've got a copy of the decision here. And
basically I think neither of you are actually right, I'm sorry to say. Basically, as was set out by Jin
earlier on, the test is if the issue is to be tried and in regard to the balance of convenience, and Lord
Justice Floyd said there was a serious issue to be tried, but he said actually the judge properly
evaluated the evidence on the balance of convenience, therefore no preliminary injunction to
Warner-Lambert.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I just want to say I didn't intend to stump anybody there.
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MR. COHEN: You stumped us both. Why did he find a serious issue, then? Because I
thought the whole point was according to Floyd's test, you had to show that the pharmacist knew
that he was going to be giving generic Pregabalin for the patented use.
Robin is looking as if he may be getting up. It may be to go to lunch rather than to answer
a question. Isn't that right, Robin?
SIR JACOB: I think they've gone mad. If I play golf, like tee up, and there's a bunker over
there and the odds are about 99 to 1 in favor that my ball will land in the bunker. But only a lawyer
would say that I intended to put it in the bunker. And this whole question of intention, it rises in
all sorts of things. In criminal law, say murder, you intended to kill or cause serious injury is,
roughly speaking, the test. What happens if you do something where you didn't subjectively intend
to do that, but objectively, that's very likely a consequence, the natural probable consequence of
your action. That's not enough for murder.
At least in English law. When I was a kid we had a case called DPP and Smith and had a
huge row about all that.
But I don't think it is good enough for commercial law. A guy who is selling a generic
product, which he knows is going to be used 30 percent or whatever for the new use, ought to be
taken to be intending the natural and consequent -- natural consequence of his use. I think that's
what Floyd is roughly speaking he said.
It's what we said in Grimme. I can't say I can't help it. You know it's going to happen. I'll
take the benefit of it. But that gives you the big problem of what happens when it's the 50/50 use,
injunction or no injunction. Or an injunction you're going to raise your price. And that's why the
more you think about it, the more you've got to focus on the payers and say listen, boys, you are
paying for these new uses. You had better cough up the proper price for them.
So I think maybe the German route, in making these guys follow the money, as I say, and
not the generic company.
MR. COHEN: Robin, sorry. It's obviously straightforward that the Grimme test was good.
I'd forgotten it was one of yours. But it does say the ultimate intentional use.
SIR JACOB: We had a follow-up from Grimme -- which was KCI v Smith & Nephew.
HONORABLE KALDEN: I'm sorry. The answer to it, it's not intent in the sense of
willfully or it -- it just means intent just the purpose, for the purpose of.
MR. COHEN: Yeah.
HONORABLE KALDEN: And yeah, I think it's the same test. It's a foreseeability that
it's going to be used for the purpose of this indication. And that's ultimately done by the patient.
And there's no reason to require that the doctor or the pharmacy should do -- should both consider
the specific medicament made by the generic company, and the therapy that's going to be used for.
The ultimate end use is with the patient and he's taking the pill because he wants to be
cured from this certain disease that this second medical use patent is all about. And that's my idea.
And I think Floyd meant it that way as well.
MR. TELLEKSON: It's time to have lunch, which is presented outside here. And we can
continue this discussion over lunch, but I want everybody to thank our esteemed panel.
[Applause.]
[Concluded at 12:35 p.m.]
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PANEL VI
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES FOR ADDITIONAL PROTECTION AND GLOBAL HEALTH

Moderator:
Brian Cordery, Bristows (London, UK).
Panelists:
Dr. Manisha Desai, Eli Lilly and Co. (Indianapolis, IN, USA).
Adam Plich, Teva Europe (Amsterdam, the Netherlands).
Dr. Allyn Taylor, University of Washington School of Law (Seattle, WA, USA).

PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: The last two sessions are even more exciting, coming up
with solutions for challenges identified as well internationally and domestically and things pending
in Congress as well as different legislation as well as international agreement to be covered by this
panel. So please come forward.
MR. CORDERY: So good afternoon everybody. My name is Brian Cordery, I'm with the
Bristows office in London. Can I just say what a pleasure it is to be asked to participate in this
event. And before I begin my very, very short introduction I do say I owe Rian an apology. We
were both right but for different reasons. But it was refused by the court of appeal but Rian had
me up against a wall at lunchtime explaining this issue and it's all been clarified. So thanks for
that. Okay.
This isn't the first time in fact I've been at a conference on second medical use issues. With
Sir Robin Jacobs in fact. I was proud to be part of the team in 2013 that organized a conference on
second medical use issues back in London. Sir Robin engaged with that in his usual infectious
enthusiasm, but it was really made possible by the joint sponsorship of both Novartis and Teva.
And it was a great event. And since then, at least in Europe, we've seen second medical uses come
more and more on to center stage.
In October 2013, I was in Venice for the judge's conference and at that conference the
attendees were presented with a fictional second medical use patent and a skinny label generic
medicine. The outcome of the debate was perhaps inevitable. The UK judges mostly felt the patent
was invalid. The non-UK European judges mostly felt the patent was valid and everyone agreed
that the issues of construction and relief were really, really tough, though none of the mega brains
sitting around the table that day could offer a solution to the problem.
Last year in September I was in Toronto where Resolution 238 was passed by the AIPPI
which deals with the situation where you have second medical use patents and skinny label use. I
was actually very surprised by the level of unanimity from representatives of almost every country
around the world that recognizes IP and they all agreed that second medical use patents were
important and that cross label use should be preventable where the manufacturer knew or ought to
know that its product was likely to be used for the patented application.
I note in passing that only the French raised serious objections to this, but then the French
tend to do that when discussing matters on a pan European or global level.
So it's great to see how things have moved on in the last three years, both in terms of the
case law and also the general awareness of the issues. But at the end of the day, case law and
general awareness can only take us so far. This is because judges have a duty to apply the law and
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at the end of the day some judges, and I do include Sir Robin Jacob here, they have been known
to change the law a little bit, some fine tuning you might say, if they feel it's in the overarching
interest of justice.
However, ultimately it is the legislators that will enact the will of the people and that's what
this session is all about. So I'm going to very briefly introduce my distinguished panel speakers
here. First we have Dr. Manisha Desai who is assistant general patent counsel of Ely Lilly in
Indianapolis, and like many patent lawyers, Manisha began life actually on the coal face of her
industry, spending almost a decade researching neuroscience before turning to the law.
Next along is Adam Plich who is also trained in science as a pharmacist but now works for
Teva and looks after pricing and market access issues, things we haven't heard much about in the
last few days. He deals with all aspects of Teva, the originator side, their generic side and the bio
similar side. So that's Adam, and last but not least we have Professor Allyn Taylor who I think is
home grown. You are resident here -- you practice here in the University of Washington?
DR. TAYLOR: At times.
MR. CORDERY: And Allyn pointed out, I'm not allowed to ask her any tricky IP
questions; however, she is a leading authority on global health issues and the TPP and she's going
to talk about that as we go on.
So we had a last minute change in running order so I'm going to try and get this right.
We've decided that Adam is going to go first, then we'll hear the first bit of Manisha's talk. Then
we're going to break while Allyn does her talk and then finally Manisha is going to close. I think
that's the right order. So I'll sit down at this point and hand it over to Adam.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
MR. PLICH: Good afternoon to all of you and let me thank the organizers for the
invitation. I've been already introduced by Brian. Let me highlight that I will be presenting more
the payer, the pricing, the commercial perspective throughout my talk. Before I go on, let me state
that what I'm going to say to you is primarily my own opinion.
Now, I already mentioned the perspective I will take in my talk. I want to outline the key
message upfront -- and I think Sir Robin already has mentioned this on a few occasions -- which
is that regardless of what is the IP or any other exclusivity protection a company will have managed
to secure for the new use of established medicines, (and that's already questionable as I'm hearing
throughout the conference.), the payers may not care too much on this. And we heard it earlier
today about the insurers in the Netherlands or Germany that are actually setting up tenders without
explicit considerations of these matters.
So let us step back a little bit. If I think about what is my responsibility, I always go back
to the patient. I believe every patient, every person, should have or deserves an access to our
medicines or healthcare solutions. But my job at the same time is to make sure that the prices make
sense. Sometimes it may not really come together. What does it mean by the way that it makes
sense? It needs to make sense for the payers for the health care systems. It needs to make sense for
the patients in case they are paying, but quite honestly, it has to make sense for us, for the industry,
for obvious reasons as well.
Now, throughout the day yesterday I had a few conversations with some of you and you
asked me, well, you must have a very tough job? And how actually do you set the prices up? I'll
tell you. Pricing has quite a lot to do with science. Why science? Because you actually need to
understand what you are selling and you need to understand the value, and frankly, there's quite a
lot of science in pricing itself. That may come as a surprise but it's quite a lot.
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It's also an art because you need to put all of this together and you really don't know how
it will all work out. But I like to point out to one important element, also the behavior, behavior in
terms of how you negotiate, behavior in terms of how you price medicines from a societal point
of view, behavior in terms of the discipline you have in the organization, in terms of not giving
too much discounts and rebates. There's also competitive behavior. Behavior is important.
Now, the issue is that when it comes to the new uses of established molecules, this approach
doesn't really work. Why doesn't it work? Because from the pricing and reimbursement legislation
point of view - so it's not really even the payer's viewpoint, it's the legislation's viewpoint and I'm
taking predominantly the European perspective here - the new uses of established medicines equal
generics. And by the way, there's nothing wrong with generics, okay? Seriously. Again, generics
are good. Use generics. But why is this the case?
So from the pricing legislation point of view, if a new medicine has the same ATC code as
the old one, it's considered to be the same thing. If it has the same INN, it is the same thing. If it
doesn't have a new active substance, it is the same thing. If it goes through what we call in Europe
the hybrid regulatory procedure, it's the same thing.
And by the way, if you go to Poland, Germany, UK, you'll find different definitions in the
pricing legislation of what "same" means or what "similar" means or what "equivalent" means.
Sometimes they are very broad. Which means that if, according to the legislation, your new
medicine that adds some value but it's using an established molecule is considered to be same,
similar, equivalent depending on the jurisdictions, you are a generic.
And again, generics are good. But the problem with generics is, as Sir Robin mentioned
yesterday, the cost of bisphosphonate is roughly around $20 a year. And by the way, in some
countries it's a little bit less than this. We are in Seattle, where Starbucks come from, so for $20
per year you can get around six cups of coffee. How many of you have had six cups of coffee last
month?
And by the way, this is an annual treatment of the therapy that prevents fractures, okay?
Just to put it in perspective. But if Teva or Novartis or any other company decides to invest into
the new treatment, and let's say we want to innovate around bisphosphonate, and we heard
yesterday we can do quite a lot of stuff around bisphosphonate, the generic price is not going to
work. Simply it's not going to work. It may work if with a generic you have a massive volume, if
there is a minimila investments in R&D, the company will be selling the product for other price,
but it's not going to work if you want to put a couple hundred millions or one billion dollars,
depending on how complex it is.
How does it work? For those of you that may not be familiar, I just took five major
European countries, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK, In these countries, the legislation enables
or enforces that generics need to have a certain level of price and it's mandatory like in France,
Spain or Italy, or it enables quite a fierce price competition in terms of the rebates the pharmacist
tenders, claw backs and so on in Germany and the UK.
Now, the issue is also in the U.S. It's not necessarily regulated in the same manner, but
when I talk to my U.S. colleagues, they also find that such situations may be difficult. And this is
actually an article that was published last year by a number of different people from the U.S. about
how to overcome the obstacles to repurposing old molecules for neurodegenerative diseases. And
what they said is that if generic versions are available, the challenges are even greater since payers
can promote a generic switch, even if branded drugs have a new indication.
So a number of quite notable individuals are stating this in the consensus paper. They also
said that it definitely discourages companies from investing in clinical trials to prove drug efficacy.
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Now, they then go on and they say payers are unlikely to cover a new formulation, altered dose,
route of administration or a combination therapy over existing approved drugs without
demonstration of clear clinical benefit at a reasonable cost.
And I want to highlight this because let's say you, Teva or other company innovates around
the old molecule. What we really need to show is that we add value. What does it mean? We need
to have a clinical study that is powered to show superiority. And for those of you who are not close
to the R&D world, superiority study is risky, it's really costly. The simple bioequivalence or noninferiority studies are much cheaper to do. And if we want to get a high price we actually need to
show it in a clinical trial. If we don't have a clinical trial, we may have fantastic IP and exclusivity
rights, but it's not going to work.
So naturally we struggle with it. We struggle because of the cost and risk of development
that such medicines with the new uses of estabslihed molecules are roughly hundreds times more
than generic. I actually am basing it on a specific case that we have in Teva that I use around
negotiations.
In addition, We haven't mentioned it too much but actually it is a much higher regulatory
uncertainty with developing the medicines with the new uses of old molecules than with generics.
And also there is higher cost in terms of the post-approval safety studies (PASS) or other
regulatoray obligations that are agreed as part of the risk assessment plan.
Some other things. Up front investments in manufacturing can be big because if you want
to innovate, you may have an interesting technology but that technology can be very costly to set
up. We talk about hundred of millions in just manufacturing plants sometimes. And believe me,
there is a case that I can definitely refer to. Cost of goods are much higher than typical generics
and the commercial investments are much higher than with typical generics. So the whole
comparison with generics simply doesn't make sense.
Now, there's one other thing. You may wonder what you are looking at. That's my daily
life. I mean seriously that's what I do. So let me take you through this - what does it mean? So this
is what is called international price referecing matrix. To put it in the simplest possible language,
One government doesn't want to pay more than the other government. That's basically the rule in
Europe. And this table describes how it works.
So if you look at the vertical columns, these are the countries that are referring those
countries when they set the price. So what does it mean? If I'm launching the product in Germany
and if I happen to go through what is called the AMNOG procedure, at some point the German
negotiator will come to me and say, Hey, what are your prices in 15 other European countries?
And just to put it into perspective, in the German basket, I have Greece, Slovakia and Czech
Republic – nations that significantly poorer than Germany.
But what does it mean? I'm launching the product in Germany. That's my No. 1 market.
And I don't really want the price in Germany to be negatively influenced by the price in let's say
Czech Republic or Slovakia or Greece. I will never be paid by the way in Greece.
Now, seriously, no. So what does it mean? I'm not launching the products in those
countries, and believe me, this is the kind of decisions, I don't want to say, I make every week
because I'm trying to get the product everywhere, but once in a while, every quarter we're not
launching a product somewhere because of this topic. And that topic is even bigger for the news
of established medicines because if even one country favors through the legislation that sort of
higher pricing that recognize the value of the new uses of old molecules, it gives this pricing
incentive, then I will prioritize those countries first and I may unfortunately neglect other countries.
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You may think it's unethical, but if I do it in the other countries then I lost the whole business in
the countries with higher prices.
So what are the consequences? I think we talked about this, but in the long run, obviously
we may not have all those medicines in all countries. The companies will either decide not to invest
anymore or they may decide to launch only in countries that provide pricing incentives
Why is it a case? Well, here is a paper that recently was published that addresses this point.
I contributed to it and it's about innovating about inhalers in asthma and COPD. In general, we
have great molecules, but we have poor inhalers hence the need to innovate around the inhalers.
And what this panel concluded is that patients will only be able to benefit from innovation in
inhaler devices if the pharmaceutical manufacturers have sufficient incentives to invest in such
innovations. What they say then is that the lack of recognition of innovation in inhaler devices
which deliver off patent molecules will at best deprive the patients access to the medicines – and
can lead to inequalities across countries – while at worst it can limit the financial incentives for us
to actually put the money into the development of these medicines and bring them to market
altogether.
Now, coming back to this paper which I mentioned to you earlier, it talks about something
very interesting. The authors say if a repurposed generic drug lower payer costs significantly, as
there will be an effective low cost treatment available where previously there were none, generally
speaking, in such situations, there may be a portion to actually work in the payers in some sort of
partnerships to, you know, to put the system in place to recognize innovation in the uses of all
molecules.
I refer to the example that we had yesterday, the Alzheimer's. That's exactly the case. This
company innovates around a system, but if they would be able to show that they are lowering the
treatment cost of Alzheimer's, that actually can work very well for them and for the payers as well
and there may be incentives for them to do.
So my call to action. I think generally speaking the
What are the potential solutions? What are the potential legislative solutions? Well, I think
that yesterday it was mentioned on a couple occasions that HTA, Health Technology Assessment,
may be one of the ways to address that. What's the health technology assessment? It's basically a
way to systematically assess the evidence and the value of the medicines compared to what is
currently being used.
The big issue is, however, and this is what is described in the table here on the right-hand
side, is that for the medicines that come with the old established molecules, in many countries the
route to even go through HTA is blocked. From the pure legislation point of view these medicines
are considered generics. Because they're considered generics they cannot go to HTA. That's the
case with AMNOG process in Germany. That's the case in Poland.
Okay. So that's the first thing to fix. It's very easy things to fix, just let's open up the
legislation so that if the company wants to go through HTA, we can have a possibility to do this.
And one of the ways to address that potentially could be to, within the agenda of EuneHTA at the
European level. There and there was a discussion yesterday on the topic: to bring those medicines
into the agenda as well not just the originators
I think we've had many interactions about the new indications. One of the solutions is just
to create a system where you can differentiate the price between the indications, but you cannot
forget about pharmacy substitution systems as we heard it very clearly in the morning.
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Procurement. In Germany, when you have a tender, and that's clearly stated here, the only
thing that matters is price, that's it. So if you're a generic, and these kind of medicines will be
considered generics, the only thing that will matter in the tender will be the price.
And finally, I think there's another level that we can engage in, it's the World Health
Organization (WHO). Why WHO? Because they are in charge of the fundamental system of
classification of medicines. They're in charge of granting INNs, granting ATC codes and defining
the daily defined doses (DDDs). And I'm not going to go through this in detail what it all means,
but the bottom line is, if WHO is open to differentiate at that level between the new uses of the
medicines and the old ones, then this creates a very strong foundation for all the health care systems
to follow because all the health care systems have signed up to it.
Now, I also think there is some responsibility we need to put on ourselves. I think, first of
all, if we innovate around those medicines, I think we need to bring value to the patients, because
otherwise, if we talk about a very small incremental innovation, it might not necessarily be the
solution. Other thing is to generate evidence. One of the general managers at Teva always say to
me: if you can't demonstrate it, shy away from it. And that's an important component as well.
I think the other point is that we may litigate with the payers in case there is a disagreement
about the price but I would prefer to work with payers as customers and partners. It's difficult
sometimes, but at the end of the day that is my vision, so I think as the industry we need to open
up much more for those kind of partnerships. At the end of the day, the payer's mission is to help
the society the greatest public or population health while managing budget so to speak. They have
the inherent mission of public health. Even if they are the private payers, they have the obligation
to follow.
And I think it's something we can tap into as well. It's just not always about the costs, even
if that's the type of thing you always hear for 95 percent of the time.
I think the other thing is about pricing. We should price the medicines with the new uses
of established molecules responsibly. We should reflect the value of those products in their prices.
But I have something to say to you actually. I would love to see this conference next year
with payers here.
SIR JACOB: We tried to get them.
MR. PLICH: Maybe we should work together on that. I think we need to bring them here
because they are the only ones that can change the system. And it seems, based on the judge's
ruling of the pregabalin case that we saw earlier, that that's also what was recommended because,
frankly, we as a group are not going to be able to sort it out by ourselves. Thank you.
[Applause.]
DR. DESAI: Thank you. I'd like to thank the organizers very much for the opportunity to
speak with all of you today. As you heard, Allyn and I are going to do a little bit of a public/private
partnership and divide our talk. I'd like to start first with development, drug development and
incentives in the U.S. and then Allyn and I will both address the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
So you can't have an industry person talk about drug development without seeing some
form of this slide. I know you've seen it a lot so I won't cover it in much detail. It's either a funnel.
It's a rocket ship. Whatever it is. But the point that I want to make with it, I guess there are two to
three points that I want to make and that is, you've heard that we filed the patents early and the
longer it takes to get to FDA approval, the shorter the remaining patent term.
We also have in the U.S. regulatory data protection and there are different coverages for
small molecules versus biologics, five versus 12 years, but those overlap with the patent period.
And just to make it a little more personal, I will say that I started in the patent division 16 years
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ago and I started by drafting patent applications. And with regard to how difficult it is, nothing I
ever wrote became anything so all the -- everything has failed basically.
So you have heard and you will hear some more that there's kind of a perverse reality about
the patent system and that is that we do file our applications years before the product receives
approval. And of course, if medicine is truly innovative, it's going to take longer to go through the
clinical trials, and of course, longer development means shorter patent term. And it's this variability
in the patent term that creates a disincentive to really work on and innovate and develop the most
novel medicines and innovative medicines.
And so we have what we call a modern solution. In the U.S. there was an initiative -legislative initiative called the MODDERN Cures Act, and it was actually developed by a coalition
of patient advocacy groups, the National Health Council, and it created a concept of when a therapy
is dormant, the act provides mechanisms of a fixed incentive -- or a fixed period of protection to
provide an incentive to create that and to develop that therapy.
So the idea of the MODDERN Cures Act was a fixed regulatory data protection, a period
of 15 years, during which no generic or bio similar applicant can obtain approval of a product by
relying on the sponsor's data. And the designation of dormant therapy is something that the FDA
would grant, a sponsor would request it, and when a dormant therapy is listed as such, the sponsor
would have to provide a list of all patents and patent applications that would protect that medicine.
And the idea of the dormant therapy is not only the fixed period of 15 years of data
protection, but also the extension of any existing patent rights to the end of that 15 years, but in
addition, the waiver of any patent rights beyond that 15 years. So what medicines would qualify?
This is an FDA categorization. An unmet medical need would be something that is serious or lifethreatening and for which there is no available therapy, or in the alternative, there are several
conditions that could also qualify. And the critics of this proposed bill have argued that 15 years
is too long, but in reality, the U.S. Hatch-Waxman system is capped at 14 years. There is a period
of six-month potential pediatric exclusivity and there is a period of 180-day or six-month
exclusivity for the single first generic. So a medicine with a strong patent protection gets about 15
years anyway.
Some have criticized it as it would allow too many products to qualify, and actually it's a
standard that the FDA uses to define what is an unmet medical need. So it would be, I think
currently or recently it's been about 40 percent of FDA approved medicines.
And finally, the idea that there is potential for abuse, and the reality again here is that the
patent owner is giving up any rights to any patent protection beyond the 15 years so the criticism
of evergreening actually cannot apply.
But as with all good things, the House, the U.S. House carved out the MODDERN Cures
provision from the 21st Century Cures Act which was passed in July of this year, and a
corresponding bill in the Senate was introduced in 2014 but not passed and it was not reintroduced
yet in the current congress.
So actually, that's my breaking point and to be continued later.
[Applause.]
DR. TAYLOR: Thanks so much. This is such a pleasure to be here this afternoon. I want
to thank the organizers, especially Toshiko and Rupert for inviting me to join his panel, and I have
to reiterate again because it makes me so nervous. Unlike others on this panel and in this room, I
am not an intellectual property attorney so no tricky questions. And consequently, I really learned
a lot in the last day and a half, not only by a series of really marvelous presentations, but also with
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the number of side dialogs, with generous and highly patient patent attorneys, and you know who
you are and I appreciate our conversations.
My expertise is in international law and global health policy and I'm going to try and bring
a bit of that background on training to look at some of recent legal developments surrounding new
uses for old medicines, particularly with the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and then
Manisha will be coming back with the industry perspective.
As we've been discussing over the course of the last two days, finding the balance between
health trade and IP policies to sustain innovation and ensure widespread access to life-saving
technologies is one of the primary public health policy challenges of our time and as Dick Wilder
so reminded us yesterday, we've long been out of balance. In the -- historically, medical innovation
has failed to address major diseases that are endemic to most countries. According to Medecins
Sans Frontieres, MSF, only four percent of new drugs and vaccines that have been developed
between 2000 and 2011 were for neglected diseases.
Now, whether it's called drug repositioning, reprogramming, repurposing or reinventing,
the process of reusing these old medicines is beginning to change the picture for neglected diseases.
As we heard yesterday, public and private product development partnerships were springing up to
repurpose drugs for neglected diseases. And in addition to the important work being done by Gates,
there are a number of other public/private partnerships such as the Drugs for Neglected Diseases
Initiative and the Medicines for Malaria Venture who all viewed drug repurposing as a critical
avenue for providing cost effective and timely access to drugs to patients in developing countries.
I think the key question in this realm is how to incentivize pharma to donate compounds to
participate in these partnerships in a way that ensures widespread access to essential medicines at
affordable prices.
Another critical issue is the tension between public and private sector interests in drug
repurposing. I'm sure Jerry McLaughlin, who's not looking, did not expect to see himself on my
slide but he really struck me what he said yesterday. I think he so well described yesterday that the
tension is due in part to some public interest bias against repurposed drugs. And I think it is really
fair to say that advocates tend to view drug repurposing as mere illegitimate attempts to extend the
patent life of a drug without real innovation. But unfortunately this has been bolstered by the words
and actions at times of the industry itself. Indeed, the literature is replete with industry reference
to patent clips and drug tweaking.
And opponents of evergreening, including organizations such as MSF and Oxfam, point to
exactly these types of statements and the practice of extending patents to minor or trivial
modifications that do not advance public health as the reason why new patents should not be
granted for old drugs.
Now, I think Jerry is absolutely right in pointing out that not all repurposed drugs are low
level patents. Indeed, many involve substantial investment in innovation. But we also need to
recognize that there are bad players. And ultimately there are important conflicts between the
public and private sector interests, particularly with respect to repurposed medicines that can have
wide-ranging impacts for global public health.
So what's the global legal framework? We know that the multilateral legal IP framework
provides the context and the general guiding legal principles then for the operation of national IP
systems, including the framework for drug repurposing. The WTO TRIPs agreement has
significant implications of course on the application of IP to medicines, but is notably silent on
new uses.
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Now, since the adoption of TRIPs, patents on new uses has been extensively debated and
there's no commonly accepted international practice. And ultimately, the issue of patentability is
not just a technical decision, but I think it's above all a political decision linked in a way in which
a country which is to interpret and apply the patentability criteria in order to promote and protect
economic social and technological developments.
Now, some developing countries, as I'm sure you're all well aware, have resisted the trend
for packeting new uses. India, countries of the Andean community including Peru, Bolivia,
Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, among others, expressly exclude new uses. Other countries such
as Brazil do not have express inclusions or exclusions, but have at times denied second use patents
as not being novel or inventive enough.
So although the TRIPs agreement leaves members some flexibility on the patentability of
second uses, I think the rule may be shifting with the recent adoption of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement. As you know, the TPP is a massive trade deal that covers 12 countries
constituting 40 percent of the world market. Negotiations of the TPP concluded in October. The
agreement was tightly held -- though many of you in this room may have seen it. I'd be interested
to know that -- during the negotiations and the draft was only released to the public less than a
month ago. And the agreement is absolutely enormous. The chapter on intellectual property alone
is 74 pages and it covers numerous areas.
Now, during the negotiations, public interest and public health groups, including some UN
agencies, voiced concern over the TRIPs plus provisions in the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement. The TRIPs plus provisions in previous trade deals, as you know typically have
imposed a higher level of protection for intellectual property rights than is required under TRIPs,
and advocates argue that the so-called TRIPs plus provisions limit or undermine the capacity of
developing countries to legislate and use TRIPs flexibility to ensure access to medicines. And it
has been argued that the TRIPs plus provisions in the TPP could impose obligations on developing
countries that go far beyond any other trade agreement.
Now, public interest groups are particularly concerned about the TPP, because besides the
fact that it's a massive agreement in and of itself covering 40 percent of the world market, it was
designed as a platform agreement that can be acceded to by other countries. The TPP has also been
touted as a new gold standard for future trade deals and is expected to set the precedent for similar
provisions to be included in these future agreements.
Now, I think at this point the full health implications of the TPP are difficult and impossible
to judge for a number of reasons. Again, the provisions were markedly complex. The agreement
was just released. It is also important to know that the draft that we have seen and that is available
has not been through the final legal scrub so the provisions could change. And also it's important
to note that there's considerable question about when or whether the TPP is ever going to enter
into force. The text requires the agreement will enter into force when at least six the signatories
have completed applicable ratification procedures, provided that these six countries together
account for at least 85 percent of the combined gross domestic product of the signatory. And what
that means in short is that the TPP will not go into force until when and whether the United States
decides to join.
So what are the provisions of the TPP? And Manisha is going to have a lot more to say
about this. Like TRIPs, TPP provides that a party shall make patents available for any invention
that meets those three standard criteria, being new or novel, involving an inventive step, and being
industrially applicable. And subject to certain exclusions article 1837, which is the key provision
for us, explicitly requires parties provide patents for new uses, new forms and new methods of use.
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Now, there are other provisions also to create the potential for extending patent terms for
new uses, and these are going to be more thoroughly discussed by Manisha, including article 1850
which provides three years of data exclusivity for new uses of old medicines and Article 1846
which mandates adjustments in patent terms for patent office delays.
Now, the debate around these articles has been stirring for some time. Advocates argue that
these new use and other provisions will extend patent terms and limit the capacity of their
governments to use TRIPs flexibility such as compulsory licensing to protect public health. But
proponents of the TPP argue to the contrary, that the concerns of the public health community are
simply overwhelmed and that indeed this agreement allows ample flexibility for states to protect
public health.
And it does so for several reasons: First of all, like TRIPs, the TPP does not precisely define
the criteria patentability, right, there's three provisions. So it gives some countries some flexibility,
as we like to say in international law, "wiggle room," right, to interpret these provisions.
Second, the provision includes specific -- agreement includes specific provisions on the
authority of countries to protect public health, including and particularly this provision Article
18.6. There are also other provisions that reach out to public health including Article 1841 that
explicitly affirms the right of countries to use TRIPs flexibilities.
Now, although the TPP includes a specific public health provision and others, I think there
are other provisions in this agreement that are likely to have a chilling effect on the use of the
public health exceptions and TRIPs with respect to not only second use, but first use patents. And
I want to just briefly describe those. I don't have much time. And what I'm particularly concerned
about are the enforcement provisions of the TPP.
Indeed, in some respects, the enforcement provisions of this agreement and the secretive
manner of its negotiations are tremendously reminiscent of ACTA. You all may remember that
failed anti-counterfeiting trade agreement that was assigned to be an enforcement agreement for
TRIPs. Well, I think the TPP has a lot of provisions that were just sort of the pulled out from
ACTA. First of all, the TPP mandates that rights holder have access to civil judicial procedures,
including the possibility of injunctive relief. Notably, the agreement also requires that state law
provides a presumption of patent validly and civil and administrative enforcement proceedings.
And what this means is likely increase of probability of interim measures like injunction. There
are a number of other important provisions here. Article 1874 also includes the potential for
debilitating financial damages based upon any legitimate measure of value that the rights holder
submits, including suggestive retail price. And the concern does not stop there because the TPP
also provides that judicial authorities shall have the right to impose court costs and expert and
attorneys' fees.
The provisions on discovery are also extensive and potentially chilling, including the right
to access information about persons that -- allegedly involved in the infringement, the means of
production and channels of distribution. And I think finally and most controversially, I just want
to say a few words about Chapter 9 of the TPP which creates an investor state dispute mechanism.
Now, this investor state dispute mechanism could potentially empower foreign companies
to sue state parties for hundreds of millions of dollars in damages in the claim that their rights have
somehow been undermined. Notably, such provisions have been included in trade agreements
before of course, but the scale of the TPP substantially increases the likelihood of more of the
number of such challenges.
I think also of concern is that the TPP does not include any meaningful provision protecting
states from these investor claims when they introduce regulatory measures to protect public health
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or other policy interest. Now, Article 9.15 of the TPP has been touted as the public health exception
for TPP but it merely provides that states can introduce such regulatory measures to protect public
health and other public interests that are otherwise consistent with the agreement. That renders a
provision essentially legally meaningless.
Now, notably, firms have used provisions like these investor state dispute provisions and
bilateral trade agreements to challenge a range of laws, and most recently they were used to
challenge public health laws in Australia in the top context of tobacco control. The tobacco control
community is so strong at the global level at this point that they were able to carve out an exception
in the TPP. So this investor state dispute resolution procedure does not apply in the context of state
measures on tobacco control.
Now, in my view it doesn't make health policy sense that one public health concern gets
carved out of the TPP but not others. Notably, the TPP has a strong state-to-state dispute resolution
mechanism, including the possibility of trade measures being imposed. I believe that the private
sector shouldn't have the authority to bring sovereign governments to arbitration proceedings for
decisions to protect the public health, and we need to recognize that the mere potential for
arbitration, as well as the potential negative outcome may indeed induce a regulatory in Chilean
countries, especially in low income countries that do not have the resources to battle investors.
So in conclusion, increasing number of bilateral and regional trade agreements, including
the TPP, highlights need to analyze these agreements very carefully from a public health and
economics perspective. And this was just the beginning. The agreement says it's not necessarily
the last word. There is today limited analysis of the impact of intellectual property laws in most
countries and although the fate of the TPP is uncertain, I think the negotiations themselves have
helped us to refocus attention on issues surrounding access and innovation and is contributing to
the discourse that we're having here on alternative mechanisms for incentivizing innovation to
protect public health. Thank you.
[Applause.]
DR. DESAI: I've missed you all. Okay. So the point I want to make with this slide, you
know, I won't go through the numbers you've heard many times, the pharmaceutical industry, you
know, spent over $50 billion on research and development last year, and actually this number is
from pharma so that number only reflects pharma member companies. It does not include other
biopharmaceutical companies that are not members of pharma.
In the U.S., Americans are very concerned about health care costs. We hear it in the news
all the time, and I think a large part of the reason is that although prescription drugs remain at
about 10 percent of health care costs, payers, the actual patients, are paying about 40 percent out
of pocket. And meanwhile developing countries are a growth opportunity and some have said the
emerging markets will represent about 42 percent of the global pharmaceutical market by 2019.
So the question is: Who's going to pay for all these medicines? And I have a bad habit,
when I'm on airplanes and I talk to the person next to me, and the gentleman next to me on the
way to Seattle gave me a Wall Street Journal which had on the title page the fact that Americans
are subsidizing the health care costs for the rest of the world. So when I look at the TPP, I look at
it may be slightly differently than what you've just heard.
So in the U.S., the ability to negotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership is dependent on the
ability of the administration to negotiate and then not have everything renegotiated by the
Congress, and that authority came from the Congressional Bipartisan -- excuse me -- which is a
rare word in the U.S., Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act, or often
referred to as TPA. And the TPA sets goals for what Congress, what legislators hope to achieve
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with negotiation of a bilateral or multilateral agreement. And in the IP section, it includes the
provisions of the trade agreement -- of any trade agreement that is entered into by the U.S. should
reflect a standard of protection similar to what is found in U.S. law. And second, that preventing
or eliminating discrimination with respect to matters affecting availability, acquisition, scope,
maintenance or enforcement of IP rights. And so the question is: Were these goals achieved?
One of the things that the pharmaceutical industry was paying very close attention to, as
I'm sure you've heard and are aware of, is the data -- regulatory data protection provisions. In the
U.S., as I've showed in my first set of slides, we have five years’ regulatory data protection for
small molecules and 12 years for biologics. And although the TPP does say there is five years of
regulatory data protection from the data marketing, there were several annexes that I don't think
that we weren't aware of when the announcement was made in October, but have had a chance to
see when the text was released in November. And essentially, a lot of that protection is eviscerated
by various annexes and side letters.
So as an example, Peru has a free trade agreement with the U.S. that was signed in 2010 I
believe, and it includes regulatory data protection for five years but it says that if Peru approves
the drug in less than six months after -- for example, if the innovator relies on data that we used in
the U.S. and Peru approves the drug in less than six months, the data protection period is based off
the first approval anywhere in the world.
So it really doesn't equal five years. It's more like three and a half. And although they say
they have to approve in six months, we had an instance in Peru where the agency asked for
additional data and decided to stop their six-month clock, so even though it took them longer than
six months to approve, we still only got five years from the first date of approval. And that
exception remains in TPP. And of course with biologics, in the U.S. we have 12 years of data
protection, and as we -- as I believe you know, that is not reflected in TPP.
So another provision that we -- you heard earlier about the Hatch-Waxman law in the U.S.
and what that allows the innovator and the generic to do is to resolve any patent disputes before a
generic is launched and before we get into horrible damages as Allyn alluded to. So the TPP
includes provisions on notice to the patent holder and early a resolution mechanism, but also
included side letters that basically either exempt or weakened what various countries had already
agreed to.
So again, Chile and the U.S. entered into a free trade agreement in 2004 and it included
these early resolution mechanisms, but as of 2015 Chile had now passed those or put those
provisions into their law, and now with TPP, they -- the provisions are weaker and they basically
did not -- have 11 years of not abiding by the original free trade agreement.
So to go back to the first part of my talk, I will just say that Lilly was a strong supporter of
the MODDERN Cures Act and a period of fixed exclusivity and -- as a mechanism to ensure
greater certainty and encourage development of drugs for unmet medical needs. And so we look
at these things and we believe that there are ways to legislate innovation or to incentivize
innovation but unfortunately they're still theory at this point. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR. CORDERY: Thank you very much indeed. I'll open the questions to the floor in just
a few seconds. Got a couple of questions of my own. My first one is to Allyn and it's about the law
of obviousness in Sweden, Allyn.
DR. TAYLOR: No, no, no.
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MR. CORDERY: I have three questions for you, Allyn, they're all wrapped up in one.
Will the TPP be signed? Does it depend on who is in the White House and will that person be
called Hillary or Donald?
DR. TAYLOR: Well, I think it was signed, right?
MR. CORDERY: Will it come into force then?
DR. TAYLOR: Will it come into force? I think that's a political question. I don't think it's
going to come into force during this administration. This is my own view of the political, you
know, political wins. I don't think that this is -- even though I think it's a benefit to the business
community and the public, I don't think they're going to want to support this during this
administration. I think it might take -- if it enters into force I think it's going to take a couple of
years. What do you think?
DR. DESAI: So for once I'm going to speak on my own behalf and not my company's
behalf. I will say that our CEO, two days after it was announced, publicly did say that something
is better than nothing. He was disappointed but that any improvement in patent law is better than
nothing. And now that the text has been released I don't know what our CEO and I don't know
what our company thinks, but a lot of the things that I thought would improve in the countries that
I have managed, I see as being really not -- no better enforcement mechanism, no real improvement
in data protection, which is really the certainty that we would all like to see, even though that
would put me as a patent litigator out of business.
But as a patient and a payer of medicines, it would certainly be the kind of certainty that
ensures innovation. So do I think it will pass? I think that the Senate has expressed a lot of
reservation so Senator Hatch has already criticized it as, again, not meeting the goals of the TPA
that Congress passed to allow the administration to negotiate the TPP. So I'm actually kind of
skeptical.
MR. CORDERY: Thank you much. Allyn, did you want to make an additional point on
that?
DR. TAYLOR: Who's going to be president?
MR. CORDERY: Sorry.
DR. TAYLOR: I think one of the sort of interesting questions is how it will be used as a
model agreement for future agreements. So, you know, there are these two ideas, one is that other
states with the agreement of all the parties can accede, assuming it enters into force, or it will be a
model to negotiate other agreements. And I think if I would happen to access -- and I'm not a trade
lawyer either, I'm a global health lawyer, the fact that this agreement was negotiated in such a
secretive way, right, where techs apparently like to our Congress, they were allowed to see the
agreement where we're not allowed to take notes or keep copies of it, right?
So I can imagine like trying to negotiate an agreement with Europe. I don't think the
Europeans would tolerate this. I mean they would say this is why ACTA failed. So if it's going to
be a model it's not going to be by acceding to this agreement but that there will be separate
agreements that include provisions. And I do take exception even with Manisha because I think
the investors say the dispute resolution procedure is a huge improvement for the business
perspective. So I think other, you know, I think companies would be quite interested in advancing
the agreements that include that provision.
DR. DESAI: So you promised you wouldn't bring it up but I will.
DR. TAYLOR: I'm not going to bring it up. We're polite.
DR. DESAI: So those provisions have been in free trade agreements and they have not
been -- although there are individual cases, they have not been used every time that someone's
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patent rights are weakened or taken away. I mean, you know, if we want to talk about delays or
lack of patenting, as you yourself mentioned, there are so many countries that I manage that we
can't get second medical use patents. You mentioned Latin America, the Andean pact countries.
In Brazil we file applications that are still pending 12 years after they were filed, still unexamined
by the patent office, and I've actually had to tell our Brazilian affiliate that they are launching a
new drug and even though we filed the application they don't have any patent protection.
So these are, you know, these are not member countries of -- or at least Brazil was not part
of the TPP, but these are real issues that we are trying to have addressed by these free trade
agreements.
MR. CORDERY: You talked about transparency and I think we all agree that it's terribly
important and it sounds like it was a dreadful business by not being allowed to read something and
not take notes or something. Here is the question I want to ask Manisha. I mean if in preparing for
this presentation this afternoon and moderating it, I looked at what has been happening just in the
UK in the last 12 months. There's an extraordinary thing, there's a thing called the off-patent drug
bill was proposed, and the idea was that for -- basically where there was promise in a new
indication, the secretary of state in the UK could apply for marketing authorization so that that
medicine was licensed rather than being used off-license so to speak. And that bill was actually
thrown out using a process called filibustering. And filibustering, do you know what that is?
DR. DESAI: I thought only we had that.
MR. CORDERY: Okay. So filibustering you have in the U.S. Okay, the guy was supposed
to get a conservative minister called Alistair Burt, essentially used up all the time dedicated to
discussing the proposed bill by just going on and on and on and timed out and the thing doesn't
happen, which seems to me extraordinarily like cross-party support. So my question is? Are things
any better on your side of the pond? And I'm hearing the answer no but do elaborate.
DR. DESAI: Just turn on the TV and you'll know the answer. You know, we were really
disappointed with, as I mentioned, the MODDERN Cures provision. We thought that it made a lot
of sense. It was really aimed at just incentivizing medicines that would otherwise not be developed.
And it was disappointing that not only did it not -- it got carved out of the House bill so I think,
you know, the opportunity to bring that back now is very -- actually very small.
In the Senate, again, it got killed by -- it was very much not a bipartisan bill. And I don't - I had in my slides, not reintroduced, and a colleague of mine who is so much more optimistic
than I said, please put "not yet reintroduced." But the reality is I don't see it happening, especially
in an election year.
MR. CORDERY: Okay. Time is passing so let me open up the floor and ask if there's any
questions for any of our speakers this afternoon?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So from what you described about MODDERN, I didn't see how
it would help new uses of old medicines. It in fact seemed like it would inhibit that by preventing
patenting or the benefit of patents if there was another substantial new use. For Allyn, I'm just
curious: Why does anybody care about these small increments that are patented when they're -- if
they're not necessary for a generic version of the drug? Why would payers pay for it? Why would
patients care about it? And why are people worried about this incremental innovation that doesn't
make a difference? Because you could still have now that withdrawal can be only based on safety
issues and we can no longer orange book list a patent five minutes before and get another 30-month
stay, so who cares about these incremental innovations? They may be important and we don't know
when we file the patent application. Why should they be denied?
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DR. TAYLOR: I will say while they're negotiating I'm going to answer the question. I
think you make an important point. First of all, there's a lot of misunderstanding about the way the
law works in this area, right? And there's a lot of rhetoric that evergreening covers the compound
as well as the new use. So I think there's a certain degree of misunderstanding and that's why there
is a lot of dremity [sic] around it.
I also think that, again, not being a pharma person or an IP, there is concern that may be
legitimate that there may be minor tweaking that's going to affect the usability of that new
compound. And perhaps somebody else could speak more directly to that.
DR. DESAI: Well, I think I was confused who you were asking questions to, but I will at
least take my part of the question you asked as for new uses and I'll do it somewhat anecdotally.
So the idea is if you have something that does not have extensive patent life, and I have been in
meetings where someone will ask, Well, when does this patent expire on some compound that was
in development but then got pulled or got put in what we call the parking lot, just got put to the
side for a little while, someone is interested again, wants to look at it for a new indication. Asks
me what the remaining patent -- or what's the patent expiration date. If it's three years, five years,
that's really not even enough time to develop it.
And I don't -- I don't know what happens or what decisions got made, but I do know that I
didn't get a new project. I mean that didn't become something I was working on. So the idea is not
just new uses of old medicines, but the ability to develop a drug that might otherwise not be
developed because of other concerns. And with regard to -AUDIENCE MEMBER: That was the question I had for you.
DR. TAYLOR: Actually the final reason, I mean there's concerns that you could have
minor changes, minor tweaking that can have profound implications for public health, but the
public community will not have access to it. And I want -- I don't want to bring it up Jerry, but let's
talk about the antithesis of the example he gave us, right? Which is the development of new use or
a new formulation, right, new dosing of an existing compound for Alzheimer's, which -- and he
showed us the global burden of disease.
So people in the public health community want to know how are we going to get access to
that medicine to the millions of people around the globe who need it and when you have -- and I
don't want to use his example, a drug that is being repurposed with new dosing at minor cost, minor
innovation? You know, I think this is exactly where there's a tension between the public sector
interest and the private sector interest.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Then it comes down to pricing. We in pharma ask for a price.
Guess what? We don't always get it. In fact, we almost never get it.
DR. TAYLOR: Exactly right. We had an extensive discussion about that, you know, in
the context of this innovation, so absolutely.
DR. DESAI: Can I -MR. CORDERY: Please, briefly.
DR. DESAI: So the point I did want to make about the 15 years and subsequent uses for
that compound, I've been in meetings and I have witnessed that, you know, when a new drug
launches in the U.S., because of the Hatch-Waxman system, it's going to be challenged in four
years, five years. And so when the team is trying to make decisions about are we going to try to
develop this or a new indication, are we going to look for a cancer drug, new cancers that it could
treat, they feel like they're in limbo. Well, are we going to have exclusivity to be able to invest in
that or are we not? We don't know until we go through the patent case.
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So the idea again of MODDERN Cures is you will get 15 years and you know you get 15
years, and in that 15 years, you have the -- at least the certainty that you are recouping the
investment that you've made and have the ability to invest more.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you.
MR. CORDERY: Thank you. The reason I haven't had the television on, Manisha, in the
last couple of days is because I've been absorbed in this very interesting book and I've visited all
the good bookstores and there are only four now left on Amazon. But actually, one of the highlights
so far of what I've read in here is Sir Robin speaks to the public sector inquiring report in Brussels
which was given in 2008 -- was it that long ago? My goodness.
And he talks in there about quotes from the Pied Piper of Hamelin about how everyone
wants to pay a master price for something and then they get it and then they say, Oh, we possibly
can't pay that much for it. And the fact that pharmaceuticals cost, some pharmaceuticals cost quite
a small amount of money to actually manufacture, but in reality all the money goes into the
investment both for that medicine and for all the medicines that didn't make it along the way of
course and everyone in this room well understands that.
But the problem I have is that we all in this room all understand that but the people who
read the daily newspapers in the United Kingdom, and I'm sure the same is true across the world,
did not get it, and yet they're quite happy to pay for expensive cosmetics or expensive clothing
which costs next to nothing to make it.
So my final question goes to Adam, and Adam, you negotiate prices for originators and for
generics, yes? It's part of your job, the metrics which make me glad I've got my job and not yours.
Do you have a set formula if someone, a layperson asks you, you know, why do medicines cost so
much? Adam, you deal with this. Why do they cost so much? What's your answer to the world on
that one?
MR. PLICH: So first of all, I encourage everybody to work in pricing. I think it's very
interesting. In reality I can tell you I had the pleasure to work with a fantastic group of lawyers at
Teva, and you will probably hear from one of them in the next panel, and the legal world is not
too far from the market access world because we also need to present the case. We are presenting
the case. We are also the judges, which is usually the payers or bureaucrats, but it's similar in my
model. Anyway, to your question, first of all, I don't think that the medicines are that terribly
expensive to start with. Why is that the case? If you look at the proportion of spending in medicines
in the majority of the European or global countries, they constitute a rather small proportion of all
the costs. I think that's the other part of the health care that is much, much more inefficient than
pharmaceuticals, and I can tell you why I think it's the case. When I go to Brussels, for example,
to one of our industrial meetings and I mention the tellis train [sic], and I see that there is a new
government somewhere and they need to find savings, I know they have a problem in two months
because pharmaceuticals are the first thing that will come to us to bring the prices down. And there
are many different tools that can happen. And I fully understand that that's the way it works, which
is easy. So I think that's the way I'll respond to it at the end of the day.
MR. CORDERY: So long term, short term, medium term is how you have to look at it
rather than just short-term savings all the time. Okay. We probably have time for one final question
if anyone has anything to ask or any observations. If we're all done -- are you going for break or
do you want to ask a question. Two quick questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Mine is sort of off the wall. But I was sort of wondering, so we
are talking about the U.S. subsidizing the rest of the world which is not exactly true but there's
something there. One of the differences between the U.S. system and it has to do with payment is
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we have a private system where the prices are mostly set through the private sector with insurance
and most of the rest of the developed world and even emerging markets it's governments who do
that.
Like is there thought within the U.S. of trying to push the rest of the world to move to a
Medicare Part D system or something like that where actually you have private insurers doing the
negotiation for prices? Because that's actually like -- like that would be more of an equalizing
thing, or vice-versa, you could actually move the U.S. to the -- that would do a lot more work than
a lot of other things we're talking about.
MR. PLICH: I will respond to that, not necessarily on behalf -- you know, I have quite a
different part of the world, Europe. It's actually happening in many countries that operates in very
similar ways. That's, you know, Netherlands is one of the examples, Germany is one of the
examples, that you have the private insurers. Switzerland is another example that you have private
insurers. And then there's government and then there's the medical so to speak in the age group
that sets some rules. And then there is negotiations. It's just the role of the government may be
much bigger as well, so there is -- still in Europe you have them do all the negotiations. In fact,
you have triple negotiations because you negotiate with the government. Then you negotiate with
the insurer. Then you negotiate with the pharmacy. And then you negotiate with even the hospital
or God knows what more.
So that's the way it works. Now, coming back to your second part of the question, I think
things may go on to the other way around. That the U.S. may inherit or may adopt some of the
European ways of price medicines rather than the other way around.
MR. CORDERY: Okay. I think we're up to break time if that's all right. You can ask
anything you like at break time but I think it's back here at 4 o'clock for the final session. So thank
you all for your attention and break time.
[Applause.]
[Recess was taken.]
[Concluded at 2:46 p.m.]

PANEL VII:
SECURING INCENTIVES FOR NEW USES: PATENTS, EXCLUSIVITY AND/OR NEW APPROACHES?
Moderator:
Hon. Professor Sir Robin Jacob (ret.), University College London (London, UK).
Panelists:
Professor Mondher Toumi, Aix Marseille University (Marseille, France).
Dr. Galit Gonen, Teva Pharmaceutical (London, UK).
David Rosenberg, GlaxoSmithKline (Brentford, UK).
Professor Benjamin Roin, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Boston, MA, USA).
Bryan Zielinski, Pfizer, Inc. (New York, NY, USA).
SIR JACOB: Well, this is the session where we sort of say, Well, what are we going to do
about it? And the first thing that I'm going to remind you is what I said at the beginning, "it" was
the creation of incentives for finding new uses for established medicines. We've heard of patent
solution. We're going to hear about -- we've heard problems of the patent solution. I remind you
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that probably the biggest problem of all is that you can't patent anything to do with an established
use, you can't, in many, many cases because a patent has to be novel and not obvious, and often
the starting point is in publication by a doctor saying, I haven't noticed this beneficial side
effect so you can't get a patent.
Well, the team are going to come up with solutions. The intention is actually to take the
solutions even further than just this, but let's go to the solutions first. And we have asked Ben Roin,
who's thought about this and published about it longer than most people have, and so Ben is going
to start.
PROFESSOR ROIN: So thank you for having me. Thank you, Robin. I'm really excited
just, you know,
I've written about this. I've got a paper which I actually need to publish that's been sitting
out in unpublished form for a while, and like any good law review article, it's a thousand pages
long but it's 90 percent footnotes so it's not really so bad.
So this is going to be about solutions and, you know, I'm going to go in a particular direction
which is not actually the specifics on whether we should use patents or regulatory exclusivity
periods. I'm a big believer of regulatory exclusivity periods but not so much that, but it's going to
be an underlying problem we need to solve in order to be able to deal with any of this stuff and we
can do that, you know, we can see how to do that.
But before I do that, I actually just want to start quickly and remind us why we're here. And
that's -- we've got a system designed to promote pharmaceutical innovation and it's really designed
to promote the development of new drugs. Quite substantially that's what we did. We've got patents
and we've got regulatory exclusivity periods and they're aimed at getting new drugs on the market.
And the drawback to that is it turns out developing new drugs is like the single hardest thing to do
in pharmaceutical innovation, maybe like in any form of innovation. Not only is it absurdly
expensive and takes over a decade usually and has a failure rate that would make a Silicon Valley
investor cry, but actually it's just like really hard to find novel compound structures that you can
administer in the human body in a therapeutically efficacious dose without exceeding toxicity
thresholds. That's just hard to do. It's the reason why medicinal chemistry has been the bottleneck
in drug discovery for the past like 50 years, or one of the big bottlenecks in drug discovery, that's
hard.
So we have a system designed to reward or encourage the thing that turns out to be one of
the hardest things to do in this area, while at the same time we have tremendous progress going on
both research in the clinician side and gaining a better understanding of drugs, both like their
mechanisms of action and how diseases work and understanding different targets for treating
diseases, understanding, you know, different sort of patient profiles and how you can sort of
better personalize medicine. So we're gaining all this knowledge about that.
But we have this problem which is that, you know, we've got a finite patent term and so a
quote from Janet Woodcock. "Once the generic competition occurs, any commercial incentive for
further development disappears."
So as we gain better understandings of new disease targets and different similarities across
different profiles and so, you know, we look at -- in the U.S. we have roughly 2,000 off-patent
drugs at the moment and we can say, Gosh, I think a lot of these might actually work for some
other disease and we're getting better at predicting that. Or we look at those 2,000 off-patent drugs
and think, Gosh, I think some, maybe probably like most or all of those have personalized medicine
applications. We need to do better in terms of knowing when to give patients those drugs and what
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the dosage should be and who should be treated, you know, what mutations and the tumors or
whatever that we should be looking at.
As we gain that knowledge, we don't have incentives to do anything with it if the drug is
off-patent. And this is actually just sort of another quote which I think, you know, we haven't made
the point, but it's worth making, so "If personalized medicine is only pursued by developing new
drugs with companion diagnostics," so, you know, developing new drugs right now, "it will be a
long time before this approach becomes the standard of care for most common medical
conditions."
Like, if we have to develop -- instead of using the 2,000 drugs, off-patent drugs in our
current arsenal, which in the U.S. represents about 80 percent of the prescriptions, instead of using
that and trying to personalize that and finding new uses for that, we have to develop new drugs for
all of this, that is a huge burden to put on our innovative community as opposed to, you know, just
sing what we have with us.
All right. So what do we need? And I need to go fast, I know. So this is all -SIR JACOB: You can run a bit longer. They're not that clever.
PROFESSOR ROIN: Oh, right.
[Laughter.]
PROFESSOR ROIN: I'm very excited to be here. I normally talk to academics and they
don't know anything about this area and so I'm introducing all of it to them, and you guys actually
do, so this is great.
So what do we need here? We want clinical trial data evaluating potential new uses in
personalized medicine applications for old drugs, so we want those studies to be run. We want
those things to be developed. We mostly rely on private for profit industry to make these types of
investments. Of course, we could rely on the government to do it and the government
actually does fund some of these studies, but honestly, the money just isn't there for the kind of
investments we are looking for.
So we're going to talk about creating incentives for private industry to do it, not all of it but
like a lot of it. The way we do this now is we incentivize private sector investments in new medical
treatments by awarding temporary monopoly rights over those treatments. That's our system. We
do that with patents and with regulatory exclusivity periods, that's the way it works. So what do
we need here? We need either temporary monopoly rights over new uses or some other reward
system that would serve the same function like prize system sort of with, I'm not a huge fan, but
the paper is not about that and you can do something like that.
So I actually think it's worthwhile thinking about this in terms of two potential ways you
could structure these monopoly rights. One of them is what I'm going to call standard monopoly
protection for drugs. This is what we have. This is what we're used to. Standard monopoly
protection is when you have a monopoly right that blocks generics from the market, so whoever
the brand number company is, they have a monopoly on all sales for that drug because you can't
get it from anyone else.
There's actually another type of monopoly right you could have which I would call
indications to the monopoly protection, and we actually have these rights. They're awarded. But
we'll talk about this. They're just hard to enforce and so we kind of ignore them. So an indication
to a specific monopoly right would do one of two things. It would either give you temporary
monopoly protection that block generic sales for a specific indication for the drug but not others.
So the generics could -- you know, they could sell for a bunch of the older indications but you
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couldn't use a generic for a new indication. Or you could actually and -- this would be same thing,
it would -- just money would move around a little differently.
You can imagine a world where if a drug is prescribed for a new patented or protected
indication, you could prescribe a generic for that, that's fine, but the payer needs to pay the branded
company for that sale so you just move money that way. So that would be indication specific
protection.
Now, this is just review. I'm going to go through this quickly. The standard monopoly
protection that we warrant and use to encourage development of new drugs mostly is not available
for new uses of old drugs, and this is all obvious to most of you, so you've got product patents on
the active ingredient and formulation. If it's a new use for an old drug, obviously some of those are
unavailable because the drug is no longer novel, the formulation is no longer novel.
Now, sometimes this works if the new use requires a new formulation, like you can't use
the generic for the new use because it requires a radically higher or radically lower dose or a
different route of administration, then it actually works and you've got a repurposing strategy and
you can get protection over that. But if the generic works for the new use, you can't get patent
protection over the product itself.
We've talked a bunch about this. You can get process patents over the new uses. This would
be a patent covering -- well, in the U.S. you can and the protection you can get in other countries
varies. But as we talked about, so this can work for the first use so -- but it doesn't work for
subsequent uses because once the first use is generic, you can just use skinny labeling and get
around it.
So basically all the generics you need to do is get approval for the drug for the old use,
leave the new use off the label and they're not infringing the patent indirectly.
So the use -- we've actually talked about regulatory exclusivity periods. In other countries
we haven't talked a lot about here, I need to go through this quickly. So the U.S. we've got four
different types of regulatory exclusivity. You've got a three-year period for previously approved
active ingredients. That's actually relevant for new uses. You have five years for new active
ingredients, seven years for orphan indications, and that's actually going on to market exclusivity
as opposed to data exclusivity which can matter.
The orphan exclusivity would also be available for new uses, so a new use that's an orphan
indication, you would get that for seven years’ protection and then 12 years for new biologics.
So much like new use patents, these are actually subject to the same skinny labeling
limitation. All this protection does is says that the generics can't get approval for marketing for
that indication, so if they don't ask for approval to market for the new indication, only for the old
one, there's no problem, right. So that's the situation we're in with sort of the standard monopoly
protection, it's just for the most part not available for new uses.
What I want to point out here is that there's actually good reason for that. That's not like an
unintentional gap in the system. It's an intentional feature, and the reason why is that patents are
supposed to link the private returns to innovation to the social returns. And the way this works is
the patentees charge the customers, the people who are already using their invention, and so for all
the people that are using it, they will pay based on the willingness to pay. So if you develop a drug
and it's a breakthrough medical treatment for a very serious disease that's really common, you're
going to make a ton of money. And if you develop a drug that's a minor improvement over existing
treatments for a pretty uncommon disease, you're not going to make a lot of money because you'll
have a smaller customer base and they won't be willing to pay. And that's the way the system is
supposed to work.
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When you reward firms -- so this would be an example where if you were to come up with
a system where we're rewarding development of new uses for old drugs by sort of giving a
monopoly right over all sales of that drug, by keeping generics off the market for longer, what
you're doing is you're allowing them, the company with the longer monopoly rights, to charge not
just for the new uses of the drug but also for all uses, and that actually breaks the link between the
incentives for creating that new use and the social value you've created. And it does this other thing
which is that we worry that you could actually have the perpetual monopoly protection.
The way you can think about this is, imagine if we have a system where you could sort of
extend your monopoly period over a new drug, a drug you had already developed by three or four
years if you develop a new use for it. What would have happened with Lipitor? Would Pfizer have
ever let Lipitor go off patent? And the answer has got to be no. The board of directors would go
nuts if the executives let that go off patent. You would constantly develop new uses for it. Some
of it might be really important like maybe statins actually work for preventing cancer, that would
be great, but some of it might be -- you know, maybe it reduces toenail fungus or something like
that. If they could get three or four years for that they would, they would have to. And so that
would happen and it would sort of never go off patent.
The other thing is some of those uses would allow them to extract huge amounts of money
because they're not only charging for the toenail fungus, they're also charging for lowering
cholesterol and diabetes and all that stuff.
So what does Europe do to avoid this? What Europe does is this they say, Well, we're going
to have -- we're not just going to give you four years, we're only going to give you two and then
one and you can only do it once or twice so we're going to limit the number of extensions you can
do. That's kind of the solution they have in Europe where in America we don't do any of that. So
imagine instead of it being Lipitor for toenail fungus, imagine what it is it's actually a pretty
uncommon cancer drug for Alzheimer's. Are you really going to put a drug through Alzheimer's
trials which are going to take five, six, seven, ten years, a long time, cost huge amounts of money,
a lot of risk, for only one or two years of protection? Probably not.
So it makes it really hard to design a good incentive system in this set. So indication specific
monopoly rights -- or monopoly protection is the right idea here but they're just hard to enforce,
as we've talked about. So you can have indications of monopoly -- that preserves the link between
the rewards for innovation and social value and you still have access to low cost generics in this
space, for the old uses not the new ones. New use patents are actually sort of the easiest way to
imagine this happening, where you could do regulatory exclusivity periods too. So the trick with
these patents, and this is the way it works in the U.S., so they're directly infringed by the patients
and sometimes the physicians but no one wants to sue them. Also you don't really know. They're
indirectly infringed by the insurers and the pharmacists if they know about the new use patent and
they know the physicians are prescribing the drug for the patent indication, which by the way you
might think is a lot but actually increasingly that's the case with E-prescribing and prior
authorization where those things are being disclosed.
The problem is that that infringement doesn't mean anything unless the drug company
knows it's happening. The drug company needs to know that that sort of prescription there is
infringement. If they can't detect the infringement, they can't enforce the right. So that's sort of the
state of law in this place. And we have to build that and so what happens is we talk, Well, we could
have these indication-specific monopoly rights but they're impossible to enforce so let's ignore it.
We definitely don't want to do that, and one thing I want to do is step back at this point and
say, you know, once you see it like this you actually realize what's going on here. The problem
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with new use is underneath all of this, use is subscribed once or a million times, right? You need
to know that. And, you know, just build it into the patent system.
So if we can't observe the utilization rates, it's just very hard to come up with any kind of
effective system in place, our patent system currently won't work, it would be hard to do a priority
system rightfully. None of it really works.
If we solve this problem, our existing patent -- at least in the U.S., existing patent laws will
kick in and provide actually a highly imperfect source of problems, with Robin pointed some out
and there's quite a lot. But it was just something in this space, but you could also imagine us doing
something different. Or you could also imagine us coming up with a better system. But we kind of
need to get at these information problems first.
The other thing worth pointing out here is that once you realize that underneath this there's
an information problem, you realize that it's much broader than just new uses for old drugs.
Because it's not just old drugs that have multiple uses, it's new drugs that have multiple uses. Lots
of drugs have multiple indications and those multiple indications are essentially different products.
They're developed through different R&D investments. They require different clinical trials.
They're delivered to a different set of patients and they deliver a different value.
And that last point actually is important because when they deliver a different value, they
should probably have different prices. Value-based pricing sometimes also requires indicationspecific pricing. We don't have indication-specific pricing, and the reason why is that the drug
companies don't know when a drug is being prescribed for one indication as opposed to another.
So if they were to negotiate with an insurer, Well, we'll bill a lot of money for this use but not so
much for that other one, the insurance company would be like, Great, that's fine. What percentage
of use were the low value uses? Well, all of them.
Like there's no way they could check so you're not going to get differential pricing because
the drug companies just don't know, which is the same problem we have with new use patent
enforcement.
And this is actually where it gets interesting. So once you realize that there's actually this
kind of information problem underneath it, and it's a much broader problem than new use and it
actually applies to patented drugs too, you say, Well, how does this play out in the market? In the
U.S. at least, and I think this is also true but maybe operating in different ways in the EU and
Europe -- or in the EU and in Japan, insurers, instead of negotiating lower prices for lower value
indications, which they just can't do because the drug companies won't negotiate a lower price
because they couldn't tell the difference between when it was expensive and not so it wouldn't
work.
What they do is they impose access restrictions. They say, we will not cover the drug for
this lower value indication, we're only going to cover it for these others, for the ones that are the
most valuable or something like that. And that's actually -- in a sense that's bad for everyone. It's
bad for the drug companies because they're losing a sale. It's bad for patients because they're not
getting access -- if you want to use that for rheumatoid arthritis, you just can't. Insurance companies
won't cover it even if it works for that. And actually it's not good for insurers either, at least if they
can charge this, because they're reducing the value of their plan. They have less coverage. The
more restrictions on access and insurers don't like that.
This is sort of going through. So what insurers do is they use something called prior
authorization where they sort of demand access -- they demand doctors to tell them, you know,
what is the indication behind this prescription, and if it's not covered, they won't grant access to it.
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So as soon as we realize what's going on with prior authorization, also we realize that the
underlying problem here, like we can't separate out the markets between an old use and a new use
and multiple different uses. We realize that's a solvable problem and we know it's solvable because
insurance companies here have already mostly solved it. Not entirely, but we can't really separate
out the market between like a drug for mild back pain and moderate back pain, there's no way we
can ever do that. But, you know, HIV and cancer, you know, brain cancer versus melanoma,
Alzheimer's, like there's lots of markets we can separate and insurance companies are already doing
it.
So how do they do it? Well, they only provide coverage for certain indications. They use
prior authorization which they sort of say doctors have to report what the indication is. And they
have access to the patient's health records. So if the doctor lies, they can tell, at least if it's visible
on the health records, which it's like not always but a lot of times you can tell.
Interestingly, the PBMs say -- PBM, if you're not familiar, those are the -- in the U.S. they
are the insurance companies for drugs. So we have Blue Cross Blue Shield or something else for
most of your health stuff, but drug insurances run through these pharmacy benefit managers. They
report that they have great success at preventing payments for drugs not provided for medically
accepted indications by using prior authorization, when it's permitted.
So apparently it works, not always, but a lot, which means that third parties can in fact
observe indications so we can have a system in place where we know the difference between
Indication A and B and C and for that we have different prices, essentially by the way including
when some of them are off patent.
I really need to go fast because I know I've gone over time and you guys are being super
nice by not flashing the time.
So what would you do to do this? So one way would be indication reporting. This is not all
that hard. Like E-prescribing enables -- so that's when you're just dispensing the prescription drug
with no pharmacist through computer records. Those can have and frequently do have indication
reporting features in them. And actually there is a study where they have mandatory indication
reporting through E-prescribing in Quebec. And like apparently it worked really well so that's
interesting.
E-prior authorization is another thing which is currently being developed and it looks like
it's just through state laws and will be mandatory in a lot of these places. Again, it makes it really
easy for not only management but for physicians to report indications when they're prescribing
something. So, you know, once that information is down, that's really what we need so you sort of
make that mandatory.
And I can think of two different ways of doing that: One, you could use the CMS
regulations. Another one that I actually find a little bit more clever is you can actually imagine an
FDA rule that says when a pharmacist dispenses a drug they need to have the appropriate labeling
for the indication on the label that's given to the patient. And that would actually -- all of a sudden
like if you had that rule in play, that would also enforce a whole bunch of things to happen. So
Step 1.
Step 2 is the disclosure of that information to the PBM, because the PBMs already have
this information, so it basically is giving pharmaceutical companies access to the reported
indications and then also the -- and this is tricky, the health records. They would need to be able
to see that. Because if you can't observe, if you don't have the health records, you don't necessarily
know if they're lying or not. That raises privacy concerns obviously which I could talk about.

427

428

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol 12:3

So the main thing you would do to deal with that is you would identify the records as
available to the drug companies. So not so much with the health records but at least with indication
reporting, this is less crazy than it sounds. With sort of the FDA -- the REMs rule, so when there's
sort of a safety problem with a particular drug, it's actually not all that different from what we do
now where the drug company needs to know to make sure that the patients who are being given
the drug actually should fall within the category.
So we've had to do some stuff like this already. Like if you want to deal with privacy
concerns, you can imagine expanding HIPAA or something like that. One thing worth noting here
is this obviously doesn't work across the board. It does not work if you're trying to distinguish
between moderate and mild back pain because like how on earth would you know whether a patient
had one or the other? But it's definitely feasible in a bunch of places, including when the
prescribing physician for one of the indications that you care about is a specialty doc, so that will
right away tell you what the indication is.
Also particularly more serious conditions, you have concomitant or follow-up treatment
that go along with it that will tell you right away like, this is prescribed for HIV, or, this is
prescribed for cancer. You can tell the difference there.
And the other thing is that increasingly there's diagnostics being used along with
prescribing and that's going to happen more and more. If there's a diagnostic in the health records,
you can use that to tell. Right? So the idea is you could, from the health records, know what the
indication is -- and insurers are already doing this, so this all seems feasible.
So then I'm going to end on this -- well, I have a thank you slide -- but before this, so what
I've done here is I've said that if we can solve this underlying information problem that we should
know when doctors are prescribing a drug for one of the patients as opposed to another, and that
information can be made available to either the insurer or the payer, whether that's the state or
private insurer and the drug company, you could separate out the market for these things. You
could enforce new use patents. You could actually enforce regulatory exclusivity periods. You
could do all that stuff. But without that knowledge it's very hard to do that.
But I haven't said the right way to do it. And there's a lot of questions here for how you
would design this system. So one of them would be, you know, what should we use? Should we
use patents? Should we use data exclusivity? Market exclusivity? Prizes? And I could talk a lot
about this stuff because I read a lot about it. How long should the protection last? It's a little weird
so we've got three years built in with data exclusivity in the U.S. for new uses. The patent term is
20 years. It's like there's a huge range and I don't know what the right answer is but this is weird
just how big the range is.
What new uses should be eligible for protection? So this is actually what Robin was talking
about a little bit earlier. You know, patents only protect new ideas. Regulatory exclusivity periods
protect anything that wasn't previously approved by the regulatory agency. That's very different.
So with patents there's going to be a lot of stuff that's normal and protectable. You also might have
stuff that, like, shouldn't be protectable but technically qualifies as a new idea, whereas with
regulatory exclusivity periods, that's actually like -- usually that's sort of what we care about
because you argue you put it through the FDA, but you can imagine the use of that system in this
context too. So it's an interesting question.
And then when should the protection be rewarded? Do we do it early with patents at time
of discovery, or do we do it late with like FDA approval where either the regulatory exclusivity
periods or it happens when you finish clinical trials?
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Oh, and also, who should the rights be enforced against? So you can imagine, and this is
actually -- so the second to last panel from before -- not the one before but the one before that, they
were kind of talking about a system where you're enforcing patents over new uses against generics,
which is an interesting way, but you can also imagine doing it against payers which is sort of more
directly and I can talk that about that if people have questions.
Thank you.
MR. ZIELINSKI: Can you leave that last slide up?
PROFESSOR ROIN: Yes, sorry. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR. ZIELINSKI: So what I'm going to do is I'm going to build on what he just said by
giving a bit of the industry perspective so my main point is: Do we even really have a problem?
There are many examples where second uses have been developed. A good example is finasteride,
I think that was mentioned in one of the earlier presentations, one of the initial presentations. In
that case, Merck, after they developed finasteride under the trademark Proscar for BPH, they
discovered it could be used to treat hair loss so they filed a use patent. And they were able to do
that and to stem cross label use.
Now, how were they able to do that? They came up with a different dosage so they went
from five Megs to one Meg, and they also developed a new trademark, Propecia. But it's really the
change in the dosage so that when the BPH indication went off patent, they had about some number
of years left on the use patent for hair loss and it did not get significant cross label use so they were
successful.
Another example is Viagra. Now, Viagra itself, as I think most people are well aware of,
is itself a sort of second use. The drug originally went into clinical trials for cardiovascular
indication and in the course of those trials it was discovered the patients weren't given the drug
back and we had to ask them why. Oh, really? No, that's actually how it played out.
[Laughter.]
MR. ZIELINSKI: So we filed a use patent for ED and that became the primary use. Now,
in the course of developing a drug for that, and really after it was approved, we also did a clinical
trial for pulmonary arterial hypertension and the Phase 2 trial for that showed that the drug was
efficacious for that, but the business did not want to develop it for that indication and the reason is
because we couldn't get a patent. And so that indication, the pulmonary arterial hypertension
indication would go generic in 2012 and that could undermine the ED indication which is -- which
was projected to go off patent in 2018.
So that was a very significant worry, they wanted to kill that. But there was significant
physician pressure to develop for that indication because it was so efficacious and so it became
almost ethical to do it. And we did it and we developed a drug, but again, it was with a different
dosage. So the dosage form, the oral tablet for pulmonary arterial hypertension was 20 Megs and
the lowest dose for Viagra is 25. They're somewhat similar, but even when the hypertension
indication went generic, we haven't seen significant cross label use that would undermine our sales
for ED. So there was a success.
But these are exceptions. The norm is really Zoloft. Zoloft was an antidepressant. It was
part of the SSRI class. Many drugs work by that mechanism but physicians actually have
demonstrated that you get slightly different responses with the different drugs and we got a great
number of indications for Zoloft. But we pursued virtually all of them during the exclusivity period
for the product, and toward the end of the exclusivity period, we simply stopped. We might have

429

430

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS

[Vol 12:3

pursued a trial for Alzheimer's education but we just didn't do it because the worry was that we
would never get a return for that investment. So that's a shame and that's the norm.
And in fact, we do have a case for OCD, obsessive compulsive disorder where eventually
there was generic competition for the depression indication that was the first indication that's in
the original patent. When that patent expired, the generic competitor introduced a drug with the
skinny label directed to depression but they didn't include all the other indications including OCD.
We see it on the OCD patent, obsessive compulsive disorder patent, we've demonstrated that the
generic product was getting prescribed at the rate of 10 to 20 percent for that indication. We also
even demonstrated the generic was aware of this and receiving a benefit of it, but it wasn't sufficient
under inducement law at that time, and in present law too. And that's the way it is. You know,
you're just not going to get a return for it.
So the solution ultimately doesn't really rest in the current patent law. It has to be -- maybe
current patent law has a role in part of the solution but it's got to be something like this that's tied
to how the drug is prescribed for the new use. That ultimately is the likely solution in my opinion.
It can be a combination of regulatory exclusivity plus a prescribing change or it can be something
tied to the patent too to determine the length of this period of exclusivity where you have the brand
where it is somehow mandated that the brand drug be prescribed for the new use. But it's going to
have to go beyond the patent law in my view.
And is that viable? Bob Stoll spoke earlier that legislation that is seen as benefitting the
pharmaceutical industry is very hard to push forward, but I don't think it's impossible. He did
mention that -- you know, he spoke briefly about patent reform and he said the pharmaceutical
industry is pursuing this Hatch-Waxman -- pursuing an IPR carveout for all pharma products,
biologics and small molecules, and he noted that it's just not going to happen. It's politically dead.
Well, he's probably right. But I think part of the reason for that is it's seen as just purely a
benefit to the pharmaceutical industry. It doesn't tell a positive story. If you do have legislation
like this where you can demonstrate that new uses, important new uses that wouldn't otherwise be
developed would get developed, I think that you end up having a much better story even if the
legislation scores.
And that's an important factor. For any new legislation in the United States, it goes through
the Congressional Budget Office and they assess whether there will be a cost to the American
consumers and that's called the scoring process, and legislation that scores is really essentially
legislation that represents a cost. And often, if you introduce legislation to the scores; that is, it
presents a cost for consumers, you have to have a pay for. And that's what they're looking for the
IPR carveout, a pay for, some other legislation could compensate that.
I'm not sure that we would need a pay for this type of legislation, but one thing is clear,
that we would have to tell a compelling story, and even then I don't think the legislation would
move quickly but I do think there's a fighting chance and it's got to be something in the nature of
this.
[Applause.]
SIR JACOB: Well, you got an insult to France earlier on. I'm not sure I go along with that
but anyway you haven't got to answer the insult. Thank you very much.
MR. TOUMI: I do not have a chart to start nor a table of content. I commit not to oppose
to any agreement and I will try to tell you a story.
Drug repositioning is something very common and it's not something new. If you look in
the field of CNS, we identify in the recent research which is about to be published 109 CNS
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repositioning drugs for 183 indications, and out of them 90 are under development. So this is
something quite common. There is even some algorithm for classification about drug repurposing.
The other part is that health authority have endorsed and analyzed the value of second use.
And in France, for example, you have drugs that have been -- that have received marketing
authorization like for use in additional indication outside of the original indication of the product.
Some of those products are off label and some are in label. So this is something well on the edge;
however, there is a lot of resistance and this incentive to use these types of product or to develop
these types of products.
We have two situations. Some of the product may be on patent and if you double up an
extension of indication for such product, you will have to go through a new price assessment. It
can trigger an SGS assessment, price reevaluation, and you will have fast erosion of your market
share and manufacturer may not get return on investment. If you look at off-patent product, you
have issues about the data protection and patentability which have been discussed, and even if you
have a new indication, generic product may be used instead.
The substitution is in that case a critical issue and, again, manufacturer may not get return
on investment. You have here a number of pricing regulation that may apply for this type of
product and will all lead to price erosion in the different categories, I took the big five in Europe
here, and if you come within your education for an old product, a natural product, a second use
position, you trigger an HTA reassessment. You trigger price revision and usually because the
price will increase you get the low price.
You will be requested to have a risk management plan. You will be requested in a number
of cases to develop a pediatric plan. You may not get the new active status. And the price
negotiation is often driven by the value of the historical product, even if thought it should be a
value-based pricing process where the price would be driven by the value of the product.
Take here an example, Siklos. So they used to be a . . . company, an old product using
oncology that has shown to be effective in sickle-cell syndromes and widely used in Europe for 15
years, but is totally not written for pediatric patients. The company has got an orphan designation
and develop specific population for pediatric education and got an approval. However, in France
the authorities compare the product to Israel and consider that they were negligible benefit over
this product and end up pricing this product on the basis of the original old product. And the
company got the price of 67 Euro for 1,000-milligram when the average paying price was about
10 years more. And this led to litigation procedure for about 10 years for the company to end up
with 67 Euro at the end of the day.
So therefore companies are abandoning this field and going into the RER where there is no
substitution to see to as much as possible that that product is not replaced by another product. So
there is a lot of missed opportunities; however, we have a lot of value behind new use of mature
product. These are cost effective products. They prevent the escalation of the therapy cost. They
are to say faster, cheaper and less risky development. We get product with the safety that is well
known. There is an important element as the decrease of labor use because often those products
are used off label and this increased access.
I'll show you a few examples. If you get an old product and then a new one coming in or
new invented product, you will have everybody switching from the other. If you have an interim
step with products that are less expensive, you will have less patients switching to the third line
therapy which is very expensive. So you have an opportunity to reduce the price of the product.
And one of the big issues is off label use. Off label use is -- is a good opportunity because
you get an option to have a drug for a patient who had no treatment option. In -- relative in many
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cases we have no evidence that it works, no evidence that it's safe. It's often inefficient use of
resources. It creates opportunity, because some patients will have access to highly specialized
center that will use off-label drugs while others will not have access to the center. And this is an
issue that is currently growing. You have here a list of well-known products which are widely used
off label. If you look here at the systemic product use for treating atopic dermatitis, the red ones
are the ones that are used off label and you see there is much more red than black, and if you look
at the U.S. guideline you see that the red one in the guidelines, recommended by the guideline, are
all off-label product and this is not a very safe product. This product do carry some safety issues
and should be very careful when using them.
If you look at the lupus, you can see here the same in red the product that are being used
off label and in green the product being used in label. And if you look at the price of those products
being used off label, perhaps limited, and you expect a new price of the new product and
development to be more than 30,000 Euro per patient. So here off label use in chronic cough,
everything in red is off label -- is off label, yes.
So we do have a possible solution. We have been able to create regulation for orphan
designation. For product that develop new indication within the first eight years we have the
opportunity for one-year market protection, but the pediatric development plan leads to additional
protection. New active systems may be granted sometime without any grants and price differential
has shown to be possible in a number of countries.
So here the example of Tecfidera, we do not have any ground to resell the new active
substance status and because the Commission anticipated that the company may not launch the
product if they don't get the status, they have granted the status on the basis of no grant. So things
are possible.
You can see here the same product, Everolimus, with three brand names and different
prices showing that difference in pricing is possible. It is possible even under the same brand. In
Italy, for example, you can have specific agreement to obtain different price for the same brand.
This is also possible in France and some other countries where the same brand has different prices
through different regulation mechanism. This is something exceptional.
So incentives are needed. That would be different based if you have a product in the early
stage of development, the first eight years. If it is in the following years after the first eight years
or if it is a product where substitution is possible or a product where substitution is not possible,
there is a clear gap here and we have to think from a public health perspective how to securely we
can fill in that gap.
So second use of well-established product is real important for society and you have to
think how we can capture this opportunity. It may be through different processes, from regulatory
processes through incentive processes including for nonprofit organization. Thank you.
[Applause.]
MR. TELLEKSON: Good afternoon. I have absolutely nothing new to say but I'll say it
for about five minutes.
SIR JACOB: It hasn't been said by you yet.
MR. TELLEKSON: Firstly, everything I'm going to say is because it's in my individual
style, my personal views and may not be those of GSK. Secondly, unusually, I'm going to agree
with both Pfizer and TEVA which will probably get me fired. It's the end of two days and it's been
fascinating so let's have a little bit of audience participation. How many of you are not lawyers or
IP lawyers or IP students? How many of you are not lawyers? Which shows why we have been
talking only about patent law, essentially about patent law. And this morning we had really
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fascinating stuff about patentability Swiss forms, construction, packaging, remedies for interim
injunctions, filing injunctions and damages. Enforcement, Article 50, whatever it is of the EPC,
fascinating stuff, but it doesn't really work, does it? It's all a bit blah blah blah when it comes to
this issue. And it's a mess and it's a very expensive mess. For those of you who have followed the
Warner-Lambert decision, a case that leads to 724 paragraphs -- 728 was it? I can't remember. That
reached on just cannot be cheap to run. It serves nobody any use whatsoever except external
lawyers, and I was one of them. And then I saw the dark side and went to the pharmaceutical
sector.
What's worse than it being a mess, as Brian mentioned, the imperfections of patent law are
actually driving research or driving research not to be done. That is not a sensible position
irrespective of the ethics of it.
The second piece of audience participation, I'm going to put forward six or seven
propositions and anybody who disagrees with them can put their hand up, okay? The first
proposition involves a problem I think that we've seen. We've heard a lot of talk about patents and
very little talk about the patient. This is all about improving patient health, Proposition No. 1.
Anybody disagree? And the patents system should be about ultimately benefitting
patients.
Second proposition: Repurposing or whatever we want to call it is important for patients
and is going to become increasingly important over the next few years. Anybody disagree? That's
great.
Thirdly, in the same system needed to develop new products and also incentives are needed
to invent -- to -- incentives are needed to develop new uses for old products. Anybody disagree?
I would suggest and I'm not convinced to disagreement, that exclusivity is one of those
incentives and pricing is another one of them. Neither is a solution to itself. Patents just aren't
enough.
Fourthly, generics must be allowed to supply for the off-patent use. Anybody disagree? I
might do just for the hell of it for some time. This is too easy.
Fifth, the innovator should supply for the on-patent use. Any of you disagree? And that's
really where the tension comes in patent law, how do you balance those fourth and fifth
propositions?
And the sixth proposition, and I don't begin to have an answer for this but it's the one Robin
has raised every time. There are going to be lots of cases where we may be able to develop new
uses but we will not get valid patents. I don't begin to have an answer for that issue, but does
anybody disagree with that? Great.
So the solution, to use Jurgen's phrase was to -- I think you used "partition" or "segregate"
the market. Can I suggest you don't use either of those when there's a competition order out?
"Segmentation," I still suggest you don't use that word when there's a competition floating around,
but that's what we have to try to achieve. And how do we do this? I don't think we're going to do
it with patent law. I don't think we're going to do it by litigating against generics. For once, this is
an area where I think the innovators and generics have absolutely common interests.
It really is one of those situations where we have a win-win-win. It's win for innovators,
it's win for generics potentially, it's win for innovators. It's win for generics, win for payers, and
most importantly, win for patients. But it's not going to be something for lawyers to achieve in
court. It's far too important to leave it to lawyers.
It's not going to be about the technicalities of patent law because if you just look at Richard
Arnold's judgment, which is beautiful in its writing and wrong. You can just see how difficult it
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is. It was easy in Holland, with great respect, you can do a short judgment because you have 97
percent of the market but it's the wrong patent, but the 50/50 case is the difficult one. But it's not
for Richard Arnold, it just failed for the innovator.
We've got to incentivize these new uses which benefit patients but I don't think we're going
to do it by patent law alone. The answer is going to be even more difficult than patent law because
it's going to involve politicians. Politicians are going to have to take action and it's probably going
to involve something along the lines that Ben talked about, information available on prescribing
and dispensing rules as to that. It's probably going to involve the sort of thing Adam talked about
in premium pricing for the new indication. But because it's going to involve those two, it can't
involve the European Union because this is not in the competence of the European Union. And I
use the word "competence" in both sense, one, their power, and two, their ability.
It's going to require political will for legislators, either in legislation or in regulation, to
spend public money for the benefit of the patients, and certainly in Europe getting public money
spent when we're broke is very, very difficult.
I said at the outset Lord save us from the lawyers. I'll just finish by saying Lord save us
from the politicians. And now the last piece of audience participation, polite applause, please.
[Applause.]
DR. GONEN: May I?
SIR JACOB: Yes. Big pharma and now we have generic.
DR. GONEN: Thank you very much. I'm not sure if I should be happy or not to be last.
SIR JACOB: We save the best for last.
DR. GONEN: First I would like to thank Jurgen again and I would like to thank Sir Robin
Jacob for bringing me to them to co-organize with them this conference which was a great honor,
extremely interesting and good fun. Jurgen grew a beard during the process. Sir Robin Jacob
became a great athlete. You know, when I first met him I expected a helicopter and then we got a
man on bike with a rain suit all wet, running and explaining that that's how he's saving time. He's
doing his sport and bicycle and he's thinking at the same time, so it was good fun. Thank you very
much.
So I thought long and hard what should I do in order to basically be last and still be
interesting to you? And I attempted to do a recap of this conference and repurposing of drugs and
try to centralize all the information in one place. How do I do this? Okay.
So introduction. When we talk about new users of established molecules, we're talking
about incentives, and this was the talk in this conference so we talked about patents, regulatory
exclusivities, prices; however, it is very important to remember the other side of the coin and the
other side is access and access is as important as incentive and it is complementary to the incentive.
And we are talking about access to pipeline, data and data mining, regulatory early access tools,
funding, patent tools and potential timing considerations.
So I think Professor Toumi had by coincidence the exact same quotation that I have. I think
we all support innovation for new uses of established molecules. The most fruitful basis for the
discovery of a new drug is to start technology advances, the new transparency rules, early access
programs.
Speaking on behalf of a generic company, TEVA, and this is in green not by coincidence,
generic companies depend on innovation and generic companies fully support innovation. That's
the pipeline at the end of the day that the generic companies are built on.
So incentives are required to support investment in finding new uses. The incentives should
be in line with the size of innovation. I think also we all seem to agree on this. It should be balanced.
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It should be balanced; on the one hand you want to incentivize, we really want these discoveries
for society. Balance needs to exist with the benefit of generic entry to payers and to patients. And
again, we have the other side of the access which needs to be -- needs to be kept in mind.
So repurposing is all over the media. We are not -- you know, we're not the only one who
are talking the talk. It's in The Financial Times, The Guardian, Wall Street Journal, The Economist,
all over the place. Everyone seems to be in agreement.
So going to the incentive sides, we're talking about patents, regulatory exclusivities and
pricing, and here it is very important for me to say, and again, generic companies, TEVA, we do
not oppose innovations. We do not oppose innovations on the specialty side of course but also on
the generic side. We do not oppose incentives. Incentives are important. What we do oppose is
unjustified abuse of the incentives to the TEVA competition, and this is something completely
different. This is something which is very refined, but incentives overall are good for the industry
and generic companies, and I'm wearing the generic hat for this statement, generic companies like
incentives and agree with them.
So the first incentives: Patents. I think I agree with my panel friends here that we're not
really discussing problem with the patent system as such. We are discussing issue with prescribing
habits. We are discussing -- we are discussing problem with data. Data and prescribing habits. And
the solution I think many of you mentioned, prescription by indication, and the thing is that in
today's technology, this shouldn't be a problem. We have eHealth technology. We don't need to
disclose to the other people in the pharmacy what was the indication. We don't need a conversation.
It can be up an app with the iPhone, it can be somewhere in the software. Doctors should find it
very easy to know what indication is patented or not.
And I think today we can actually make it happen, and there is an example for this. So the
pilot is in Denmark. In Denmark that's the rules. We have substitution which is defined by patented
indications. So when the indication is patented, basically the pharmacist who is the guard needs to
dispense the brand drug. And it doesn't matter what the doctor wrote. If the doctor wrote the INN
or the name of the brand, it doesn't matter. The pharmacist at his counter must dispense the brand
drug. When the indication is not patented, then the pharmacy -- the pharmacist need to dispense
according to the substitution rules in the country. So the cheapest, they want to tender, whatever
the rules are, but there is a difference in prescribing and the problem was solved in Denmark,
which is nice because it is a proof of concept so this works somewhere.
The second incentive is a regulatory exclusivity. The advantage in regulatory exclusivity
is that can be in line with the scope of innovation. . And we heard within the U.S. it's five years
for new molecule, three years for formulation. In Europe basically there has been almost nothing
in terms of regulatory exclusivity. Jurgen challenged this, Stefano just yesterday. I think there is
no reason why we shouldn't have it in Europe.
Again, when we talk about innovations maybe here an idea. As with orphan drugs we may
need to show significant benefit or unmet need. So there seeds to be certification for the regulatory
exclusivity. And just to say, regulatory exclusivity doesn't mean the information remains
confidential, not at all. It just means that the generic company cannot use the results of the clinical
trials in their filing and therefore their filing would be deficient by the end of exclusivity. Still, the
clinical trials can be published or not, it doesn't relate at all to the existence of the exclusivity. Last
incentive is the price, so even if we have a patent, and we have prescription by indication and we
have regulatory exclusivity, at the end, if the payer is not convinced to pay the premium price for
the indication then nothing is going to work. And I think this was the conclusion that if the industry
agrees with the importance of the innovation for new users in established molecules, then this
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should be the next talk. It should be a talk between the industry and the payers about paying
premium for value. Adam mentioned that the current health technology assessments are only for
new molecules, for example, in Germany. This is somebody that can be changed. Why won't we
have health technology assessment for new indication? Why wouldn't we advocate for payment
for value? So this is I think the next step on the way to having the incentive package complete.
Moving to access, which is again facilitator, the other side of the coin, and I think maybe
it was a little less discussed in this conference and therefore I'm repeatedly emphasizing the
importance. So we're talking first about access to pipeline. Here the example that I found, we're
talking about collaboration between the industry academic institution with the government. The
example that I found and wanted to present is the collaboration between AstraZeneca and the MRC
in the UK, where AstraZeneca contributed research facility in Cambridge, they contributed
pipeline, screening methods, and then the academy scientists have free access. There is an
agreement about who will own the IP from certain innovation, Astra has first rights to market the
product. It's an agreement which makes commercial sense. More companies then joined this
corporation so Astra wasn't left alone. So this, for example, gives access to pipeline. This also
promotes innovation. This is the other side of the incentives.
Second, for the access is data and data mining so we all -- we all are familiar in Europe,
we have many initiatives of the European Medicines Agency in relation to transparency of clinical
trials. Some clinical trials need to be disclosed with certain limitations. I actually want to be nice
now to David Rosenberg, my panel friend, and say that we're not talking only about transparency
rules by the EMA and data mining. There are other ways. For example, I think GSK was the first
company that actually disclosed clinical trials as a reply to request for academic researchers. So I
think the approach was that the company said, Researchers, you want to do research, come to me.
You know, we will agree on terms. Whatever makes sense, at the end of the day you'll get what
you need you, we'll do the research. So GSK was first to disclose its clinical trials in this scene
which was privately agreed on but was very successful and then other companies followed.
Last, on data mining, I don't think we can have a slide on that data mining without
mentioning the company 23andMe which is located in California. And this company specialized
in genetic tests for private people and through this they collected an amazing bulk of data which,
under confidentiality and agreement from patients, is raising now a lot of interest from the
academy, from many institutions. Many are approaching them and want to use part of the data or
some of it and now they started doing drug developments themselves.
And also TEVA, by the way, made recently a deal with IBM to set up a cloud for potential
data collection on the basis of what's innovative technology and the thinking is that for a narrow
degenerative disease, which is our franchise, we would collect data and, you know, who knows.
This can lead to good things. So it's hard to define in advance but it's nice to have the platform to
at least have the approach to collecting the data.
Then on access regulatory early access tools. So the European Medicines Agency in Europe
is very much encouraging research in new uses and repurposing, and these access tools are actually
the most appropriate for this kind of drugs because we're talking about safe drugs and therefore it's
easier to accelerate the regulatory procedure. So we are talking here about some schemes which
are creating a balance between timely patient access and sufficient data on benefits and risks.
I included all possible schemes here, present and future. I want to actually focus on this
one. So this is a future one which is going to go to pilot next year and this initiative is basically all
about talking at very early stage with our stakeholders. So instead of the company asking for
scientific advice in a unilateral session, the AMA will talk with the developer about a development
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plan, what exactly will be needed, which drugs can be done after the product is launched, payers
would be part of the conversation, have technology assessment. It will be done right from the start
so that the incentive would be kind of guaranteed from the start and the research will be very much
encouraged.
For example, recently in Europe, there was a clinical trial in a drug which is called
Lisinopril. It is used for MS and the clinical trials it was done as an open trial. Patients were at
their homes reporting high end up and the result, so this kind of trials are more nuanced, more
open, easy, less of an investment is required than the AMA is granted and there is a very diligent
follow-up after the launch. But again for safe drugs, this may be the right access tool.
Just briefly to mention funding and the IMI initiative which is a corporation between the
government and the industry in Europe, mostly a funding for malaria antibiotics, basically research
areas which nobody wants to fund so they stepped into the niche and offered funding, which is
also very important to -- for access.
And then patent pools. Also, this has a very specific context so this tool may fit for some
situations and not fit for others. This specific patent pool is for HIV drug development for
developing markets, and so basically the drug companies created a tool whereby they offered
licenses for their patents to generic companies that can manufacture cheaply high quality
medicines for developing countries and they get in return license fees.
So again, another platform to encourage development. It may not work in Western markets
and the generic margin may not be so tempting to originate or grant license on but it worked for
this purpose. It worked to advance HIV medicines for development markets -- developing markets.
And then here is my last slide, almost -- one before last where I try to preempt or pose
questions so that I won't be surprised so I thought, what is left? So these are open questions. Timing
consideration for third party developers. So say an originator drug invented a molecule, who
should then invent a new use? Is it only the original company? Yesterday we heard about third
party who developed a drug for Alzheimer's who was invented by another company. Should we
encourage it? You know, I don't know that I have a view. I don't know that TEVA has a view, but
I think that these are questions which need to be addressed.
What makes more sense? Our collaboration makes more sense when we talk about
development of new users for established molecules because the research is slightly different than
the basic research, and maybe we can grow markets and have win-win here, or maybe not. And
again, some products can fit for some markets and some products and it may not be a right fit for
others.
So just to conclude, we see that many, many initiatives, and in fact almost all initiatives in
the health care sector today are relating in one way or another for research, for new uses in
established molecules. So all the initiatives that I mentioned in Europe, tens of them are all
concerning this subject matter, and if we succeed to solve it, then everyone is a winner. We're
talking about the industry as a winner, the industry will have a more robust pipeline which is great
for originator, great for generics. The patients of course, they will have more cure, proven benefits
of drug. They will have timely access. Clinicians, they will not have to use off-label drugs,
innovate, cutting pills, they will have safe drugs to use.
And then the health system, the payers, the general health systems, patients will stay
healthier and will contribute better to society. So it's a win-win to everyone and I think let's get it
done.
[Applause.]
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SIR JACOB: Well, now, I did not know that Professor Toumi was going to produce a
paper of that magnitude, that amount of research, that formidable heavyweight contribution for
this debate. And I don't know, has it been published? Or is it -- was it still in the course of
publication or what?
PROFESSOR TOUMI: I understand that it will be published. All that was presented here
will be published.
SIR JACOB: But the basic work, is it in separate papers already?
PROFESSOR TOUMI: Many are already published.
SIR JACOB: I don't know that they have got sufficiently wide circulation.
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: Is it in English?
PROFESSOR TOUMI: In English, yes, yes. Frenglish.
[Laughter.]
SIR JACOB: Frenglish, I've never heard of that. Frangli I can speak.
Because that is the case. We talked about in general that's the case. And I'll ask the panel
generally, are we all agreed the patent system is not enough? Then the next question is, how are
we going to do something about it? How are we going to get the politicians and the civil servants
to realize this matters and that they can get more money, more value for their money by going
down a route of providing the solution to this problem. Any ideas?
PROFESSOR ROIN: So I would say I think there's two things going on. So one of them
is building an infrastructure where indications are imported, which you would want to sustain
either using patents or regulatory specific periods or, you know, anything.
SIR JACOB: Yes. And we want that for another reason, don't we? Because if you record
the indications, when you go data mining, you might find all sorts of things you didn't know.
PROFESSOR ROIN: Yes, it's good for health records, it's actually good for separate
pricing for on-patent drug indications which actually turns out to be a thing that national health
insurance companies and private health insurance companies really like because they -- and what
they don't like is putting access restrictions on, they prefer to just have a lower price and they also
think -- they actually think -- this may be right -- that they would save money if there was
differential pricing by indication for off patent drugs, so I actually think that you have support for
potentially.
Doctors seem to be the most resistant to that just because they don't like entering stuff that's
tied to them, but I think they're going to lose that fight. And then so once you have a system, it's
like, okay, we could separate the market for these things which is, Well, how do we want to do it?
And I do think in the U.S. there's a slow moving but growing consensus that the patent system is
not the optimal way of determining which drugs get protected and how much protection there
should be.
I'm not a big supporter of that but it's been depressing to me how slow it's taking for that
to sort of set in and the complexity of building a political consensus around that point, which it
seems like everyone seem to agree with and most people seem to agree with, but like once you
recognize that, you need to pick a number. So how much protection should things get, that is
contentious, and it's very hard to separate out sort of the recognition that the way the patent system
works in this space is deeply problematic and we can do better with regulatory specific periods, so
let's pick a number.
SIR JACOB: How are we going to get the change then? How are we going to get the
politicians -- we tried to get a congressman here but he didn't show. We tried to get the European
commission. They cried off at the last minute. I don't know, maybe there was a good reason.
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PROFESSOR ROIN: MODDERN Cures had just a 100 co-sponsors in the House, about
50 percent Democrat. It was like one or two more Republicans than Democrats. But there were
100 House members that signed up. So there's a push there. And when you think about it with
MODDERN Cures, MODDERN Cures is a really interesting act. You know, 15 years is a long
time.
SIR JACOB: Very long.
PROFESSOR ROIN: So you can imagine what if the number were 12, could you get it
passed? Or, you know, 12 is the average amount of time a drug takes. So if the number -- if we
pick 12 years until generics enter instead of 15, maybe that actually, you know -- and some people
will say, well, it should be eight or seven or 10 or something like that, but 12 is sort of the average
number. So maybe it's that -- maybe instead of getting 100 but it's not getting in the bill maybe
you get 150 and it gets through. But again, what do I know?
SIR JACOB: Do you have any idea how to do something about it?
PROFESSOR TOUMI: I think the real problem is how to overcome the resistance and
the resistance is that the pharmaceutical industry is having a very degredated image in the public,
and there is a strong fear that this is a new trick to earn more money and cost more to the health
services insurance and not necessarily deliver better health for the society and for the country. And
you have to overcome that perception to make sure that you can start and have a constructive
dialog. We say it's good to create health value. Who has an idea on how much value? Who
measures it? Who attempted to measure it? Is it going to create savings? Who will try to measure
that savings?
It's still a concept. And you have to move from concept to hard figures, and you have to,
again, overcome the resistance, which may not be easy to make. And in my opinion it's more at
that level that you can progress to get the finding regulation. Because solutions exist, many are
possible. I've seen that in the past, but we need to create a momentum and a will and the right
routes for the public that this is the right decision.
SIR JACOB: David, have you got any ideas about where we go next?
MR. TELLEKSON: It took us 40 years to do the UPC, it will probably take us the same
to do -- no, I don't. In Europe I think there is -- and I'd love some of the European lawyers here to
disagree with me but I think we have a real problem. There is no EU competence in this area,
so it's going to have to be done in a member state, by a member state, particularly if we're
talking about prescribing, dispensing or pricing. We can just about get a new incentive based on
exclusivity through in competence terms, but that's not actually what we're asking for. At least I
don't think what we're asking for.
So we're talking about 28 member states, or 27 when we leave next year, or when we vote
to leave and then it will take five years to do that. But "I don't know" is the honest answer. Maybe
the best way through is to start by saying we need incentives for certain diseases, just ask for
limited scope of incentive, a limited remedy.
SIR JACOB: Pick some big ones which the public would vote for as it were, Alzheimer's
or Parkinson's or something.
MR. TELLEKSON: You know me, Robin, I'm not entirely an optimist on anything, but I
wouldn't be optimistic about getting anything done because, as you say, this industry has a dreadful
image in Europe. Part of it's self-inflicted and part of it's not.
MR. ZIELINSKI: I think that -- I think one solution is do we actually have concrete data
demonstrating the uses that -- something concrete to demonstrate uses that are not getting
developed that would otherwise get developed if you had legislation like this.
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Another thing is to make it reasonable in scope. You could pick particular therapeutic areas,
that seems to be one mechanism that has had -- in the United States, and that also the period, Ben
mentioned going to 12, maybe that would help. But then beyond that, I think it's advocacy beyond
the pharma and biotech industry.
SIR JACOB: It is advocacy. The way you persuade people of things is never to talk about
generalities, always tell them a story. And you're saying, well, pick some stories.
MR. ZIELINSKI: That's right.
SIR JACOB: Which is indeed of course where we began with Graham Russell who told
us some stories.
MR. TELLEKSON: But I think one of the problems on that is if companies come out,
and you've done it today and that's great, and I think Novartis has done it, when companies come
out and say, we didn't develop a new indication because we wouldn't make money, we are
portrayed as villains. And it's just the way the world works, that we will be castigated if we come
out with a whole series of indications that we didn't develop.
SIR JACOB: And then you say, well, there must be a way of dealing with it. I mean
Professor Toumi's thinking danger of off label use might be quite a good story for part of it.
PROFESSOR ROIN: Yeah, that actually is -- go ahead.
PROFESSOR TOUMI: I think it's a major public health issue and it's not really addressed.
And in oncology about 30 percent of the drugs are used off label. And nobody knows what is the
benefit and nobody knows what is the safety issues associated, but some guess, looks good. We
know that a lot of product we guess they were good and never reach the market so you can imagine
what does it mean? We guess it looks good without trials. Some have trials, but when we do the
same trial in a double-blind randomized and respecting GCP, we don't find the same results. We
know many of those stories.
So I think this is a real public health issue and I do trust that the main angle is public health.
The lost opportunities of not treating, curing, improving patients with drugs that are available and
the risk of misusing drugs to treat patients when we, in the best case, do nothing, and the worst
case, we aggravate their situation.
SIR JACOB: Quite dramatic stuff, isn't it? Out there does anybody have any good ideas?
Marino, you had an idea.
MR. MARINO: I should take my jacket off because I have to speak not as the EMA lawyer
but as the former chair of the Trademark Committee at EFPIA. First of all, let me say I'm very
pleased at the end of the conference, as I realize that for once generics and innovators sit at the
same table and have about the same ideas. This was not the case in 2003/2004, when EFPIA was
developing certain proposals for the Commission who was revising the legislation. And believe it
or not, I was the one proposing to the Commission and the Parliament to introduce a mandatory
brand prescribing where new uses of existing drugs were patented. And that was not only because
at the time I believed in the inner value of pharmaceutical trademarks, but also because I knew that
in the short/medium term not only Big Pharma but also generic manufacturers and in particular
small/medium enterprises would have come and claimed for additional protection of these new
uses.
At the time, after an initial moment of sympathy, the Commission was completely unable
to listen to this proposal because the views of the EGA, European Generics Association and the
views of EFPIA were dramatically divergent. It was impossible to say “a doctor must prescribe by
brand if there is a genuine public health issue”. What is the public health issue? The fact that, as
you know, a drug must be prescribed and administered for the use for which it was authorized and
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it was intended by the doctor. Therefore, if a company obtains a patent for a new use of an existing
drug - with all of the difficulties that we heard this morning - , but then through off-label use the
generic product is administered to the patient, I think we are basically betraying one of the pillars
of the legislation of the directive.
The same unfortunate attempt was made again in 2011, when we were trying to convince
the Commission that it was not good that in Article 14 of the ”cross-border Directive” 2011/24
2011, 24, there was and there is a provision saying that the normal way of prescribing drugs should
be by INN. Fortunately the Commission introduced a “public health exception”, so if there are
public health reasons then the prescriber should use the brand. And again, it was impossible at the
time, only four years ago, to reach an agreement among the innovators and the generic
manufacturers. Even the –pharmacists’ association were shifting in favor of that but then all this
collapsed.
As a result, several Member States introduced in their transposed rules, provisions saying
that the general rule should be prescribing by INN.
So why am I making this long historical digression? Because I was fascinated to hear that,
by Professor Roin I believe, that in the U.S. these ideas have already matured. I think there is a
new political climate today. The Commission, a couple of years ago, enacted the “Better
Regulation” path, basically one of the pillars of that document is that they ordered themselves to
listen more to stakeholders and to enact legislation which is more consistent with the stakeholders’
needs.
Now, if for once generic manufacturers and innovators are on the same line, we have a
number of provisions that, if read together correctly, would be sufficient not to require a dramatic
change in the legislation. If read together: 10.5 of the Directive (the one year of regulatory
protection for new studies); Article 11(3) of the directive saying that the generic cannot have in
the SMPC the patented indication; Art.6(1)and 87(1) of the Directive which say that a drug cannot
be placed on the market and advertised for any other use than the ones authorized or intended, if
you read together all these, all we need is to help the Commission and the Member States
understand, as Professor Toumi was explaining, that this is a public health issue, and that the only
thing that needs to be introduced is a mandatory system of branding, i.e. prescription branding
where there is, I would say, not only a patent on the new or existing uses but when there is
regulatory protection for the new uses. I have admired the efforts that have been made in Germany
and in the Netherlands by the Courts even in terms of construing the EPC in a way that would be
consistent with this additional protection. The judges should be praised for that, but I think the
solution is not a patent-related one.
The solution must be administrative and regulatory-driven. Therefore, the effort should be
to go for mandatory brand prescribing when circumstances are appropriate as we described. If
doctors deviate from this mandatory rule, remember, the prescription is an administrative act, and
if one makes a false statement on an administrative act, there are, according to the various
jurisdictions, either civil or criminal or both, liabilities.
Insurers and payers would be happy because they would not be paying in vain, they would
not be paying too much. And the patients should be happy because maybe they would have new
drugs in the long term. Finally, in connection with electronic prescriptions, there is another
instrument that 10 years ago was deemed unthinkable. This instrument is the currently called
“Article 57 database”, which the EMA is developing and it will be ready next year.
In the Article 57 database, which will be available to all Member States, all medicine or
products registered in Europe will be recorded. It is a very user friendly instrument and will bear
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all the strengths, all the dosages, all the route administrations, brand names, everything. So maybe
10 years ago this was deemed unthinkable. Now we have it and it may helpful in connection with
electronic prescriptions to allow doctors to prescribe by brand name if appropriate.
Put all things together with the enormous power of the think-tank that Sir Robin is driving.
I think the Commission will be happy to hear these proposals, but remember, if generics and
innovators are not on the same side of the table, this will be again another lost attempt.
SIR JACOB: Thank you very much indeed. Not exactly a question but does anybody
disagree with what he said? Because he's been saying the same thing that everybody has been
saying up here. Well, audience?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My idea for getting something like the MODDERN Medicines
Act passed is to tie it to something that would rein in the companies that are engaging in what
appears to be very opportunistic pricing, the companies that will purchase a product line and then
increase the price by some very large percent, and I think that if the two were tied together, some
measure to prevent that from happening, you would have a much better chance of getting
something like the MODDERN initiative passed.
MR. ZIELINSKI: Can I address that one? You know what, this guy Turam [sic]? You
know, he's not the pharmaceutical industry. He's just a rogue. You know, and so we would be
completely supportive of something like that. The other thing that's worth noting, I think my
colleague raised the question of what to do about uses that are experimental in nature that fall
within say our patent, should that be allowed? You know, and the answer to that is we don't sue
people for experimental uses and research uses. You know, within the pharmaceutical industry
we're all working within each other's patents trying to do further innovation.
You know, that's not where the fight is. The fight is when someone's trying to come to
market with an identical version of your product that's within the scope of your patents. It's not
research uses. So I don't think that should be an obstacle either.
PROFESSOR ROIN: I would just say it was sort of strange to me, so when I came at this
I would think of solving policy problems, like, okay, here's a problem and here's a solution to that
problem. And one of the things I've learned is that, at least the way I think about it, it's not the way
a lot of people think about it and it's clearly not the way they think about it in Congress. In there
it's very much a give and take, so you're absolutely right. And we were talking about this a little
earlier. So if you're going to do provision and it looks like this benefits one side, even if it clearly
benefits everybody in some sense, like it's a good idea because you're solving a problem, if it
benefits one side, then you actually kind of need to do something on the other side.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: That's my thinking.
PROFESSOR ROIN: Yeah, so that's what I was saying, so with differential pricing by
indication, that actually -- on the payer side, they actually view that as good for them with
unpatented stuff. So you have differential pricing by indication. So it's a cancer drug, it's expensive
for this indication but cheaper for that one and cheaper for that one. Payers seem to really like that,
but then once you get to so it's generic for certain indications and it's for others, so maybe that's
the compromise there and, you know, then for picking for regulatory facility, yeah, we need to do
something. Like there needs to be something on both sides of the equation.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: The other side of the coin hasn't been given I don't think
sufficient prominence this afternoon and that is the cost of clinical development. There is an
opportunity here to really go for the early access to medicine schemes. They're very well thought
off; they are five schemes that Stefano said that are in operation now. If only the implementation
of those schemes could be accelerated, the cost of clinical development would come vastly down.
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There would be smaller studies, faster done, faster, more quickly performed and more maybe
premature benefit risk assessments done. But that could be monitored because the operations are
in place to monitor post marketing.
And that would itself improve trust in the industry if they don't constantly give these
examples, which I think personally are exorbitant and inflated costs of development.
MR. FEHLNER: I was just thinking that there's another stakeholder here and that's the
doctors. Now, you talk about some concern by the doctors are going to be regulated, they might
be prosecuted if they don't fill things out properly, they get more paperwork, more burden. If that
were not controlled, you might have a public backlash that for some reason the generics and the
brands are getting together to somehow manipulate things. I'm wondering what outreach you
would have to get the doctors on board on this?
DR. GONEN: Can I relate to this actually? So in my Danish example, the keeper is the
pharmacist, not the doctor. So they made it with a smart software actually easy for the doctor so
the patent indication, you know, is just a software and then whatever he prescribes, he prescribes,
INN, brand. And then when it gets to the pharmacist, it is the pharmacist's duty for patented
indication to dispense the brand product, whereas for nonpatented indication, the normal
substitution rules are there. So it's not really a burden on the doctor who just uses a simple software,
but the keeper is the pharmacist.
SIR JACOB: So I don't understand how that works. The doctor prescribes, and most times
now a doctor just prescribes some medicine or other, five grams’ pills, two in the morning, two in
the evening or whatever it is, and the pharmacist just gets a box and puts the pills in and puts those
instructions on it and he doesn't know what the doctor has prescribed it for. How does the
pharmacist get to be the gatekeeper in this system?
DR. GONEN: It's electronic.
SIR JACOB: The doctor must say the five milligrams is for, whatever it is.
DR. GONEN: No, there is a patient file with what the doctor's write-up and then he just
presses the right button and it's all marked. And by the way, when we talk about price, I actually
forgot to mention it in my presentation, in Belgium there is a reimbursement by indication. So it's
exactly the same thing when price is concerned. So the doctor has its conditional reimbursement
and the doctor needs to, again, on software, quite easily accessible, needs to type indication and
on the basis of which the reimbursement is decided.
So we have it already, it is just not all over the place.
MR. ZIELINSKI: Some prescriptions are still done the antiquated way where they fill out
a little piece of paper and they just put in the therapeutic and amount. Sometimes prescriptions are
written -- are done electronically. I was just prescribed Zithromax not that long ago and it was
done electronically and the doctor just -- he didn't give me a slip, it was just already in. And maybe
that's the best path forward to make it easy for doctors.
SIR JACOB: We have to make it very easy. I'm not sure threatening them with prison if
they get it wrong would help, but I think most doctors would cooperate with this. And you're quite
right, Garrett, that if this is going to be taken seriously you have to make sure there's not opposition
from people that are going to get stuff on the red tops. And getting -- if generics and Big Pharma
get together and say we have a common interest here and it's a public health interest, it's a patient
interest and it's the doctor's interest because of that.
DR. GONEN: It's even more than this because it's the doctor's interest because the data is
important -- regardless of the subject of the conference, the data itself, how many patients for each
indication, the follow-up and the confidentiality concerns can -- again, is a big source today with
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the methods of justification of date and utilization. We have tools for this which we didn't have 10
years ago.
PROFESSOR ROIN: Just add to this, this is actually I think an important issue and I had
this paper and I actually got some hate mail from a couple doctors. The burden you're going to put
on this, this is crazy, we're going to have to report indications, we need to be trained on this
software, this takes so much time, it's going to ruin our lives. And, you know, a little reactionary.
But like -- and one of the things I found actually, you know, people talk about the pharmaceutical
industry's super powerful. If doctors don't want something to happen, they can stop it from
happening. Doctors are super powerful in Congress because like every person, every politician
goes to a doctor, goes to several. They have relationships.
So I actually think, and building off of our existing software and just saying, Look, if we're
doing indication reporting anyway, and it is kind of happening, we're moving in this direction
anyway. We have experiments with it, you know, the CMS is forcing U.S. doctors to start doing
e-prescribing, they've got standards for that. e-prior authorization which requires indication
reporting. A bunch of states have laws that are requiring supplementation. So you'd be working
off of that and not doing something new. But there's something that actually -- and this is the most
serious point of resistance I've found and I worry about, which is that, so imagine you've got a
drug and it's a cheap generic for some indications and expensive for others. Doctors are kind of
going to want to prescribe the cheap one, particularly if they think it's cheaper for the patient. If
there's cost sharing in these insurance deals and it's more expensive so the patient has to pay $90
if it's prescribed for one thing and it's $5 for the other or free for the other, that is a really serious
problem.
So I actually think one of the things that would need to happen in the space, if you've got
expensive drugs for certain indications that are basically free for others, this is actually going to
work, I think, but I'm not sure, but might require deals with the payers, with the insurers to not
have expensive co-pays for the unpatented indications. Which they want to do because that's how
they control utilization. They have to do other things.
But otherwise like it might not work or it would be hard. You need to actually have
penalties. And, you know, some places those work and there actually are penalties now. So, you
know, lying about the indication is fraud if it's Medicare/Medicaid covered and you can get in
trouble for that, but more importantly, if it's privately covered and you lie about the indication,
insurers actually bill the doctor for the cost of the drug if they catch them and then doctors complain
about get audited. So stuff is already going on.
MR. TELLEKSON: I think that might be a very different situation in Europe. In the UK
you pay a fixed price per prescription which I think is, you will be amazed, it's 12 pounds or
something. I think -- but I think that varies from 28 member states. So the simple solutions we are
proposing here may be simplistic simply because we have 28 different systems of prescribing,
dispensing and reimbursing. So...
PROFESSOR ROIN: Yeah.
MR. TELLEKSON: But we get our drugs much cheaper than you do.
PROFESSOR ROIN: Not your generics.
MR. FEHLNER: You're welcome.
MR. TELLEKSON: There's incentives that make pricing reversed.
MR. FEHLNER: So we've agreed that patents aren't the solution here, but patents are a
potential solution and I wonder how the panel thinks about doing what they do in other industries
to facilitate access of competitors and that is something we don't often do and that's licensing.
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Would there be an appetite to license our secondary patents, including the additional medical uses
that we've developed, instead of trying to perpetuate continued exclusivity? And if we offered
those licenses on fair and reasonable terms, would the generic industry take those licenses or would
they resist?
PROFESSOR TOUMI: I think nobody would take it because it has no value because you
cannot capture the value of it. That's the problem today, is you can't capture the value.
MR. FEHLNER: Why not? If they get a royalty on my license, why I'm not -- I'm not
capturing the value I might have had, but as Pfizer has learned, they might not get that value
anyway.
PROFESSOR TOUMI: You have an additional indication of a product that is already
generic. How are you going to –
MR. FEHLNER: So I'm only talking about in this question, licenses to the patents I have,
the portfolio of patents I have on my product for the approved purposes, which I may have gotten
approval for more than one indication. Oftentimes companies do multiple indications, either
multiple kinds of cancer or we talked about overall and I saw the slide up there. There's three really
very different indications for that drug. What if I offered licenses instead of litigation?
SIR JACOB: Licenses for what? For new use or the existing use?
MR. FEHLNER: The existing uses, but to facilitate the generic entry. And I still get some
reward from that. Instead of spending millions of dollars on litigation, I'll get a small amount of
money in royalties. It's not going to be the same amount of money I would get for exclusivity, but
it would be something. And we talk about the generic -- sorry -- the innovator industry having a
black mark. Would this help the innovative industry perhaps better its image by not fighting for
the last -- to the last breath for exclusivity?
DR. GONEN: I would think another motive of, if we are talking licensing, I just think that
a simple license would be problematic because the generic margin is tiny and I don't think it would
be sufficient to make it worthwhile basically, at least in Europe. But I can think of a different
model whereas the originator has his patent to the original drug and then it licensed the patent to a
generic with capability of research for new uses, and then the generic incurs the investment of the
new use and they split the profits on the sales.
And it doesn't monopolize the market for the old use, we just talk about different patient
population so basically the generic made investment, the generic grows the market. Everyone wins
because the generic would have basically derogation for the sake of manufacture from the original
exclusivity and then really the license fees can be beneficial because they would come on top of
the original branded market. So I think this is a deal model which can be thought of at least –
SIR JACOB: But it all presupposes that the thing is patentable, the new use. I mean the
real problem is if that won't work, if it's not patentable because the generic spends the money
getting the benefit of new use and another generic comes in and says, well, thank you very much.
MR. FEHLNER: Right, and it does presuppose there's a patent to license, absolutely.
MR. ZIELINSKI: If you did get the patent -- so to some extent this is already happening
already. Most of our litigation we ultimately sell, at least with respect to the secondary patents.
And with respect to the new use, quite often we have limited development dollars. People -- it's
already been pointed out that development is the most expensive part of the R&D equation by far.
It's like 80 percent of the cost of R&D is in D, is in development, which you know. So we're always
looking for ways and other pharmaceutical companies are looking for ways to defray the cost of
development. In part, one way to do that is risk sharing through that type of arrangement and we
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do that. And so it would be a natural extension to what's already happening to do just that. So I'm
assuming we would go down that path.
MR. FEHLNER: Then I have just another thought and that is listening to Gates yesterday,
is that a potential model for these additional uses that are dormant years after all patents have
expired around a product, potentially a generic public partnership where there's public investment
either from payers or governments or both with a generic company that's capable of doing some
development work? And we're talking about definitely less expensive development, right? We
already know the safety profile of the drug in principle, it's just to get on-label additional
indication.
And then kind of what would the potential rewards be? Differential pricing is an interesting
one but that's a pain in the ass, and we know that if there's differential pricing we're going to get
arbitraged. How about just exclusive sales into that indication? If you're managed it through the
payers and managed it through the governments, whoever is paying for it, you can have that kind
of exclusivity. And Brazil does it already through their tech transfer model. In return for
transferring the technology to manufacture a drug, Brazil guarantees you five years’ exclusivity to
supply that drug to their health care system. So the model could potentially work and it does
provide a mechanism for getting these additional uses without having to worry about differential
pricing but the generic company expands its market and has exclusivity in that expanded market
for some period of time. I would be interested in your thoughts about that possibility. Thank you.
PROFESSOR TOUMI: I think there's an interesting example, the example of Lucentis
and Avastin that everybody knows. Avastin was a drug by Roche and Lucentis, which is an Avastin
B, was licensed to Novartis. So if you look at what is happening now, you see in UK they have
studied to study to compare Lucentis and Avastin. In France, the minister of health has granted
marketing authorization of Avastin for ophthalmology; despite they don't own the product, they
provide the right for the physician to use it in this indication.
So I'm not sure it's the solution. If you look in Norway, the authorities are making the study
to look at the substitution of GNF to show that when you substitute bio similar there are rules. If
there is a risk, at least measure the risk and they anticipate low risk. In France, the government has
suspended a study to assess the value of baclofen for alcohol withdrawal syndrome. I think there
is a risk that tomorrow such indication will be funded by health authorities or by nonprofit
organization and become available for free to everybody. There is not clear action and attitude
from the pharma industry to show that there is a real public health issue and there is a real benefit
for the society, and this is not a trick to prolong the patent life or the exclusivity life of such product,
so there is no action to rest in that direction. I'm sure that it will happen. And I see already clear
trends of when the government of funding, supporting the development of such product to create
evidence that they work and provide the necessary information to allow physician to use them off
label but with robustity. If nothing is done on the industry side, this would be the direction you
would go.
SIR JACOB: Well, now, I'm supposed to do a wind-up unless anybody's got some burning
questions. I think everybody is completely worn out. Two days -- that's a cell phone. When I used
to sit in court you would threaten people with that.
MR. TELLEKSON: Why should you change now?
PROFESSOR ROIN: That's when you had power.
SIR JACOB: Two days of very intense -- and very constructive towards the end, I thought,
of exposing the problem, exposing -- I felt this morning a bit discussions of angels as the lawyers
talked. Swiss form claims which are obviously a branch of metaphysics really. Do you know what
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metaphysics is? It's the physics that nobody do so you just call it, you just debate it all the same,
things you can't measure. But towards the end of this second day, we've had extraordinary measure
of agreement in a way forward. It's not for me to do that, it's not for most of us, but it is possibly
for generics and Big Pharma to get together I think probably with Garrett's suggestion of maybe
getting the doctors on site before they start howling, and then maybe at the end of it all we might
solve the problems which Graham Russell began with, but not only for the bisphosphonates, but
for all other medicines.
Again, this could not have happened without the sponsors, without the ideas of the
sponsors, and it couldn't have been any good without the audience and it couldn't have been any
good without Washington University, and it couldn't have been any good without the people from
Washington University. But it has been quite extraordinary and I think there may be another such
conference but I hope if and when it comes, we're further down the road. And that depends upon
generics and Big Pharma getting together. Of course all competition will lie and say, You're crooks
in the first water but making the case for getting more value for the public money that is being
spent on -- or the private money that's being spent on medical care and the better medical care, and
if we can do that we've done something.
Thank you all very much indeed for coming and thank you all for being such fun too.
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: Again, it was a big honor for the University of Washington
to host such a wonderful conference, very interesting conference on such an important topic.
Before closing, I would like to acknowledge special people, associate director of health law
program Mr. Terry Price.
[Applause.]
PROFESSOR TAKENAKA: As well as, I don't know if she's still here, but I would like
to thank the director of CLE program and the conference, Ms. Kathy Kline, students from the LTA
journal, in particular Ms. Kris Lee who helped preparing the conference. I hope that, you know,
this discussion will continue somewhere in the United States or Europe or Asia. Thank you very
much again.
[Applause.]
[Concluded at 4:56 p.m.]
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